Crowe v. Strong Built, Inc. et al

Filing 81

ORDER denying 51 Strong Built Incorporated's motion to dismiss. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 8/28/2012. (mab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

GENE CROWE,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STRONG BUILT, INC.,
)
STRONG BUILT INTERNATIONAL, LLC, )
STRONG BUILT OUTDOORS, LLC,
)
BPS CATALOG, LLC, and
)
BASS PRO, INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL NO. 11-354-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Strong Built
Incorporated (“Incorporated”) (Doc. 51). Plaintiff, Gene Crowe, filed a response to Defendants’
motion (Doc. 51). The Court has considered the papers and for the following reasons, the motion
to dismiss (Doc. 51) is DENIED.
This is a lawsuit for personal injuries that Plaintiff incurred on October 3, 2007, when
Plaintiff was in tree on a ladder stand (Doc. 46). Plaintiff contends that a ratchet strap manufactured
and provided by Incorporated failed, which caused Plaintiff to fall to the ground and sustain injuries
(Doc. 46). The third amended complaint, which is the operative complaint here, alleges that when
Incorporated ceased operations, Defendant Strong Built International (“International”) became the
successor in interest to Incorporated (Doc. 46). The president of Incorporated became the sole
officer/member of International (Doc. 46). Accordingly, counts one and two of Plaintiff’s operative
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complaint are alleged against International as successor in interest to Incorporated (Doc. 46). These
two counts both allege Incorporated manufactured and sold an unreasonably dangerous and
defective product (Doc. 46).
Defendant Incorporated contends that because counts one and two are derivative claims
against International as successor in interest to Incorporated, the claims should be dismissed with
prejudice (Doc. 51). Essentially, Incorporated’s motion to dismiss is premised on the proposition
that a predecessor in interest must be dismissed from a complaint that alleges liability under a
successor in interest theory (See Generally Doc. 51). However, Incorporated fails to cite any legal
authority that supports their position.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed federal pleading requirements in recent
years, see generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), leading the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals to issue additional guidance to the district courts.
Our system operates on a notice pleading standard; Twombly and its progeny do not
change this fact. Cf. Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th. Cir. 2009) (noting
courts’ over reliance on Twombly). A defendant is owed “fair notice of what the …
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47,
78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). Under Conley, just as under Twombly, it is not
enough to give a threadbare recitation of the elements of a claim without factual
support.
Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint must contain
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face” – the now familiar phrase
originally used in Twombly – and “also must state sufficient facts to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bissessur, 581 F.3d at 602-03. A claim is plausible on its face “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “This said, in examining
the facts and matching them up with the stated legal claims, we give ‘the plaintiff the benefit of
imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.’” Bissessur, 581 F.3d at
602-03. Circuit Judge Posner has explained: “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will … be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.’” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009),
quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
Here, Plaintiff has in fact stated a claim for relief, plausible on its face. In counts one and
two of the operative complaint, Plaintiff states that Incorporated manufactured and sold an
unreasonably dangerous and defective product and thus asserts two counts against International as
a successor in interest to Incorporated. Plaintiff has clearly pleaded sufficient facts under the notice
pleading standard to apprise Incorporated of its claims for relief and the grounds upon which each
claims rest. Again, it bears noting that Incorporated fails to cite any legal authority that supports
their position that a predecessor in interest must be dismissed from a complaint alleging a successor
in interest liability. Accordingly, Incorporated’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 51) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 28, 2012
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G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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