Sunny Delight Beverages Co. v. Suchenski et al

Filing 20

ORDER denying 18 Motion to Quash Subpoena. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson on 7/21/2011. (hbs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SUNNY DELIGHT BEVERAGES CO.,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD SUCHENSKI and TRACEY
SHANNON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:11-cv-285-MJR-DGW

ORDER
Now pending before the Court is a Motion to Quash a Subpoena filed by Geraldine A.
Davidson, a non-party proceeding pro se (Doc. 18). Ms. Davidson, the realtor in the real estate
transaction that is the basis of the lawsuit, requests that the Court quash the subpoena issued by
Defendants seeking production of documents in her possession regarding the real estate at issue in
the case. Ms. Davidson claims that: 1) the named parties were not the buying and selling property
owners, 2) all the documents in the file are privileged, and 3) the information requested is in the
possession of the Plaintiff.
Defendants respond in opposition to the Motion to Quash the Subpoena, arguing that Ms.
Davidson has not established a legal basis for quashing the subpoena (Doc. 19).
DISCUSSION
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A), a court is required to quash or modify a subpoena that 1)
does not allow a reasonable time to comply; 2) requires an individual to travel more than 100 miles
to comply; 3) seeks disclosure of privileged matters; or 4) imposes an undue burden. Under Rule
45(c)(3)(B), a court may quash or modify a subpoena that seeks disclosure of trade secrets, seeks
disclosure of an unretained expert’s opinion in certain circumstances, or imposes a substantial
expense for travel. Regarding the scope of discovery, a court may “order discovery of any matter

relevant to the subject matter involved in the action” when good cause is shown. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(1).

Relevant information does not have to be admissible at trial, but it must be

“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.
The Court finds that the discovery requested in the subpoena is relevant and therefore
discoverable.

Evaluating Ms. Davidson’s assertions in the motion to quash under Rule

45(c)(3)(A), the Court finds that none of the circumstances described require the Court to quash
the subpoena. Ms. Davidson does not contend that the subpoena does not allow enough time to
comply, nor does she contend that she would be required to travel more than 100 miles. Ms.
Davidson tentatively asserts that the documents in the real estate file are privileged, but the Court
has found no realtor-client privilege under either Illinois or federal law. Finally, the Court does
not believe that the subpoena is overly burdensome; it requires only that Ms. Davidson produce the
documents related to the real estate transaction that is the basis of the lawsuit. Likewise, the
Court does not find, nor does Ms. Davidson argue, that the subpoena seeks trade secrets,
unretained expert opinions, or imposes a substantial burden on her to travel. Thus, the Court finds
none of the provisions of Rule 45(c)(3)(B) apply. Ms. Davidson’s two other claims—that the
parties in the lawsuit were not the parties to the transaction, and that the plaintiff already possesses
the information—are not bases for quashing the subpoena under either the mandatory or
discretionary portions of the rule. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Subpoena is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 21, 2011

DONALD G. WILKERSON
United States Magistrate Judge
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