Douglas v. Super 8 Motel

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Granting 18 motion for summary judgment. Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 4/5/12. (bkl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
VICKI R. DOUGLAS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 11-CV-640-JPG-SCW

SUPER 8 MOTEL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Kaival
Motel, Inc., d/b/a Super 8 Motel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 18).
However, the Court has accepted matters outside the pleadings, and thus, the Court now treats
defendant’s motion as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, of which plaintiff has received notice (Doc. 25). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has
responded to defendant’s motion (Doc. 31).
I.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosed

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l-Ind., Inc., 211
F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The reviewing court must construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678,
685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396.

A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of “some
alleged factual dispute between the parties,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois, Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692
(7th Cir. 2000). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if “a fair-minded jury could
return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252; accord Michas, 209 F.3d at 692.
II.

Facts
Plaintiff Douglas worked at the Super 8 Motel in Harrisburg, Illinois, for approximately

one year until her employment was terminated on August 24, 2009. Douglas, who suffers from
Crohn’s disease, filed a complaint on July 25, 2011, alleging that defendant discriminated
against her in connection with her firing in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”).
Defendant Super 8 Motel (“the motel”) has a total of seven (7) employees and has never
had fifteen (15) or more employees at all relevant times hereto, which Douglas does not dispute.
III.

Analysis
The ADA was implemented to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for

the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
Congress concluded that “historically, society tend[s] to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities” and that the ADA is designed “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(2); 12101(b)(3).

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Section 1112 of the ADA applies to disability discrimination with respect to the
termination of employees and states:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (emphasis added).
A “covered entity” under Section 12111 is defined by the ADA as “an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 42 U.S.C. §
12111(2) (emphasis added). Further, the ADA defines “employer” as:
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current
or preceding calendar year . . .
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (emphasis added).
Because the motel does not and has never employed fifteen (15) or more employees, it is
not a “covered entity” and cannot be liable under the ADA. While the Court expresses sympathy
to Douglas, the ADA does not apply to the motel and the motel is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
1. GRANTS the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 18) on the basis that the
ADA does not apply to the motel because the motel does not employ fifteen (15) or more
employees, as statutorily defined.
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2. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 5, 2012
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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