Dallas v. Social Security Administration
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. The final order of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 11/1/2012. (jmt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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RONALD DALLAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Civil No. 11-116-CJP
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Ronald Dallas is before the Court,
represented by counsel, seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying him Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) Benefits.1
Procedural History
Mr. Dallas applied for benefits in February, 2007, alleging disability beginning on
November 15, 2004. (Tr. 91). The application was denied initially and on reconsideration.
After holding a hearing, ALJ Thomas C. Muldoon denied the application for benefits in a
decision dated January 30, 2009. (Tr. 14-29). Plaintiff’s request for review was denied by the
Appeals Council on January 7, 2011, and the decision of the ALJ became the final agency
decision. (Tr. 1).
Administrative remedies have been exhausted and a timely complaint was filed in this
Court.
Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following issues:
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This case was referred to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 12.
1
1.
The ALJ’s assessment of his RFC was not supported by substantial evidence
because of errors in the evaluation of the medical evidence.
2.
The assessment of plaintiff’s RFC was “conclusory.”
3.
The ALJ’s use of the Grids instead of a vocational expert was erroneous where
plaintiff had significant non-exertional limitations.
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the applicable
statutes. For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3) and 1382c(a)(3)(C).
However, limitations arising from alcoholism or drug use are excluded from consideration of
whether a claimant is disabled. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(C); 20 C.F.R. §404.1535.
“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing significant physical or
mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether a
claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained this process as
follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in substantial gainful
activity. The second step evaluates whether an alleged physical or mental
impairment is severe, medically determinable, and meets a durational
requirement. The third step compares the impairment to a list of impairments that
are considered conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of
the listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the evaluation
continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual functional capacity
(RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If an applicant can engage in
past relevant work, he is not disabled. The fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC,
2
as well as his age, education, and work experience to determine whether the
applicant can engage in other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he
is not disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is presently
unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that is
serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged
to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5)
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy, given his or her
age, education and work experience. Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1992);
see also, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b-f).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision is supported
by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. The scope of review is limited.
“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must determine not
whether Mr. Dallas was, in fact, disabled during the relevant time period, but whether the ALJ’s
findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made. See,
Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306
(7th Cir. 1995)).
This Court uses the Supreme Court’s definition of substantial evidence, i.e, “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into
consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of
credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384,
1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court
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does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921
(7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Muldoon followed the five-step analytical framework described above.
He determined that Mr. Dallas had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged
onset date, and that he was insured for DIB through December 31, 2009. He determined that Mr.
Dallas had severe impairments of L4-5 bulging disc with lumbar radiculopathy, cervical disc
protrusion/spondylosis with right cervical radiculopathy, tremor of the dominant right arm and
headaches.
The ALJ found that plaintiff’s testimony was not entirely credible. Plaintiff has not
challenged that finding.
The ALJ determined that Mr. Dallas had the residual functional capacity to perform a full
range of work at the light exertional level. Relying on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the
ALJ found that plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as a Slitting Machine Coiler
as it is generally performed in the national economy. The ALJ made an alternative finding at
step 5 by applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “Grids”) (20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 2), which directed a conclusion of “not disabled.”
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in formulating this
Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record is directed to the points raised
by plaintiff. As plaintiff has not challenged the finding that he did not have a severe mental
impairment, the Court will not summarize the evidence related to his alleged mental impairment
in any detail.
1.
Agency Forms
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Mr. Dallas was born in June, 1965, and was 39 years old when he allegedly became
disabled. (Tr. 124). Plaintiff had worked as a clerk and as a laborer in factories and warehouses.
He had worked as a machine operator in a slit house. (Tr. 128-136). He graduated from high
school. (Tr. 150).
In a Disability Report, plaintiff said that he was off work following an industrial accident
in January, 2004. He was released to return to work with restrictions in August, 2004, but he
was terminated because of his condition in November, 2004. (Tr. 143). In 2004, he was
working at a Kraft factory, issuing parts from the storeroom. (Tr. 129).
2.
Evidentiary Hearing on October 14, 2008
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the hearing. (Tr. 30).
Mr. Dallas was the only witness. He was 43 years old at the time of the hearing. He was
5'9" tall and weighed 174 pounds. He lived with his wife and 13 year old son. (Tr. 33-34). His
last full-time job was as a parts clerk at Kraft/Capri Sun. That job ended when he was
terminated in 2004. (Tr. 35). Before that, he worked as a machine operator. (Tr. 35-36).
Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work because of pain and stiffness in the right
side of his body, including his ankle, knee, biceps, wrist, neck and head. His condition was
caused by a work accident. (Tr. 37). He had tremors in his right arm. Activities such as
bending, stooping, twisting, turning and walking for prolonged periods increased his pain. (Tr.
38). Looking up caused a sharp pain behind his right eye. (Tr. 39). Standing or walking caused
him pain in his right knee, which went up his right side. His neck hurt when he walked. Sitting
for an hour caused him to get stiffness in his right side. (Tr. 40).
Mr. Dallas said that he had tremors in his right hand which interfered with his grip. He
was taking medication, which helped. (Tr. 43).
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3.
Medical Records
Mr. Dallas’ primary care physician was Dr. Robert Blankenship. Plaintiff saw Dr.
Blankenship on March 10, 2004, for an on-the-job injury. Plaintiff told the doctor that a door hit
him in the face, causing him pain in his neck and numbness in his right hand. He had headaches
and muscle spasms in his neck. The company physician had told him it was a “muscle type
injury.” Dr. Blankenship diagnosed torticollis and referred him to a chiropractor, Dr. King.2
On March 13, 2004, an MRI of the cervical spine showed a minimal C5-6 disc protrusion
which “appears chronic and is unlikely to be of clinical significance.” (Tr. 338).
Dr. David Kennedy, a neurologist, performed an independent medical examination,
evidently in connection with plaintiff’s workers compensation claim. Dr. Kennedy noted a
history of having been hit in the head when a gate recoiled on January 19, 2004. Plaintiff had
been working as a storeroom clerk at a Kraft/Capri Sun plant. Mr. Dallas complained of pain at
the base of the neck with radiating pain into the right arm. An EMG study was normal, and an
MRI of the cervical spine showed mile prolapse at C5-6 with no cord or root impingement. Dr.
Kennedy diagnosed a cervical strain which did not require surgical treatment. He recommended
trigger point injections to reduce pain and allow for more vigorous rehabilitation. He
recommended that , in the interim, plaintiff not lift more than 20 pounds or do more than
occasional overhead lifting. (Tr. 361-363).
In August of 2004, Dr. Blankenship noted that Mr. Dallas was receiving therapy from Dr.
King’s office and was somewhat improved. He had developed a tremor in the right arm which
was being treated with Primidone, and he now had “practically no further tremors.” Dr.
Blankenship noted that he was cleared for light duty. (Tr. 209).
2
“Torticollis is a twisted neck in which the head is tipped to one side, while the chin is turned to
the other.” See, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001757/, accessed on
October 30, 2012.
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In May, 2004, plaintiff began treating with Dr. Syed Ali at Tri-City Neurology. (Tr.
396). An MRI of the head was normal in June, 2004. An EMG/nerve conduction study showed
relatively slower right ulnar velocity and tremor. (Tr. 316-317). In July, 2004, Dr. Ali noted
that his tremor was better. He had no side effects from Primidone (Mysoline). (Tr. 390). In
August, 2004, Dr. Ali noted that he could not do light duty “due to employer reluctance.” The
assessment was tremor, status post head injury and cervical radiculopathy. (Tr. 389). Dr. Ali
recorded that plaintiff was back to work in September, 2004, but he was “suspended from work”
in November, 2004. (Tr. 384-386).
In February, 2005, Dr. Blankenship noted that his tremor had not been well-explained,
but had improved on Primidone. He had “no other complaints.” (Tr. 207). In May, 2005, Dr.
Blankenship noted that Mr. Dallas was being seen by a neurologist and was taking a muscle
relaxer for his back. He denied headaches and said he felt well. (Tr. 206).
In April, 2005, plaintiff complained to Dr. Ali of low back pain. (Tr 381). An MRI of
the lumbar spine showed a central disc bulge at L4-5 with no significant bony or soft tissue
impingement on canal or foramina. (Tr. 308). In May, 2005, Dr. Ali noted that plaintiff was
trying to start a janitorial business. (Tr. 378).
Dr. Ali recommended trigger point injections for neck pain, but there was a question as to
whether this would be authorized by the workers compensation insurance carrier. (Tr. 374). In
March, 2006, on exam, Dr. Ali found decreased range of motion of the neck and collapsing of
the right upper extremity with no tremor noted. He recommended pain management. Plaintiff
was looking into a chauffeur job, but said that driving increased his pain. (Tr. 373). In June,
2006, according to Dr. Ali, plaintiff felt better temporarily after cervical and lumbar injections.
He did not get the job that he had been hoping for. (Tr. 370).
Mr. Dallas was treated by a pain management specialist, Dr. Gunapooti. From April to
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October, 2006, Dr. Gunapooti gave him a series of epidural steroid block injections in the
lumbar and cervical areas. According to Dr. Gunapooti’s notes, Mr. Dallas experienced
significant or good relief of his pain for a period of time. (Tr. 398-409). On October 18, 2006,
his chief complaint was low back and right hip pain. Dr. Gunapooti noted that his neck pain was
“resolved.” On exam, he had full range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spine, but it was
painful. On palpation, the doctor detected slight tenderness over the cervical paraspinal region.
Straight leg raising was negative. Motor strength in the upper and lower extremities was 5/5 in
all muscle groups. Sensory testing was normal. The doctor recommended an x-ray of the left
hip, and advised him to continue his home exercise program and to use Robaxin as needed for
spasms. (Tr. 406).
David T. Volarich, D.O., performed an independent medical examination of plaintiff on
October 25, 2006. (Tr. 411-419). This was evidently done in connection with his workers
compensation claim. On examination, Dr. Volarich found that strength in the right arm was
reduced at 3/5, and there was a resting tremor in the right forearm, wrist and hand. He had
normal sensation in the upper extremities, but reduced sensation to pinprick in stocking
distribution in the lower extremities. Range of motion was reduced in the cervical and lumbar
spine. (Tr. 414-415). Dr. Volarich opined that plaintiff was able to work with the following
limitations:
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limit repetitive bending, twisting, lifting, pushing, pulling, carrying, climbing and
similar tasks to an “as needed” basis;
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no handling weight greater than 20 pounds, and limit “this task” to an occasional
basis;
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no handling weight over his head or way from his body;
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no carrying weight over long distances or uneven terrain;
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avoid remaining in a fixed position (sitting or standing) for more than 60 minutes;
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and
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change positions frequently.
Dr. Volarich also recommended that he pursue a stretching, strengthening and range of motion
exercise program in addition to non-impact aerobic conditioning. (Tr. 418).
Dr. Raymond Leung performed a consultative physical examination in connection with
plaintiff’s application for social security benefits on April 25, 2007. (Tr. 420-424). Mr. Dallas
complained of head and neck pain. He said that he had a bulging disc in his neck. He told Dr.
Leung that he had steroid injections “which have not helped.” He said that pain went down his
right arm and his fourth and fifth fingers were numb. He said he had occasional trouble
grabbing thing with his hands, his right arm and right leg are weak, and he may have tremors on
his right side. He was taking Primidone and Hydrocodone. On physical exam, Dr. Leung found
that his gait was normal and he was able to walk 50 feet unassisted. He could not heel walk, but
was able to toe walk and squat. He had occasional moderate tremors in his right arm and hand.
He had significant difficulty picking up a penny due to tremors. He had a full range of motion of
the lumbar spine. He had decreased range of motion of his neck. His right arm, leg and grip
strength were reduced to 4+/5. He had decreased sensation to light touch in the right fourth and
fifth fingers.
The next medical treatment was on August 6, 2007. Dr. Gunapooti gave plaintiff a
cervical epidural steroid injection. He reported good relief of pain, but he still had throbbing
pain over his right biceps. (Tr. 454). In March, 2008, Dr. Gunapooti did two selective nerve
root blocks at L4-5. Plaintiff reported “at least 50% relief of pain.” (Tr. 452-453).
Dr. Gunapooti ordered a cervical MRI, which was done on March 6, 2008. This study
showed “very mild degenerative disc disease at C5-6 and C6-7 without significant central canal
or neural foraminal stenosis.” (Tr. 446).
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Plaintiff saw Dr. James Lu, a neurosurgeon, on April 4, 2008. Dr. Lu found that he had
point tenderness in the right upper paraspinous region and limitation of range of motion of the
cervical spine. He had “give-way type weakness of the right triceps and deltoid secondary to
pain.” Otherwise, his strength was full at 5/5 throughout. He had a resting tremor that worsened
with intention in the right arm and leg. He had diminished sensation in the fourth and fifth
finger on the right, extending into the palm and forearm. Dr. Lu reviewed the MRI from March
6, 2008, and noted that there was “no clear anatomic correlate” for his symptoms based on the
results of the MRI. He recommended that Mr. Dallas continue conservative management for his
neck pain and follow up with his neurologist. (Tr. 436-438).
On April 10, 2008, Mr. Dallas told Dr. Blankenship that cervical and lumbar steroid
injections had given him “minimal improvement.” On exam, he had mild limitation of motion
and some tenderness of his posterior neck. He said that he had “tremors with increased
inactivity of his right upper extremity.” (Tr. 462).
Mr. Dallas continued to be treated by Dr. Gunapooti. On April 24, 2008, she
recommended cervical facet medial branch block for diagnostic and therapeutic response, and
subsequent radiofrequency ablation (rhizotomy). (Tr. 441).
Dr. Gunapooti’s last note is dated July 17, 2008. The chief complaint was chronic neck
pain - decreasing. The secondary complaint was chronic low back pain and right leg pain in L45 distribution - under control. Mr. Dallas reported “at least 70-80% relief of pain from the
previous facet blocks.” On exam, he had full range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spine,
with pain, and slight tenderness over the lumbar/cervical paraspinal region. He also had
tenderness at the mid-trapezius region. Straight leg raising was negative, and motor strength in
the upper and lower extremity was 4+/5. Dr. Gunapooti noted that Mr. Dallas was “pleased with
the amount of pain relief with cervical facet blocks,” except for the mid-trapezius region. She
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recommended trigger point injections. (Tr. 440).
4.
State Agency Consultant RFC Assessment
State agency consultant Richard Bilinsky, M.D., assessed plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity (RFC) based on a review of medical records on May 14, 2007. (Tr. 425-432). He
opined that plaintiff was able to perform the exertional requirements of light work , i.e.,
occasionally lift 20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, stand/walk for 6 out of 8 hours, sit for 6
out of 8 hours, with unlimited ability to push and/or pull with upper and lower extremities. He
acknowledged that plaintiff complained of pain in his right arm and numbness in his fingers, and
that he had difficulty with fine manipulations with his right hand due to tremor. Dr. Bilinsky
opined that Mr. Dallas had manipulative limitations such that he was restricted to only
occasional fingering and feeling with his right hand. Occasional is defined in the RFC
Assessment form as “occurring from very little up to one-third of an 8-hour workday.” (Tr.
425). He assessed no postural limitations.
A second state agency consultant reviewed the file and agreed with the above assessment
on October 15, 2007. No additional records had been submitted since Dr. Bilinsky’s review.
(Tr. 434-435).
Analysis
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s assessment of his RFC is not supported by substantial
evidence because it relied on Dr. Bilinsky’s assessment, but the ALJ failed to adequately explain
why he omitted a limitation to only occasional fingering and feeling with the right hand. He is
correct, and this point is dispositive.
The ALJ determined that Mr. Dallas was able to perform a full range of light work, with
no non-exertional limitations. Tr. 19. He acknowledged that Dr. Bilinsky and a second state
agency consultant limited plaintiff to only occasional fingering and feeling with the right hand,
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Tr. 23, and said that his own RFC assessment was “generally consistent” with the state agency
consultants’ assessment, Tr. 26, but he neglected to adequately explain why he rejected the
doctors’ opinions that Mr. Dallas was limited to only occasional fingering with the right hand.
Although he did not relate it explicitly to his weighing of Dr. Bilinsky’s opinion, ALJ
Muldoon did discuss plaintiff’s tremors. He observed that the medical records indicated that
plaintiff’s tremors were intermittent, and “mostly under control with medication.” He also
observed that his tremors did not prevent him from daily activities such as driving, and “would
not interfere with work activities except those such as watch assembly or calligrapher, which
require extremely steady hands.” He then went on to say that “this limitation is not a significant
limitation on the full range of light work.” (Tr. 25).
ALJ Muldoon did not explain why he rejected the limitation to occasional fingering and
feeling with the right hand, in view of his apparent acceptance of the proposition that Mr. Dallas
had intermittent tremors in his right arm. The ALJ offered no explanation for why a limitation
on fingering and feeling was not warranted for a claimant with at least intermittent tremors in the
right arm.
State agency consultants such as Dr. Bilinsky “are highly qualified physicians . . . who
are experts in the evaluation of the medical issues in disability claims under the Act.” SSR
96-6p, at 2. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(f) requires an ALJ to consider the state agency physicians’
findings of fact about the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairment as opinions of nonexamining physicians; while the ALJ is not bound by the opinion, he may not ignore it either,
but must consider it and explain the weight given to the opinion in his decision. Id.
In rendering his decision, ALJ must “confront evidence that does not support his
conclusion and explain why it was rejected.” Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th
Cir. 2004). He cannot simply selectively discuss medical opinions, ignoring the parts that
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conflict with his RFC assessment. Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009).
Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000). “If a decision ‘lacks evidentiary support or
is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review,’ a remand is required.” Kastner v.
Astrue, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 4799021, * 3 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Steele v. Barnhart, 290
F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Commissioner’s argument focuses on justifying the ALJ’s rejection of Dr.
Volarich’s opinion, which was more restrictive than Dr. Bilinsky’s. He does not explicitly
address the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Bilinsky’s opinion that Mr. Dallas is limited to only
occasional fingering and feeling with the right hand. In the course of his argument regarding Dr.
Volarich, he does argue that the ALJ “did not ignore the concerns about the tremors causing
limited fine finger dexterity.” Doc. 27, p. 9. In making this argument, however, the
Commissioner misstates the record; the Commissioner asserts that Dr. Leung found on
examination that “Mr. Dallas could pick up a penny from a table with his right hand.” Ibid.
This is incorrect. In fact, Dr. Leung observed that Mr. Dallas “had significant difficulties
picking up a penny from the table with his RT hand due to his tremors.” (Tr. 421).
The ALJ apparently gave scant consideration to whether Mr. Dallas was limited in his
ability to finger because he believed, incorrectly, that a limitation on fingering ability was not
relevant to the ability to do a full range of light work. He concluded his brief discussion of
plaintiff’s tremor and fingering ability with a statement that a limitation on fingering “is not a
significant limitation on the full range of light work, which mostly does not require fine
fingering (SSR 83-10).” (Tr. 25). The Commissioner echoes this statement in his brief, arguing
that “limited fine finger dexterity” does not “significantly impact the number of light jobs
available.” Doc. 27, p. 11. Both the ALJ and Commissioner are reading too much into SSR 8310, and ignoring the actual requirements of plaintiff’s past relevant work.
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SSR 83-10 addresses the use of the Grids in determining disability. It describes the
general requirements of work at each exertional level. SSR 83-10 explains that “Most unskilled
sedentary jobs require good use of the hands and fingers for repetitive hand-finger actions.”
However, unskilled light jobs “require use of arms and hands to grasp and to hold and turn
objects, and generally do not require use of the fingers for fine activities to the extent required in
much sedentary work.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, *5-6. In other words, light work does not
require the ability to finger as much as sedentary work does. It is an overstatement to conclude,
as the ALJ did, that light work “mostly does not require fine fingering.” (Tr. 25).
Clearly, some light work does require ability to finger to some extent. The ALJ
concluded that Mr. Dallas was able to do his past relevant work as a Slitting-Machine Coiler,
DOT [Dictionary of Occupational Titles] code 613.685-010. (Tr. 26). However, according to
the DOT, that job, while generally performed at the light exertional level, requires frequent
fingering. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 613.685-010, 1991 WL 684984. The DOT
defines frequent as occurring from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time, which is consistent with the agency’s
definition. See, SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, *5-6. If, as Dr. Bilinsky found, Mr. Dallas was
limited to only occasional fingering, he would not have been able to do his past relevant work as
it is described in the DOT.
In sum, the ALJ failed to adequately explain why he rejected the opinion of the state
agency consultants that plaintiff was limited to only occasional fingering, and he erred as a
matter of law in concluding that the ability to finger is not relevant to the ability to do light work
in general, or to do plaintiff’s past work. Therefore, this case must be remanded.
The Court wishes to stress that this Memorandum and Order should not be construed as
an indication that the Court believes that Mr. Dallas is disabled or that he should be awarded
benefits. On the contrary, the Court has not formed any opinions in that regard, and leaves those
issues to be determined by the Commissioner after further proceedings.
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Conclusion
The Commissioner’s final decision denying Ronald Dallas’ application for social security
disability benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for rehearing and
reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 1, 2012.
s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
United States Magistrate Judge
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