Moultrie v. Penn Aluminum International, LLC
Filing
200
ORDER denying 184 objection filed by Levia Moultrie. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 12/6/2012. (msdi)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LEVIA MOULTRIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
PENN ALUMINUM INTERNATIONAL,
LLC,
Defendant.
No. 11-cv-500-DRH
ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Before the Court is plaintiff Levia Moultrie’s objections to report and
recommendations or more properly titled as objections to the magistrate judge’s
order (Doc. 184) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Plaintiff raises several objections with regard to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s denial
(Doc. 178) of plaintiff’s motion to strike affirmative defenses (Doc. 148) and plaintiff’s
motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 91). For the reasons that
follow, plaintiff’s objections are denied.
I. Background
On October 26, 2011, the Court entered its scheduling and discovery order
(Doc. 30), setting a January 18, 2012, deadline to amend the pleadings. Plaintiff filed
his first amended complaint against Penn Aluminum International LLC (“Penn
Aluminum”), The Marmon Group, LLC (the “Marmon Group”), and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 702 (the “Union”) (Doc. 31) that
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same day. On November 9, 2011, Penn Aluminum filed its answer to the first
amended complaint (Doc. 37). On January 11, 2012, Penn Aluminum filed a motion
for leave to file a supplement to its affirmative defenses (Doc. 60), seeking leave to
add three affirmative defenses it discovered should have been raised.
Penn
Aluminum noted that the affirmative defenses it sought to add were identical to the
issues raised by the Marmon Group in its motion to dismiss. Plaintiff did not file a
response to Penn Aluminum’s motion for leave to file a supplement to its affirmative
defenses (Doc. 60).
On February 2, 2012, Judge Frazier entered an order granting defendant’s
motion for leave to supplement affirmative defenses (Doc. 79). The text entry order
stated as follows:
Considering the large quantity of filing in this case, the Court prefers
that Penn Aluminum files one responsive pleading after its motion to
dismiss (Doc. No. 35) is resolved. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4). New
material should be underlined. SDIL-LR 15.1[.] Piecemeal pleadings are
not encouraged. Upon a showing of good cause, the Scheduling and
Discovery Order (Doc. No. 30) is MODIFIED as follows. The deadline
for joining other parties and/or amending the pleadings is EXTENDED
to 3/15/2012.
(Doc. 79). On February 13, 2012, the Court extended all deadlines set forth in the
scheduling and discovery order (Doc. 30) for three months (Doc. 85).
On April 30, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file second amended
complaint (Doc. 91), alleging that “[s]ince the filing of the [f]irst [a]mended
[c]omplaint, information has been disclosed in discovery and in other disclosures
that identify additional necessary parties.”
Specifically, plaintiff sought to add
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Marmon Industrial Companies, Inc., Penn Aluminum’s wholly-owned owner, and
Marmon Holdings, Inc., the Marmon Group’s full owner. On May 15, 2012, Penn
Aluminum and the Marmon Group filed responses in opposition to plaintiff’s motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint (Docs. 97 & 98) on the basis of undue
delay, prejudice, and futility.
On May 31, 2012, Judge Frazier entered an order
(Doc. 104) deferring ruling on plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint until defendant the Marmon Group’s motion dismiss (Doc. 53) was ruled
upon.
On July 30, 2012, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal with regard to
the Marmon Group (Doc. 125). On July 31, 2012, the Court entered an order (Doc.
126) granting Penn Aluminum’s motion to dismiss count IV (Doc. 35). On August
1, 2012, the Court acknowledged the dismissal of the Marmon Group (Doc. 128) and
denied as moot the Marmon Group’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 53). On August 8,
2012, Penn Aluminum filed its amended affirmative defenses to plaintiff’s first
amended complaint (Doc. 140). On August 22, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion to strike
amended affirmative defenses (Doc. 148), arguing that the affirmative defenses were
waived pursuant to Rule 8(c) as they were not included in the answer. On September
5, 2012, Penn Aluminum filed its response in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to strike
its amended affirmative defenses (Doc. 155).
On September 24, 2012, Penn Aluminum filed its motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 168). That motion has now been fully briefed and is ripe for review.
On October 3, 2012, Judge Wilkerson denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to file second
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amended complaint (Doc. 91), stating that “[a]dding additional parties so close to the
trial date would be futile.” (Doc. 178). Judge Wilkerson also denied plaintiff’s motion
to strike defendant’s amended affirmative defenses (Doc. 148) in the same text order.
(Doc. 178).
On October 17, 2012, plaintiff filed his
objection to report and
recommendations (Doc. 184). As it pertains to the denial of the plaintiff’s motion to
strike affirmative defenses (Doc. 148), plaintiff “objects to the Magistrate’s failure to
recognize that waiver has occurred as a matter of law and to rule on the exceptions
to waiver, which has not taken place as of yet in these proceedings and has never
been raised by Defendants”; “Plaintiff objects to the Magistrates conclusion that the
Supplemental Affirmative Defenses, filed on August 8, 2012, relate back to the date
of the original filling on August 18, 2011.”; “Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s
decision to any extent to which the Court considered Defendant’s argument that there
was a hearing after the filing of the Motion for Leave to Supplement.”; and “Plaintiff
objects to any consideration of failure to object to the Motion for Leave set forth at D.
60.” With regard to the denial of plaintiff’s motion for leave to file second amended
complaint, plaintiff asserts that “[t]he cut-off date for filing amended complaints and
joined of parties was June 15, 2012[,]” and “[d]enial of the motion was contrary to the
law of the case.” On November 8, 2012, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal
with regard to the Union (Doc. 189). The next day the Court entered an order
acknowledging the dismissal (Doc. 190).
II. Analysis
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The Court may modify or reverse a decision of a magistrate judge on a
nondispositive issue upon a showing that the magistrate judge’s decision is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(a); SDIL-LR 73.1(a). A finding
is clearly erroneous when “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)); see also Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., 126
F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The clear error standard means that the district court
can overturn the magistrate judge’s ruling only if the district court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”). “When there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 states that leave to amend “shall be freely
given when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15. “[District] courts have broad
discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or
whether the amendment would be futitle.” Johnson v. Cypress Hill, 641 F.3d 867,
871-72 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th
Cir. 2009)). “‘[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion to file an amended pleading
is a matter purely within the sound discretion of the district court.’” Soltys v.
Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brunt v. Serv. Emps. Int’l
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Union, 284 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Here, plaintiff has failed to show how the magistrate judge’s decision was
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 71(a). First, with regard to
plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion to strike
affirmative defenses, the Court finds that plaintiff’s objection to this issue is untimely.
Penn Aluminum filed its motion for leave to file a supplement to its affirmative
defenses (Doc. 60) on January 11, 2012. Magistrate Judge Frazier granted that
motion (Doc. 79) on February 2, 2012, but instructed Penn Aluminum to hold off
filing its affirmative defenses until its motion to dismiss was resolved. The motion
to dismiss was resolved on July 31, 2012 (Doc. 126), and Penn Aluminum filed its
affirmative defenses on August 8, 2012 (Doc. 140). Should plaintiff have wished to
object to Penn Aluminum adding additional affirmative defenses, plaintiff should have
filed objections to Judge Frazier’s order granting Penn Aluminum’s motion within
fourteen days after being served with a copy of the order on February 2, 2012 (Doc.
79).
Furthermore, the Court finds that Penn Aluminum did not waive these
affirmative defenses and plaintiff is not prejudiced by them being raised now as
plaintiff has been on notice of them.
Next, the Court finds that Judge Wilkerson’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint was also not clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. Judge Wilkerson found that “[a]dding additional parties so close to
the trial date would be futile.” The Court agrees. Plaintiff has failed to explain how
either party it sought to add was a necessary party. Allowing plaintiff to add those
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parties now after discovery has closed and Penn Aluminum’s motion for summary
judgment has been fully briefed would prejudice Penn Aluminum and further delay
this case.
The Court also notes that the parties dispute the amended pleadings deadlines,
defendant contending it was April 18, 2012, three months after the original deadline,
and plaintiff contending that it was June 15, 2012, three months after the date set
forth in the order at document 79. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint (Doc. 91) was not filed until April 30, 2012. Accordingly, there
are two permissible views of the evidence and the Court finds that the deadline was
April 18, 2012.
Thus, plaintiff’s motion was untimely.
Therefore, plaintiff’s
objections are denied.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 184) are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 6th day of December, 2012.
David R.
Herndon
2012.12.06
08:30:32 -06'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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