Plummer v. I.D.O.C. et al

Filing 76

ORDER denying 70 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 71 Motion to Substitute Party.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/5/2014. (anj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CONTRELL PLUMMER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
FE FUENTES, and MAGID FAHIM,
Defendants.

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Case No. 11-cv-682-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
Before the Court are two motions to amend Complaint filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has
first filed a Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 70) in which he seeks to add other Defendants that are
responsible for the hazardous living conditions at Menard, although Plaintiff does not name these
individuals. His Second motion for Substitution of Named Defendants in Place of IDOC (Doc. 71)
seeks to add several IDOC directors and wardens to his Complaint. Based on the following, the
Court DENIES both of Plaintiff’s motions.
Pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15(a)(1) “[a] party may
amend its pleading once as a matter of course” before a response pleading is served. The Court notes,
however, that all three Defendants have filed an Answer to his original Complaint.

Plaintiff must

now seek to further amend his Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2) which allows a party to “amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” The Court notes that
Rule 15(a)(2) further states that amendments should be freely granted “when justice so requires.”
There is no indication that Defendants have consented to the amendments so the Court would have to

grant Plaintiff leave before he may file his Amended Complaint.
The decision to grant a plaintiff leave to further amend a Complaint under Rule
15(a)(2) is within the sound discretion of the Court. Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 698 (7th
Cir. 2008); Orix Credit Alliance v. Taylor Mach. Works , 125 F.3d 468, 480 (7th Cir. 1997).
However, leave to amend may be denied for several reasons including: “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party..., [and the] futility of the amendment.” Barry

Aviation, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Municipal Airport Com’n , 388 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004);
Guide v. BMW Mortgage, LLC , 377 F.3d 795, 801 (7th Cir. 2004); Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d
827, 849 (7th Cir. 1985) (court should consider prejudice to non-moving party); Forman v.

Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2s 222 (1962); Orix Credit Alliance , 125 F.3d at
480.

A court may also deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment would be futile, meaning

that it would not survive a motion to dismiss. See Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir.
2008); Crestview Village Apts. v. U.S. Dep’t Of Housing & Urban Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 558 (7th
Cir. 2004); Barry Aviation Inc ., 377 F.3d at 687 and n. 3 (collecting cases).
Further, if a plaintiff seeks to add entirely new claims or parties, then the new claims
must be related in some way to the claims currently in the case. See FED.R.CIV.P. 20 (“All
persons...may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”). Entirely new claims are also subject to
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A which requires the Court to identify and dismiss any legally
insufficient claim. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Here Plaintiff indicates that he wishes to file an Amended Complaint substituting
various individuals, including Director Michael Randle, Director Salvador A. Godinez, Warden John
Doe, and Warden Rick Harrington in place of IDOC. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s original
Complaint alleged that IDOC violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by taking his personal property
by requiring him to pay co-pays every time he received medical treatment at Menard Correctional
Center and by the inhumane conditions of confinement at Menard Correctional Center. District
Judge Michael J. Reagan dismissed the claims against IDOC with prejudice because IDOC was not a
proper party under § 1983. The only claims which survived §1915A review in the instant case were a
deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Wexford, Fahim, and Fuentes, and a retaliation
claim against Fuentes and Fahim.
Plaintiff now seeks to substitute IDOC for several named Defendants. However, the
claims against IDOC were dismissed with prejudice and are no longer a part of this suit. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to add claims against various individuals for alleged inhumane
living conditions at Menard Correctional Center, those claims are unrelated to the current claims
against Wexford, Fahim, and Fuentes and do not belong in this case. Plaintiff alleges that these new
individuals subjected him to inhumane conditions by housing him and other inmates in cell houses
with excessive dust, mold, and mildew, exposure to lead pain, leaking lead pipes, and exposure to
asbestos. These are entirely new claims which must be brought in a new suit after exhausting his
administrative remedies against these individuals. Thus, the Court DENIES both of Plaintiff’s
motions to amend (Docs. 70 & 71).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 5, 2014.
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge