Hollis v. Rayford et al

Filing 12

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice. Plaintiff is advised that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiffs obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350 remains due and payable. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 12/14/2011. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TIMOTHY HOLLIS, #S11294,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
DR. CLEVELAND RAYFORD and DEBBIE )
MAGNUSON,
)
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Defendants.
)

CIVIL NO. 11-227-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Timothy Hollis, an inmate in Vandalia Correctional Center, brings this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving a three
year sentence for drug possession. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon
as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

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granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631
F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they
fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.
2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of
a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority
under § 1915A and shall dismiss this action.
The Complaint
Plaintiff suffers from degenerative hip disease. Prior to incarceration, Plaintiff’s doctor told
him that he needed a hip replacement on the right side, but that his left hip might not need to be
replaced if he had proper treatment. According to the website of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), Plaintiff was placed in IDOC custody on November 24, 2010.1
In January 2011, Plaintiff suffered a fall while in Vandalia Correctional Center. He sought
medical treatment, and was given a cane and medication. He made repeated visits to the Health Care

1

Inmate Search feature on http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/search/default.asp (last visited
December 12, 2011).

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Unit seeking additional treatment, but was told by Defendant Magnuson that the prison’s policy was
to “maintain” his hips by giving him pain medication. His requests for surgery were refused,
allegedly based on cost, and on the prison policy “not to fix anyone” (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff claims
that his condition cannot be “maintained” with medication alone, and that his hips get worse every
day, because he has to walk up steps every time he goes to the commissary store or to other locations
in the basement. He seeks damages for the Defendants’ refusal to provide him with hip surgery.
Discussion
The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); see Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). This encompasses a broader range of conduct than intentional
denial of necessary medical treatment, but it stops short of “negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating
a medical condition.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. See also Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734
(7th Cir. 2001).
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that the responsible
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago
Cnty., 165 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference involves a two-part
test. The plaintiff must show that (1) the medical condition was objectively serious,
and (2) the state officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs,
which is a subjective standard.
Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). However, the Supreme Court stressed that this
test is not an insurmountable hurdle for inmates raising Eighth Amendment claims:
[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed
to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the
official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm . . . . Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk
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is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference
from circumstantial evidence . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official
knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
The Seventh Circuit considers the following to be indications of a serious medical need:
(1) where failure to treat the condition could “result in further significant injury or the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain;” (2) “[e]xistence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would
find important and worthy of comment or treatment;” (3) “presence of a medical condition that
significantly affects an individual’s daily activities;” or (4) “the existence of chronic and substantial
pain.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). In addition, a condition that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention is also
considered a “serious” medical need. Id.
Plaintiff’s allegation that he suffers from a degenerative hip condition that causes pain,
makes it difficult for him to use stairs, and may require joint replacement, likely meets the objective
showing of a serious medical condition. The remaining question is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged deliberate indifference on the part of the Defendants.
The Seventh Circuit’s decisions discussing the standard for deliberate indifference in the
denial or delay of medical care require evidence of a defendant’s actual knowledge of, or reckless
disregard for, a substantial risk of harm. The Circuit also recognizes that a defendant’s inadvertent
error, negligence or even ordinary malpractice is insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment constitutional violation. See Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008);
Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) (officers were on notice of seriousness of
condition of prisoner with ruptured appendix because he “did his part to let the officers know he was

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suffering”); Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003) (Courts will not take sides in
disagreements with medical personnel’s judgments or techniques). However, a plaintiff inmate need
not prove that a defendant intended the harm that ultimately transpired or believed the harm would
occur. Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d
630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996)).
According to the complaint, Plaintiff received treatment promptly upon requesting care after
he fellShe was given a cane, and put on medication. He does not complain that the medication was
ineffective in relieving his pain. The essence of his complaint is that he is dissatisfied with the
Defendants’ “maintenance” treatment, and claims that his deteriorating condition requires surgery
without delay. However, mere disagreement with a physician’s chosen course of an inmate’s
medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See
Ciarpaglini, 352 F.3d at 331; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (courts will
not takes sides in disagreements about medical personnel’s judgments or techniques); Snipes v.
DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Amendment does not give prisoners
entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable
measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir.
1997). Further, a difference of opinion between medical professionals concerning the treatment of
an inmate will not support a claim for deliberate indifference. Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392,
396 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Garvin, 236 F.3d at 898.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with the treatment given to him by the Defendants does not rise to
the level of a violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, this case shall be dismissed pursuant
to § 1915A.

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Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, and thus is DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants RAYFORD and MAGNUSON
are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff is advised that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted “strikes” under the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action
was filed, thus the filing fee of $350 remains due and payable. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 14, 2011
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G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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