Thomas v. State of Illinois et al

Filing 16

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. The Clerk is DIRECTED to re-file pages 17 and 18 of the complaint (Doc. 1) in the proper order: the page originally filed as 18 should instead be filed as page 17, and page 17 should beco me page 18. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 2-B, 2-C, 3-B, 4, and 5 fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus are DISMISSED. The dismissal of COUNTS 2-B, 2-C, 3-B, and 4 shall be without prejudice. The dismissal of COUNT 5 i s with prejudice. Defendants STATE of ILLINOIS, PUISIS, RANDLE, RYKER, MARTIN, and WEXFORD are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. Defendant DOWDEN is DISMISSED from this action without prejudice. COUNTS 1, 2-A, and 3-A shall receive furthe r review. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants BAYLER, STANFORD, STUCK, GOINS, VAUGHN, FISHER, MORRIS, and BROOKS (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 8/9/2012. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LAMONT THOMAS, No. N-03588,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE of ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 11-cv-571-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Lamont Thomas (“Plaintiff”), an inmate in Lawrence Correctional Center
(“Lawrence”), brings this suit for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving a fifteen year sentence for burglary, and four
years for theft. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
Page 1 of 26

(2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see
Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim.
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations
of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint and supporting exhibits, the Court finds it
appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this action are subject
to summary dismissal.
The Complaint
Initially, it is apparent from a reading of the numbered paragraphs of the
complaint that two pages (Doc. 1, pp. 17 and 18) were inadvertently reversed by
Plaintiff. Therefore, the Clerk shall be directed to re-file those two pages of the
complaint to place them in the proper order. References below to pages 17 and 18
shall be to the corrected version of the complaint.
Plaintiff’s claims arose on July 29, 2010, when he was brought to the Lawrence
Health Care Unit (“HCU”) in response to his request to obtain copies of some of his
medical records, which he needed for other pending litigation (Doc. 1, pp. 11, 13).
Page 2 of 26

Plaintiff had made prior requests for this information over the past seven months,
without successfully obtaining the desired records. He suffers from hepatitis-C and
hypertension, and had undergone thyroid testing. He sought records of examinations
relating to these problems from December 2009 to July 2010. Although his medical
records amounted to some 400 pages, he needed copies of only 30 to 40 selected
pages (Doc. 1, p. 13).
Plaintiff asserts that, “per rule and custom” he was entitled to receive the first
50 pages of his requested medical records free of charge (Doc. 1, pp. 9,13).
However, when he arrived to pick up the records, Defendant Julie Morris informed
Plaintiff that in order to receive the records, he must sign a voucher to be charged a
fee of $12.00. Plaintiff states that on two other occasions, Defendants Martin, Morris,
and Brooks (all HCU staff) had attempted to make him pay for excess copies after
they erroneously duplicated records that he did not request. Plaintiff did not want to
agree to any payment without first reviewing the records, and maintained that no
payment should be due because of the 50-free-pages rule. Plaintiff was also unwilling
to sign the “refusal slip” documenting that he refused to accept the copies of the
records. A dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants Morris and Brooks ensued, in
which Plaintiff claims Defendant Morris yelled racial epithets at him (Doc. 1, pp. 1416).
Defendants Bayler, 1 Stanford, and Dowden 2 (Correctional Officers) were in the
HCU during this confrontation. Defendant Brooks asked Defendant Bayler to take

1

Plaintiff sometimes refers to this Defendant as “Baylor” in the complaint, however, it is
clear he is referring to a single individual.
2
This Defendant’s name may also be spelled “Downden” (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Page 3 of 26

Plaintiff to segregation (Doc. 1, p. 15). Plaintiff was instead returned to his regular
cell, but was told one hour later that Defendant Bayler had ordered him to be taken
to segregation (Doc. 1, p. 16). He was then placed into a “strip cell” in the
segregation unit, where he remained for approximately four days.
Defendant Morris wrote a disciplinary ticket on Plaintiff, charging him with
insolence and disobeying a direct order (Doc. 1, p. 23; Doc. 1-1, pp. 1-2). After a
hearing, Plaintiff was given one month in segregation and a one-month demotion to Cgrade (Doc. 1-1, p. 3).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Morris and Brooks convinced Defendants Bayler
and Stuck to put him in the segregation strip cell, where conditions were unusually
harsh, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s assertion of his rights to 50 free pages of his
medical records, and of his right not to sign either the payment consent form or the
refusal slip (Doc. 1, p. 16). Defendants Morris and Brooks were also motivated in part
by a desire to retaliate for his having filed past grievances against them. According to
Plaintiff, the strip cell was to be used for inmates who were suicidal (which he was
not), and he was purposely placed in that cell by Defendant Stuck (the segregation
supervisor). Defendant Stuck allegedly went along with the request of Defendants
Morris, Brooks, and Bayler to house Plaintiff in the strip cell when other, less harsh
segregation cells were available (Doc. 1, p. 18).
The strip cell was filthy and had none of the amenities of a regular cell -- no
electrical outlets or switch to turn off the lights (which stayed on all night), the bed
was just a slab of concrete, and the bedding consisted of only a torn and dirty plasticcovered mattress (Doc. 1, pp. 20-22). Plaintiff was also not allowed to have any
Page 4 of 26

property, clean clothing, or writing materials. Worse, he claims the cell walls were
smeared with feces and the room smelled of urine; it was infested with bugs, red
ants, and spiders which he found crawling on his body any time he lay down (he
sustained a painful spider bite); the water was brown and dirty and gave him gas,
diarrhea, and stomach aches; there was no ventilation or handles to close the
window, causing the room temperature to exceed 90 degrees during the day and fall
into the 50s or below at night, as well as letting rain and insects into the room. He
was also denied one dinner and two lunch meals due to confusion on the part of
unnamed staff who thought he was on a hunger strike (Doc. 1, p. 22).
Plaintiff’s requests to be moved or given cleaning supplies were refused by
Defendants Stuck, Goins, Vaughn, and Stanford. Defendant Vaughn (the segregation
unit counselor) refused to give Plaintiff writing materials, preventing him from writing
a request slip to be moved from the strip cell. These Defendants also allegedly
admitted to Plaintiff that he had been placed there as a favor to Defendants Bayler,
Morris, and Brooks, and they were not going to go against the wishes of these fellow
staff members by moving him (Doc. 1, p. 20). Defendant Fisher refused to issue
Plaintiff unspecified property items that were permitted in segregation cells, while
providing those same items to other inmates who went into segregation on the same
day as Plaintiff (Doc. 1, p. 24). Plaintiff asserts this was part of the retaliation
scheme against him.
Additionally, Plaintiff claims that when he was taken to the showers and stripsearched on July 29, 2010, before being moved to the strip cell, he began to feel
faint, dizzy, and had difficulty breathing (Doc. 1, pp. 19-20). He asked Defendant
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Stuck for medical attention for these problems, but Defendant Stuck as well as other
unknown officers in the shower area refused to call for any medical staff to examine
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff further makes a general claim that from 2009 through 2011,
Defendants Martin, Morris, and Brooks (the HCU staff) conspired to hinder his efforts
to “obtain competent/adequate/and necessary medical care,” and that after he filed
formal complaints, they denied medical services and engaged in “acts of deliberate
harm/punishments” in retaliation for those complaints (Doc. 1, p. 10). He also asks
the Court to allow him to bring a common law claim of negligence against all the
Defendants, who failed to provide “unbiased medical services” to him, causing his
pre-existing ailments to worsen, as well as causing new medical problems (Doc. 1, pp.
25-26).
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that it is the policy of Defendant Wexford Health
Service, Inc. (“Wexford”), to violate his constitutional rights by failing to adequately
train, supervise, or discipline its employees, and by allowing its staff to violate its
own policies (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 25).
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent further retaliatory punishment
against him, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
Discussion
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
divide the pro se action into five (5) counts. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial
officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion
Page 6 of 26

as to their merit.
Count 1 – Retaliation
Initially, it should be noted that merely moving an inmate to segregation when
a disciplinary ticket is or will be issued does not implicate any constitutional
concerns. However, Plaintiff has alleged that several of the Defendants agreed to
make sure that Plaintiff would be placed in an especially disagreeable location within
the segregation area, in retaliation for his assertion of his right to free copies and for
other past complaints.
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances or
otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Walker v.
Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir.
2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139
(7th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, “[a]ll that need be specified is the bare minimum facts
necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that he can file an answer.”
Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). Naming the protected activity and
the act of retaliation is all that is necessary to state a claim of improper retaliation.
Id. A complaint that provides a short, clear statement of the relevant facts complies
with the federal rules of civil procedure, and thus cannot be dismissed because it
does not allege all facts necessary to clearly establish a valid claim. Id.
However,
[N]ot every claim of retaliation by a disciplined prisoner, who either has
had contact with, or has filed a lawsuit against prison officials, will state
a cause of action for retaliatory treatment. Rather, the prisoner must
allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be
inferred. Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108-09 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
that the plaintiff's complaint “set forth a chronology of events from
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which retaliatory animus on the part of defendants could arguably be
inferred” sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss). See also Benson
v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that “alleging merely
the ultimate fact of retaliation is insufficient”). Barring such a
chronology, dismissal may be appropriate in cases alleging retaliatory
discipline.
Cain, 857 F.2d at 1143 n.6.
While belligerence toward prison staff is not a “protected activity,” raising a
verbal complaint over a prison rule or condition is. Plaintiff’s version of events, in
which he pointed out the rules that he should be allowed 50 free pages of medical
records, 3 should be allowed to review the proffered documents to make sure that
they included the records he requested, and could not be forced to sign any
documents against his will, must be given credence at this stage of the litigation. See
Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff asserts that he heard Defendant Brooks tell Defendants Morris, Bayler,
and Dowden that a disciplinary ticket and segregation was in order, charging Plaintiff
with intimidation, threats, and refusing a staff order during their disagreement over
Plaintiff’s attempt to obtain his medical records (Doc. 1, p. 16). Defendant Brooks
went on to say, “in July, certain segregation cells are hellish, his (Plaintiff) black ass
has filed grievances on me for past minor errors with his hepatitis-C, kemo-therapy
[sic] medications, and other mistakes [by Defendants Brooks and Morris] . . .
[Plaintiff] needs strip cell placement.” Id. Later, when Plaintiff entered the
segregation unit, he heard Defendant Stuck say:
it seems the nurses have to re-write/re-do [Plaintiff’s] proposed
disciplinary ticket, from intimidation/threats, down to just alleged
3

The Court offers no opinion on the accuracy of Plaintiff’s assertion that a policy of the prison
or Wexford entitled him to receive the first 50 pages of his medical records without charge.
Page 8 of 26

insolence and refusing a direct order, and that [Defendant] Baylor’s
previous call . . . requesting that [Plaintiff] be placed in a strip/suicide
cell still stands, as it appears some nurses have a hair up their butts and
want [Plaintiff] to experience our hell(summer)-cells, accommodations.
(Doc. 1, p. 18).
At the pleadings stage of this case, Plaintiff’s allegations must be taken as
true. Based on the sequence of events he describes, and the overheard comments of
Defendants Brooks and Stuck, Plaintiff has made out a plausible claim that his
particular placement in the strip cell was in retaliation for both his complaint over
being charged for copies of his medical records, and for having filed prior grievances
against Defendants Brooks and Morris. Therefore, the retaliation claim against
Defendants Brooks, Morris, Bayler, and Stuck shall be allowed to proceed for further
consideration.
In addition, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants Goins, Vaughn, and Stanford
refused to move Plaintiff from the strip cell because they were acting in concert with
Defendants Brooks, Morris, and Bayler, is sufficient at this stage to state a claim of
their participation in the retaliation. See Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 831 (7th
Cir. 2002) (recognizing conspiracy claim under § 1983). “[I]t is enough in pleading a
conspiracy merely to indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date . . .
.” Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Hoskins v.
Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003); Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 740 (7th
Cir. 2002). Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Fisher denied him
property items that should have been available to segregation inmates, as part of the
coordinated retaliation, states a claim at this stage.
Plaintiff also appears to include Defendants Dowden and Martin in his claim of
Page 9 of 26

retaliation. However, he does not describe any personal involvement on the part of
these Defendants in the efforts to retaliate against Plaintiff by ensuring his placement
in the strip cell. Defendant Dowden was present in the HCU during the altercation
there between Plaintiff and Defendants Morris and Brooks, and allegedly gave the
order to Plaintiff to sign the refusal slip (Doc. 1, p. 16). He also helped escort
Plaintiff from the HCU back to his regular cell. However, Plaintiff does not allege
that Defendant Dowden gave orders or even discussed the idea of placing Plaintiff in
the strip cell. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against Defendant
Dowden, and he shall be dismissed from this action without prejudice.
Defendant Martin was a medical administrator during the events Plaintiff
describes (Doc. 1, p. 7). However, the fact that he may have been the supervisor of
Defendants Morris and Brooks does not create liability on his part. “The doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions; thus to be held individually
liable, a defendant must be ‘personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right.’” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). See also
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Eades v. Thompson, 823 F.2d
1055, 1063 (7th Cir. 1987); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983);
Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655-56 (7th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has not alleged
that Defendant Martin had any personal involvement in the incident which led to
Plaintiff’s placement in the strip cell, therefore, Defendant Martin shall be dismissed
from this action with prejudice.
To summarize, the retaliation claim against Defendants Brooks, Morris, Bayler,
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Stuck, Goins, Vaughn, Stanford, and Fisher shall receive further review.
Count 2 – Inhumane Cell Conditions
Plaintiff alleges that the conditions in the strip cell, where he spent at least
four days, were unbearable in several respects: filth, including exposure to human
waste and its odors, pest infestation, unclean water, inadequate protection from the
heat and cold, and lack of ventilation. He also complains about the lights remaining
on around the clock, the lack of writing materials and property items, and the
occasional denial of food.
Inhumane conditions of confinement may give rise to a civil rights claim under
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, which is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Such Eighth Amendment
claims have provided a means of improving prison conditions that were
constitutionally unacceptable. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962); Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994). As the Supreme Court
noted in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981), the amendment reaches
beyond barbarous physical punishment to prohibit the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain and punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime. Id., (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The Constitution
also prohibits punishment that is totally without penological justification. Gregg, 428
U.S. at 183.
Not all prison conditions trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny – only deprivations
of basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and physical safety.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346; see also James v. Milwaukee Cnty., 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th
Page 11 of 26

Cir. 1992). In order to prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must
allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the objective and subjective components
applicable to all Eighth Amendment claims. McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir.
1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The objective component
focuses on the nature of the acts or practices alleged to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992). The objective
analysis examines whether the conditions of confinement exceeded contemporary
bounds of decency of a mature civilized society. Id. The condition must result in
unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981); accord Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989);
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987).
In addition to showing objectively serious conditions, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. The
subjective component of unconstitutional punishment is the intent with which the
acts or practices constituting the alleged punishment are inflicted. Jackson, 955 F.2d
at 22. This requires that a prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994). In
conditions of confinement cases, the relevant state of mind is deliberate indifference
to inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he also
must draw the inference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); DelRaine v. Williford, 32
Page 12 of 26

F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1994). The deliberate indifference standard is satisfied if
the plaintiff shows that the prison official acted or failed to act despite the official’s
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. A failure of
prison officials to act in such circumstances suggests that the officials actually want
the prisoner to suffer the harm. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir.
1992). It is well-settled that mere negligence is not enough. See, e.g., Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986).
A. Unsanitary Conditions, Extreme Temperatures, and Lack of Ventilation
Turning first to the objective conditions alleged by Plaintiff, unsanitary
conditions and vermin infestation similar to those he describes have been found to
state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924
(7th Cir. 2007) (prisoner held in cell for three to six days with no working sink or
toilet, floor covered with water, and walls smeared with blood and feces); Jackson v.
Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992) (summary judgment improper where
inmate alleged he lived with “filth, leaking and inadequate plumbing, roaches,
rodents, the constant smell of human waste, . . . [and] unfit water to drink[.]”);
Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989) (inmate held for three days in
cell with no running water and feces smeared on walls); see also, DeSpain v. Uphoff,
264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (thirty-six hours with no working toilet, flooded
cell and exposure to human waste as well as the odor of accumulated urine, stated
Eighth Amendment claim); White v. Monohan, 326 F. App’x 385, 387-88 (7th Cir.
2009) (serious pest infestation resulting in physical injury may state a claim).
Similarly, exposure to extreme temperatures may state an Eighth Amendment
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claim. Prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to adequate shelter, including a
right to protection from cold, and cold conditions need not present an imminent
threat to the inmate’s health to implicate the Eighth Amendment. See Dixon v.
Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997). To assess whether cold cell temperatures
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, courts must consider factors including “the
severity of the cold; its duration; whether the prisoner has alternative means to
protect himself from the cold; the adequacy of such alternatives; as well as whether
he must endure other uncomfortable conditions as well as cold.” Id. at 644; see also
Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that exposure to extreme
cold for 17 hours could constitute Eighth Amendment violation); Henderson v.
DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that deprivation of blankets
for four days in extreme cold could constitute Eighth Amendment violation); but see
Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2009) (prisoner who had hurt ears,
numb hands, feelings of frostbite, and caught colds because he was never issued
adequate winter clothing showed only that he was subject to the “usual discomforts
of winter,” not the objectively serious harm required to state an Eighth Amendment
claim).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff was confined in the strip cell during summer, but
alleges that he had inadequate protection from the cold nighttime temperatures. He
could not close the window to keep out the cold night air, and had to wrap himself in
the filthy mattress in an attempt to keep warm, because he had no other bedding.
During the day, he was subject to extreme heat in excess of 90 degrees, with no
ventilation or fan to cool the room. Extreme heat and lack of ventilation may also
Page 14 of 26

state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 628-29 (7th
Cir. 1999) (prisoner stated a claim based on excessive heat and poor ventilation); see
also Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006) (prisons must provide
“reasonably adequate ventilation, sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials, and
utilities”); Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 486–87 (7th Cir. 2005) (Eighth
Amendment claim may be stated based on poor ventilation).
Plaintiff’s allegations as to the unsanitary cell conditions, pest infestation, and
extreme temperatures, combined with the lack of bedding and dirty water, thus meet
the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim at the pleadings stage.
As to the subjective element, he alleges that Defendants Bayler and Stuck
engineered Plaintiff’s placement in the strip cell, knowing that the conditions,
particularly the extreme heat, would be especially uncomfortable to him. Defendants
Stuck, Goins, Vaughn, and Stanford all heard Plaintiff’s pleas to be moved out of the
strip cell due to the unbearable conditions, or to be given cleaning supplies to combat
the filth. Although these Defendants were put on notice of the potential harm to
Plaintiff from remaining in the cell, they refused to move or assist him. At this stage
of the litigation, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment
claim for inhumane cell conditions against these parties. Accordingly, the claim
against Defendants Bayler, Stuck, Goins, Vaughn, and Stanford shall receive further
review.
B. Deprivation of Property and Writing Materials
However, some of Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a constitutional claim. He
does not specify what items of property (which were provided to other segregation
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inmates) were denied to him by Defendant Fisher. He states generally that for three
to five days, he did not have legal documents, mailing materials, books, magazines,
unspecified cosmetic/hygiene products, and clean underwear (Doc. 1, p. 22).
According to the complaint, Plaintiff went without these items for only a short time.
Likewise, the denial of writing materials by Defendant Vaughn for three to five days
(Doc. 1, p. 23) did not prevent Plaintiff from preparing and filing grievances shortly
after being assigned to the strip cell. The adage de minimis non curat lex (the law
does not concern itself with trifles) applies with the same force in civil rights
litigation as in any other tort action. Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.
1982). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
against Defendant Fisher or Defendant Vaughn for, respectively, denying him property
items and writing materials. 4
C. Deprivation of Food, Inability to Turn off Lights
In the same vein, Plaintiff complains that he missed three meals during his
time in the strip cell. Although inmates must be provided with adequate nutrition, a
court must assess the amount of food an inmate was denied as well as the duration of
the deprivation when determining whether an Eighth Amendment violation may have
occurred. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir.1999). In Plaintiff’s case, he
missed only one meal per day over three different days, and he attributes this not to
deliberate deprivation, but due to a misunderstanding by prison staff who believed he
was on a hunger strike (Doc. 1, p. 22). Such a negligent omission cannot form the
4

However, as noted in Count 1, a retaliation claim against these Defendants may be
maintained even though the underlying deprivation of property or writing materials does not
violate the constitution in and of itself. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552 (7th Cir.
2009).
Page 16 of 26

basis for liability under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Zarnes
v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff’s complaint that the lights in his cell remained on all day and night
also does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. In considering a claim
for sleep deprivation due to a constantly lighted cell, courts must consider the
duration of the condition, the effects of the interruption of sleep on the specific
inmate, as well as the legitimate reasons for the interruption. See Scarver v.
Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2006) (inmate stated a claim where cell was
constantly illuminated, which exacerbated his mental condition); Ferguson v. Cape
Girardeau County, 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996) (inmate was confined for only 14
days in lighted cell, lights were necessary for observation purposes, and inmate was
observed asleep for a number of hours); Kennan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th
Cir. 1996) (inmate stated a claim when he was subjected to bright light for 24 hours a
day during his six months in segregation, which caused substantial sleeping problems
as well as psychological harm). In Plaintiff’s case, while there does not appear to be
a legitimate reason for the lights to have been left on, the duration of this condition
was short, and he fails to allege any substantial harm.
Thus, this portion of Plaintiff’s claim shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 3 – Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
A. July 29, 2010, Incident
Plaintiff’s only specific claim as to denial of medical care is that on July 29,
2010, while he was being strip-searched in the shower area prior to his confinement in
the segregation strip cell, he became dizzy, felt faint, had chest pain, and couldn’t
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breathe (Doc. 1, p. 19). Plaintiff asked Defendant Stuck to get him immediate
medical attention for these symptoms, to no avail. Two other unnamed officers also
refused to obtain any assistance for him, telling him to fill out a sick call slip.
However, Plaintiff was never provided with any writing materials to submit such a
request. Plaintiff notes that he is over age 50, has hepatitis-C, high blood pressure, a
heart murmur, and claims to have ailments related to soy food consumption.
As with the other Eighth Amendment claims described above, a claim for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs has both an objective and subjective
component. Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). First, the medical
condition must be objectively serious. The Seventh Circuit considers the following to
be indications of a serious medical need: (1) where failure to treat the condition
could “result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain;” (2) “[e]xistence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment;” (3) “presence of a medical
condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities;” or (4) “the
existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373
(7th Cir. 1997). In addition, a condition that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention is also considered a
“serious” medical need. Id.
Secondly, the prison official must have “acted or failed to act despite his
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
842 (1994). To show deliberate indifference, a prison official must “be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
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exists” and must actually “draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The
Seventh Circuit’s decisions following this standard for deliberate indifference in the
denial or delay of medical care require evidence of a defendant’s actual knowledge
of, or reckless disregard for, a substantial risk of harm. See Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d
901, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) (officers were on notice of seriousness of condition of
prisoner with ruptured appendix because he “did his part to let the officers know he
was suffering”).
In Plaintiff’s case, his symptoms of chest pain, shortness of breath, dizziness
and feeling faint indicated that he could have been suffering from a serious medical
condition, and should have alerted a layman to the need for a medical evaluation,
even if the layman had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s underlying medical conditions. He
has thus stated the objective portion of a deliberate indifference claim. As to the
subjective component, Plaintiff alerted Defendant Stuck and the unknown officers to
his symptoms and asked for medical attention. However, they did not act on his
request, and failed to give him a pen or paper to submit a sick call slip when he asked
for them (Doc. 1, pp. 19-20). Plaintiff’s allegations are thus sufficient to state a
deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Stuck that shall receive further
review. In addition, Plaintiff has stated a claim against the unidentified officers.
However, he cannot proceed against them unless he can identify them by name in an
amended complaint.
B. General Claims
Plaintiff raises a general claim that from 2009 to 2011, Defendants Martin,
Morris, and Brooks denied him medical services, conspired to hinder his efforts to
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obtain necessary medical care, and deliberately harmed or punished him in retaliation
for filing formal complaints (Doc. 1, p. 10). However, other than the dispute over
records and the incident described above in Count 3-A, he offers no specifics as to
what medical care or services were denied him, nor does he explain what treatment
was denied him for which of his ailments.
Plaintiff’s bare conclusory assertion that these Defendants denied him access
to medical care is not sufficient to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may
be granted. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, this
portion of Plaintiff’s claim shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Count 4 – Negligence
Plaintiff asks this Court to exert its supplemental jurisdiction over a common
law claim of negligence (Doc. 1, pp. 25-26). He claims that all of the Defendants
failed to provide “unbiased medical services” to him, and instead “deliberately gave
Plaintiff ineffective, wrong, or no kind of services,” causing him bodily injury, causing
his pre-existing ailments to worsen, and causing “numerous new symptoms/ailments.”
Id. As with Count 3-B above, however, Plaintiff states only legal conclusions, and
does not give any specifics from which the Court might discern the elements of a
cognizable negligence claim.
It is true that a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), so long as the state claims
“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the original federal claims.
Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008). However, because
Plaintiff’s statements are so broad and non-specific, the Court cannot conclude that
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his negligence claim shares a “common nucleus of operative fact” with any of the
surviving federal claims. Therefore, Plaintiff’s negligence claim shall be dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 5 – Racial Harassment
Likewise, Plaintiff’s complaint about the use of racial slurs against him by
Defendants Brooks and Morris fails to state a claim. “The use of racially derogatory
language, while unprofessional and deplorable, does not violate the Constitution.”
DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Patton v. Przybylski, 822
F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir.1987)). This claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant Wexford Health Service, Inc., (“Wexford”)
Plaintiff asserts that Wexford should be liable to him for the unconstitutional
acts of its employees (Defendants Morris, Brooks, and Martin), because it has a policy
and custom of hiring untrained and incompetent employees; failing to adequately
train, supervise and discipline those employees; and allowing its staff to violate its
policies and procedures as well as policies/procedures of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 25).
A corporation such as Wexford can be held liable for a violation of an inmate’s
constitutional rights only if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged
violation. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir.
2004). See also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002)
(private corporation is treated as though it were a municipal entity in a § 1983
action). Plaintiff attempts to make out a claim that the alleged offenses committed
against him by the Wexford employees resulted from an official policy espoused by
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Defendant Wexford. However, the allegation that Wexford has an official policy of
hiring incompetent staff and allowing them to violate policies stretches credulity and
is not sufficient to state a viable claim against Wexford. Plaintiff’s allegations boil
down to a theory that Wexford should be liable based on its supervisory role over its
employees. However, this is not the law. Accordingly, Defendant Wexford shall be
dismissed from this action with prejudice.
Defendant State of Illinois
Plaintiff cannot maintain any of his claims against the State of Illinois. The
Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages);
Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of
Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment); Hughes v. Joliet
Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 219,
220 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). The State of Illinois thus shall be dismissed from this
action with prejudice.
Defendants Puisis, Randle, Ryker, and Martin
Plaintiff names Defendants Michael Puisis (Medical Director of the Illinois
Department of Corrections – “IDOC”), Michael Randle (IDOC Director), Derwin Ryker
(Lawrence Warden), and Phillip Martin (Lawrence Medical Administrator) in the
complaint. However, he does not identify any actions taken by any of these
individuals that caused the constitutional deprivations giving rise to this lawsuit.
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Instead, he appears to assert claims against them based on their role as
administrators with supervisory authority over the Defendants who caused the alleged
deprivations. For example, in the case of Defendant Martin, Plaintiff claims he “gave
nursing staff [Defendants Brooks and Morris] the assumed authority to circumvent . . .
rules, policies, training” in order to retaliate and harass Plaintiff (Doc. 1, p. 24). In
essence, Plaintiff seeks to impose supervisory liability.
Contrary to the belief of many prisoner civil rights litigants, there is no
supervisory liability in this type of lawsuit. “The doctrine of respondeat superior does
not apply to § 1983 actions; thus to be held individually liable, a defendant must be
‘personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.’” Sanville v.
McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251
F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). See also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978); Eades v. Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055, 1063 (7th Cir. 1987); Wolf-Lillie v.
Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 65556 (7th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, “A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant
by including the defendant’s name in the caption.” Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331,
334 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1006 (7th Cir. 1982)
(director of state correctional agency not personally responsible for constitutional
violations within prison system solely because grievance procedure made him aware
of it and he failed to intervene).
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal involvement on the parts of
Defendants Puisis, Randle, Ryker, and Martin in the alleged violations of his
constitutional rights, these Defendants shall be dismissed with prejudice.
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Disposition
The Clerk is DIRECTED to re-file pages 17 and 18 of the complaint (Doc. 1) in
the proper order: the page originally filed as 18 should instead be filed as page 17,
and page 17 should become page 18.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 2-B, 2-C, 3-B, 4, and 5 fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus are DISMISSED. The dismissal of
COUNTS 2-B, 2-C, 3-B, and 4 shall be without prejudice. The dismissal of COUNT 5
is with prejudice. Defendants STATE of ILLINOIS, PUISIS, RANDLE, RYKER, MARTIN,
and WEXFORD are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. Defendant DOWDEN is
DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.
COUNTS 1, 2-A, and 3-A shall receive further review.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants
BAYLER, STANFORD, STUCK, GOINS, VAUGHN, FISHER, MORRIS, and BROOKS (1)
Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2)
Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the
Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on
that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of
formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on any Unknown (John Doe) Defendants until such
time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint.
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Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the
names and service addresses for these individuals.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can
be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the
Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in
the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon
defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other
document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the
original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct
copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a
district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United
States Magistrate Judge Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the
judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required
to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his application to proceed in
forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. §
1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees
and costs or give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were
deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the
action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid
costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1)
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the
Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in
writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs.
Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court
documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 8/9/2012
_s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN__________
U.S. District Judge

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