Harris v. Ryker et al

Filing 80

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 67 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 70 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 77 Motion to Supplement. Defendants Ryker, Goins and Stafford are granted summary judgment. Summary judgment is denied as to defendant Bayler. (amv) Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 1/17/13.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LARRY G. HARRIS, #N-57672,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DERWIN L. RYKER, RUSSELL GOINS,
RANDALL BAYLER, and BRIAN
STAFFORD,
Defendants.

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Case No. 11-134-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
I.

Introduction

This matter is before the Court on dueling summary judgment motions filed by both
Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff first filed his motion for summary judgment (Docs. 67 & 72) on
October 1, 2012 seeking summary judgment on both his retaliation and due process claims against
Defendants. Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 74 & 75). Defendants also
filed a summary judgment motion of their own seeking summary judgment on Plaintiff’s two claims
(Docs. 70 & 71). Plaintiff has filed a Response to that motion (Doc. 73) as well as a supplement
containing further exhibits (Doc. 77).1 Based on the findings below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment (Doc. 67) and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Docs. 70 & 71).

1

Plaintiff recently filed a Motion to Supplement the Record in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 77). The Court GRANTS that motion and will take Plaintiff’s submitted
exhibits under advisement in conjunction with the other materials produced in support of Plaintiff’s
briefing.

II.

Factual Background

This matter stems from events which took place while Plaintiff was housed at
Lawrence Correctional Center. Prior to being transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center, Plaintiff
alleges he was known as a jailhouse lawyer and was transferred to Lawrence in retaliation for having
filed numerous grievances and lawsuits at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Doc. 73 Ex. 2 at ¶ 1).
Plaintiff continued to file grievances while at Lawrence Correctional Center. On September 28, 2012,
Plaintiff was engaged in a fight with another inmate, Richard Fox. Plaintiff alleges that Fox assaulted
Plaintiff at the direction of Defendant Randall Bayler (Doc. 73 Ex. 2 at ¶ 5). Plaintiff offers the
testimony of Maurice Wilson who testified that he heard Defendant Bayler instruct Fox to assault
Plaintiff (Doc. 72 at p. 7). Wilson testified that he heard Bayler tell Fox to get Plaintiff to hit Fox so
that Bayler could “charge that smart ass jailhouse lawyer with assault” (Id.). After the assault
occurred, Plaintiff informed Defendant Bayler of the assault and requested to report the incident to
internal affairs (Doc. 71-8 at pp. 5-6). Bayler determined that the incident was a fight by what the
parties told him: that after a verbal argument, Fox punched Plaintiff and Plaintiff grabbed Fox’s back
(Id. at p. 14). Richard Fox also testified that he punched Plaintiff after a verbal argument and in
response to Plaintiff shoving him (Doc. 72 Ex. 2 at 7, 10-11, 14)
In response to the fight, Plaintiff was charged with Fighting. Plaintiff’s disciplinary
charge of Fighting was heard by the Adjustment Committee at which time Plaintiff was found guilty
and sentenced to one month C grade and thirty days in segregation (Doc. 1-2 at pp.3-4). Defendants
maintain that Plaintiff was found guilty based on the evidence, including the disciplinary report, health
care information, and Plaintiff’s own information (Doc. 71-2 at ¶ 22; 71-9 at pp. 16-18, 22-23).
Plaintiff maintains that he was denied a request to call witnesses.

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III. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment is proper only “if the admissible evidence considered as a whole
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted)(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The party seeking
summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating - based on the pleadings, affidavits,
and/or information obtained via discovery - the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party
“must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)(quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)(2)). A fact is material if it is
outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Ballance v.

City of Springfield, Illinois Police Department, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2005); Hottenroth v.
Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A genuine issue of material fact exists if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovent’s petition is
insufficient; a party will be successful in opposing summary judgment only when it presents definite,
competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931-32 (7th
Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted).
On summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-movant. Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court adopts
reasonable inferences and resolves doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.
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Id.; Nat’l Athletic

Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d at 512.

Even if the facts are not in dispute,

summary judgment is inappropriate when the information before the court reveals that “alternate
inferences can be drawn from the available evidence.” Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir.
2004). See also Anderer v. Jones, 385 F.3d 1043, 1064 (7th Cir. 2004).
IV.
A.

Analysis

Due Process
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights by Defendant Bayler

filing a false disciplinary ticket, Defendants failing to call his witnesses at the disciplinary hearing, and
finding him guilty due to the insistence of Defendant Ryker. Defendants argue that they are entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s due process claims because he never had a right to due process
safeguards on his discipline and, even if his rights to due process arose, Defendants provided him with
all that due process requires.
An inmate is entitled to due process protections before being deprived of a
constitutionally protected interest in liberty. Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).
Prison disciplinary hearings satisfy such protection requirements when an inmate is provided: (1)
notice of the charge against the prisoner twenty four (24) hours priors to the hearing; (2) the right to
appear in person before an impartial body; (3) the right to call witnesses and to present
physical/documentary evidence, but only when doing so will not unduly jeopardize the safety of the
institution or correctional goals; and (4) a written statement of the reasons for the action taken against
the prisoner. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935
(1974); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988). In addition to these requirements, the
decision of the disciplinary board must be supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d
1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). In analyzing this requirement, a court must determine whether the
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decision has some factual basis. Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000).
However, such protections are only required when a prisoner is being deprived of a
constitutional liberty interest. Punishments such as a demotion in grade or commissary restriction do
not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n. 8 (7th Cir.
1997). Further, a term of disciplinary segregation may not rise to the level of a constitutional
deprivation of a liberty interest, depending on the length of disciplinary confinement and the
conditions of that confinement. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir.
2009). Thus, the first question the Court must ask is whether the prisoner has been deprived of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest that would entitle him to due process protections. Lekas,
405 F.3d at 607.
Here, as a result of the disciplinary report and findings at the hearing, the parties agree
that Plaintiff was disciplined with a demotion in grade and a sentence of thirty days in segregation.
Demotion in grade do not amount to constitutional deprivations. Thomas, 130 F.3d at 762 n.8.
Thus, as a sentence of disciplinary segregation was the only action that Plaintiff received which could
amount to a constitutional deprivation, the Court must determine if the segregation conditions
amounted to an “atypical and significant hardship…in relation to the ordinary course of prison life.”

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). “The key
comparison is between disciplinary segregation and nondisciplinary segregation rather than between
disciplinary segregation and the general population. Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1775 (7th
Cir. 1997). In order to determine if a sentence of segregation amounts to an “atypical and significant
hardship” the Seventh Circuit has instructed that the court must look at “the duration of the
segregative confinement and the conditions endured by the prisoner during that period.” Marion, 559
F.3d at 698.
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The first prong of this two-part analysis focuses solely on the duration of disciplinary
segregation. For relatively short periods of disciplinary segregation, inquiry into specific conditions
of confinement is unnecessary. Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005) (56 days);

Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) (59 days); Hoskins v. Lenear, 395
F.3d 372, 374-75 (7th Cir. 2005); Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (thirty (30) days did not
constitute an atypical or significant deprivation); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th
Cir. 1997) (70 days). The Seventh Circuit has noted in these types of cases, where a prisoner is
subject to only a short duration in segregation, the Court has routinely “affirmed dismissal without
requiring a factual inquiry into the conditions of confinement.” Marion, 559 F.3d at 698.
Here, Plaintiff was subjected to only thirty days in disciplinary segregation as a result of
his disciplinary hearing. Such duration is not enough to arise to a level of an atypical and signification
hardship. And even if a factual inquiry into the conditions of segregation were required, which it is
not given the short duration Plaintiff spent in segregation, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence as
to the conditions of his confinement. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s due process claims because his discipline did not rise to a liberty interest which
would have entitled Plaintiff to due process protections. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendants. Thus, the Court also DENIES
Plaintiff’s summary judgment on these same issues.
B.

Retaliation
Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that Defendants Ryker, Baylor, Stafford, and Goins

staged a fight between inmate Richard Fox and Plaintiff so that they could write a false disciplinary
ticket against Plaintiff and punish him in retaliation for his being a jailhouse lawyer. Plaintiff
maintains that he was being punished for writing grievances and filing a lawsuit about being
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transferred to Lawrence Correctional Center in retaliation for being a jailhouse lawyer. Defendants
maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on his claims because there is no evidence that
they had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s filings.
A prisoner has a right under the First Amendment to challenge the conditions
of his confinement by filing grievances, and prison officials are not allowed to retaliate against an
inmate for exercising his First Amendment Rights. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th
Cir. 2000)(citing Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1996)). In order to establish a
First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was
“engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment” and that he “suffered a deprivation that
would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546
(7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that “his speech was at least a motivating factor in
the [defendant’s] action” in order to make his prima facie case. Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371,
378-79 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006)). However,
once Plaintiff has made his prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendant “to rebut with evidence that
the [defendant’s animus] though a sufficient condition was not a necessary condition of the conduct,
i.e. it would have happened anyway.” Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff “must then demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reasons for the decision were
pretextual and that the retaliatory animus was the real reason for the decision.” Zellner, 639 F.3d at
379.

At the summary judgment stage of proceedings, “mere speculation” on the plaintiff’s part is

insufficient; instead, a plaintiff must come forward with some evidence of causation. Rockwell

Automation, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 544 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir.
2008).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Goin, Ryker, and Stafford retaliated against him by
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causing another inmate to attack him and then denying him due process in the subsequent disciplinary
hearing. As to the claim that Defendants conspired to or caused another inmate to attack Plaintiff,
Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that they participated in the attack on Plaintiff by Richard Fox
or that they somehow encouraged or conspired to have Richard Fox attack Plaintiff. The only
evidence Plaintiff offers about prison officials causing another inmate to attack him, relates to
Defendant Bayler, who Plaintiff offers evidence that he instructed Fox to attack Plaintiff. However,
Plaintiff does not offer evidence that Goins, Ryker, or Stafford participated in this action.
Instead, Plaintiff offers deposition testimony from Ryker and Stafford which Plaintiff
says contradicts each other. Plaintiff points out that Ryker testified that Internal Affairs would
investigate the allegations made by Plaintiff about the assault on him. However, Plaintiff points out
that Stafford testified that the Warden, Defendant Ryker at the time, would decide who receives the
incident reports. However, this evidence does not show that Ryker or Stafford participated or
encouraged the assault on Plaintiff. At most, it shows a disagreement about the procedures of
Internal Affairs investigations, not retaliation on the part of Ryker or Stafford.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence that either Ryker, Stafford, or Goins
knew about Plaintiff’s protected first amendment activities. Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked
because he was a jailhouse lawyer and had written many grievances since coming to Lawrence
Correctional Center. However, neither Ryker nor Stafford had knowledge of Plaintiff’s lawsuits or
that Plaintiff was a jailhouse lawyer, and Plaintiff fails to offer any evidence to show that they or
Defendant Goins had knowledge of his lawsuits (Doc. 71-10 at p.11; 71-3 at pp. 35-372). Thus, the
Court finds no issues of material facts as to Defendants Goins, Ryker, or Stafford, nor is there any
evidence that they retaliated against Plaintiff. Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
that claim.
2

Ryker testified that he did not know Plaintiff while he was at his institution (Doc. 71-3 at p.10).

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The Court also finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claim that Defendants Goins, Ryker, and Stafford retaliated against him by denying him certain due
process rights at the disciplinary hearing. As the Court previously stated, there is no evidence that the
Defendants knew about Plaintiff’s history of filing grievances or his being a jailhouse lawyer. While
Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Ryker encouraged the Adjustment Committee to find Plaintiff
guilty of the fighting charge, there is no evidence that Ryker had any involvement with the Adjustment
Committee. Ryker testified that while, as Warden, he or a designee reviews the committee’s finding,
the Adjustment Committee is separate and has a hearing and makes decisions separately from
Defendant Ryker (Doc. 71-3 at pp. 47-48, 50). Further, Defendant Ryker did not sign off on the
committee’s findings, but his designee reviewed the findings and signed off on the discipline (Id. at p.
51).
Plaintiff also makes much of that fact that Defendant Ryker knew when he transferred
to the institution that Plaintiff was a problem prisoner because of the unusual way and date that
Plaintiff was transferred on. However, while Defendant Ryker admitted that a transfer on a Tuesday
would be unusual, he did not recall Plaintiff being transferred or anything about Plaintiff prior to this
lawsuit (Id. at p.10). Even if Defendant Ryker knew of Plaintiff’s transfer and believed it to be
unusual, nothing about the transfer or any of the other evidence Plaintiff points too shows that
Defendant Ryker retaliated against Plaintiff by instructing the Adjustment Committee to find Plaintiff
guilty of a fighting charge. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on the retaliation
claim against Defendants Goins, Ryker, and Stafford. Thus, the Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s
summary judgment on these same issues.
However, as to Defendant Bayler, Plaintiff has offered evidence to create an issue of
material fact that he set up the fight between Richard Fox and Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff’s legal
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proceedings. Plaintiff has offered the exhibit of an affidavit of Maurice Wilson, an inmate at
Lawrence Correctional Center. In his affidavit, Wilson indicates that he overheard Bayler instructing
Fox to attack Plaintiff so that they could “charge that smart ass jailhouse lawyer with assault.” (Doc.
72 at p. 7). This contradicts the testimony of both Richard Fox and Defendant Bayler. Fox testified
that Plaintiff started the fight after Fox asked him if he was going to take a shower that day (Doc. 72
Ex. 2 at p. 7). In response to Fox’s question, Plaintiff shoved Fox which caused Fox to punch
Plaintiff in the face (Id. at pp. 7, 10-11, 14). Fox testified that was the extent of the fight and that he
did not attacked Plaintiff at the direction of any officer (Id. at pp. 17-18). Bayler also denied that he
spoke with Fox prior to the incident or instructed him to assault Plaintiff (Doc. 71-8 at pp. 28-29, 44).
Thus, there is an issue of fact as to whether Defendant Bayler instructed Richard Fox to attack Plaintiff
in retaliation for him filing grievances which prevents the Court from entering summary judgment on
this claim. The Court, accordingly, DENIES Defendant Bayler summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim.
The Court notes that Plaintiff has also sought summary judgment on the retaliation
claim against Defendant Bayler. However, because the Court finds issues of material fact as to
Defendant Bayler’s involvement in the attack on Plaintiff, the Court, likewise, is prevented from
awarding summary judgment to Plaintiff. Defendant Bayler has also pointed to evidence creating an
issue of material fact on the retaliation claim, namely his denial that he had any agreement with Richard
Fox or provided any type of benefits to Fox for attacking Plaintiff. Thus, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff summary judgment as to the retaliation claim against Defendant Bayler.
V.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court GRANTS summary judgment on the due
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process claim against all Defendants and GRANTS summary judgment as to Defendants Ryker,
Goins, and Stafford on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. However, Defendant Bayler is DENIED
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim because there are still issues of material fact. The
Court further DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Thus, the only claim remaining for trial is Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant
Bayler.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 17, 2013.
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge

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