Griffin v. Lehman et al

Filing 78

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Denying Griffin's Rule 59(e) motion (Doc. 77). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/22/13. (bkl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIE J. GRIFFIN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 11-cv-110-JPG-PMF

W. LEHMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff Willie J. Griffin, Jr.’s objection (Doc. 77)
to the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) (Doc. 72) of Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier
recommending that the Court grant the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Mrs.
Auterson (Doc. 57) on the grounds that Griffin failed to exhaust administrative remedies. When
Magistrate Judge Frazier issued the Report on April 4, 2013, he informed the parties that they had
14 days after service of the Report to file written objections to the Report (Doc. 72-1). On May
10, 2013, having waited 36 days after Magistrate Judge Frazier issued the Report and having
received no objection, the Court adopted the Report in its entirety, granted Auterson’s motion for
summary judgment, and dismissed Griffin’s claims against Auterson without prejudice for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.
The same day the Court disposed of Griffin’s claims against Auterson and entered final
judgment in this case, it received and docketed Griffin’s objections. Griffin’s objection is dated
May 6, 2013, so even if he were entitled to the mailbox rule of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
276 (1988), the objection was 14 days late. Griffin states his objection was late because of his
“transit status,” which caused him to receive the Report late.
A party’s failure to file objections ordinarily waives those objections. Video Views, Inc. v.

Studio 21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir. 1986). A party who files objections late may waive
those objections. In deciding whether the objections are waived, the Court should consider
whether they were egregiously late and whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party in any
way. Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Court believes 14 days beyond the deadline for filing objections could be considered
egregiously late. Furthermore, although Griffin mentions “transit status,” he has not explained
the details of any transit he may have participated in; he has not notified the Court of any change
of address since his last move in or around September 2012. Nevertheless, the Court believes the
defendants will suffer no prejudice from considering Griffin’s filing. However, the Court
believes it more appropriate to construe Griffin’s late objection as a motion to alter or amend
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
Under Rule 59(e), a court has the opportunity to consider newly discovered material
evidence or intervening changes in the controlling law or to correct its own manifest errors of law
or fact to avoid unnecessary appellate procedures. Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th
Cir. 1996); see Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006). It “does not
provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a
party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented
to the district court prior to the judgment.” Moro, 91 F.3d at 876. Rule 59(e) relief is only
available if the movant clearly establishes one of the foregoing grounds for relief. Harrington,
433 F.3d at 546 (citing Romo v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1122 n. 3 (7th Cir.
2001)).
In his objection, Griffin merely adopts his response to Mrs. Auterson’s summary judgment
motion (Doc. 61). Even considering that document, the Court finds that the Report’s conclusion
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was correct for the reasons stated therein and that amending the judgment is not appropriate. The
evidence clearly shows Griffin sought to add Auterson to this lawsuit on April 24, 2011, for her
disciplinary hearing decision a few weeks earlier (Doc. 13). The Court allowed his amended
complaint adding Auterson to be docketed on May 18, 2011 (Doc. 17). This was all well before
Griffin’s July 6, 2011, Regional Administrative Remedy Appeal of Auterson’s decision. Thus, he
filed this lawsuit before exhausting available administrative remedies in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a).
For this reason, the Court DENIES Griffin’s Rule 59(e) motion (Doc. 77).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 22, 2013
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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