Schultheis et al v. Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation
Filing
71
ORDER denying 29 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 5/24/12. (klh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SHERRI SCHULTHEIS, DIANE REED,
and KATHERINE WHEELER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation and MARION
HOSPITAL CORPORATION, d/b/a HEARTLAND
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendants.
No. 11-0435-DRH
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
I. Introduction
Pending before the Court is defendant Marion Hospital Corporation d/b/a
Heartland Regional Medical Center’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 29).
Defendant argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Count V, breach
of contract claim, of plaintiffs’ first amended complaint as that claim is preempted
by the comprehensive enforcement scheme embodied by the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 201 et seq. Plaintiffs oppose the motion (Doc. 32). Based on the
following, the Court denies the motion.
On June 22, 2011, plaintiffs Sherri Schultheis, Diane Reid and Katherine
Wheeler filed a five-count first amended complaint against defendants Community
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Health Systems, Inc. (“CHSI”) and Marion Hospital Corporation, d/b/a Heartland
Regional Medical Center (“Marion Hospital”) (Doc. 5). Plaintiffs’ first amended
complaint is brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”) and state common law claims for violation of the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. (“IMWL”), the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (“IWPCA”), the Illinois
Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174/1 et seq. (“IWA”) and breach of contract. Plaintiffs
were employed as registered nurses in the labor and delivery department at Marion
Hospital in Marion, Illinois.
II. Analysis
A party is permitted under Rule 12(c) to move for judgment on the pleadings
after the parties have the complaint and the answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); Brunt v.
Serv. Employeees Int’l Union, 284 F.3d 715. 718 (7h Cir. 2002); Northern Indiana
Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th
Cir.1998). A motion for judgment on the pleadings “under Rule 12(c) is reviewed
under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under 12(b); the motion is not
granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts
sufficient to support his claim for relief, and the facts in the complaint are viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Flenner v. Sheahan, 107 F.3d
459, 461 (7th Cir. 1997); Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007). The
court, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, must “accept as true all
well-pleaded allegations.” Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 364 (7th Cir.
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2000); Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2004). A court
may rule on a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) based on a review of the
pleadings alone, which include the complaint, the answer, and any written
instruments attached as exhibits. Id. at 452–453.
To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “[A]
plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at
1949, 1965 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. The
court does not take “legal conclusion[s] couched as factual allegation[s]” as true. Id.
at 1950.
Here, defendant argues that plaintiff Wheeler’s common law breach of contract
claim is preempted by the FLSA. Defendant maintains that state common law
claims, like Wheeler’s breach of contract claim, obstruct the enforcement and
remedial schemes embodied in the FLSA as the claims are squarely based on rights
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established by the FLSA. In support of its motion, defendant cites to numerous
district courts in the Seventh Circuit and district courts in other circuits have held
that the FLSA precludes state common law claims arising from or based upon rights
protected by the FLSA. Plaintiffs counter that the Seventh Circuit has not spoken on
the issue of whether the FLSA preempts state statutory or common law claims and
neither has Congress. Further, plaintiffs maintain that the FLSA’s saving clause does
not prohibit alternate claims with overlapping remedies. The Court agrees with
plaintiffs.
Congress has the authority to expressly preempt state law by defining the
scope of preemption, or to impliedly preempt state law where congressional intent
to supersede state law may be inferred. See U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Fid. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. dela Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982). Congressional intent
controls the preemption analysis, however the court presumes Congress does not
wish to interfere with the state’s power to provide for the welfare of its people “unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 12 S.Ct.
1187, 1194-95 (2009). The Seventh Circuit has explained the doctrine of federal
preemption as follows:
The central issue of this case is federal preemption, which occurs when
a state law is invalidated because it conflicts with a federal law. The
constitutional basis for federal preemption is found in the Supremacy
Clause (Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution), which states,
“[T]he Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land [.]” Preemption comes in three forms. First, and the easiest to
apply, is express preemption which occurs when Congress clearly
declares its intention to preempt state law. Second, we have implied
preemption which occurs when the “structure and purpose” of federal
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law shows Congress's intent to preempt state law. Finally, we come to
conflict preemption which occurs when there is an actual conflict
between state and federal law such that it is impossible for a person to
obey both. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct.
2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir.2010).
The FLSA authorizes workers to file private actions to recover unpaid wages,
damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In the area of labor law,
“[t]here is a strong presumption that Congress, in enacting the FLSA for the benefits
of the workers, did not intend to override the State’s traditional role protecting the
health and safety of their citizens.” Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 19295 (4th Cir. 2007). The FLSA contains a savings clause, which provides: “No
provision of this chapter ... shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law
... establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage ... or a maximum
work week lower than the maximum work-week [sic] established under this chapter
....” 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). Accordingly, the savings clause expressly allows states to
legislate greater protections for the benefit of workers. See Anderson, 508 F.3d at
193.
As stated previously, the Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue of
whether the remedies under the FLSA are exclusive. The Court is aware that there
is a split in the circuit courts on this issue and that other district courts in the
Seventh Circuit have ruled that state claims are preempted by the FLSA where those
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claims merely duplicate the FLSA claims.
1
The Court is also aware that other
district courts have held that the FLSA does not generally preempt state law claims
in a given case. Moreover, the FLSA’s savings clause, which allows states to enact
stricter wage, hour, and child labor provisions, indicates that the FLSA does not
provide an exclusive remedy for its violations. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a). As other
courts have held, this Court likewise believes the savings clause indicates that
Congress did not foreclose states from providing alternative remedies.
Further, and more importantly, Wheeler signed a separate written agreement
that provided her with additional rights regarding the additional hours. According
to Wheeler, “[u]nder the terms of the Agreement, any additional hours over and above
what the agreement provided for ‘may be scheduled at any time by the employee in
consultation with the Department Director or designee.’” (Doc. 5, ¶ 113). Wheeler,
in addition to alleging that defendant failed to compensate her for over time work,
also contends that defendant breached the agreement by “changing the terms and
conditions of the Agreement when it required Wheeler to work mandatory on-call
hours without her consent.” (Doc. 5, ¶ 116). Thus, the Court finds that Wheeler’s
breach of contract claim does not interfere, frustrate, conflict with or stand as an
obstacle to the goals of FLSA. Therefore, obstacle preemption is not applicable
under these circumstances.
1
See Anderson, 508 F.3d at 193 (holding that the FLSA preempts claims that “depend on
establishing that [the employer] violated the FLSA.”); See also Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1151-53 (9th Cir. 2000)(holding that FLSA does not preempt common law
fraud claims and that the FLSA does not provide exclusive remedies for violating its provisions.).
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Reviewing the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Court finds
that Wheeler has alleged facts sufficient to support her breach of contract claim.
While additional discovery may reveal that the breach of contract claim is duplicative
of the statutory claims, the Court cannot conclude at this stage of the proceedings
that the breach of contract claim is preempted by the FLSA.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Doc. 29).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 24th day of May, 2012.
Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2012.05.24
14:06:39 -05'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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