Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mach Mining, LLC

Filing 181

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, The Court GRANTS the EEOC's Agreed Motion (Doc. 175)for Approval of Consent Decree and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter the consent decree. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this matter. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 1/25/2017. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 11-cv-00879-JPG-RJD
vs.
MACH MINING, LLC, et al.,

Case No. 16-cv-01306-JPG-RJD

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (“EEOC”) Agreed Motion for Approval of Consent (Doc. 175). For the following
reasons, the Court grants the motion.
1. Background.
The EEOC filed the instant suit on behalf of Brooke Petkas and a class of female applicants
who had applied for non-office jobs at Mach Mining. According to the EEOC, Mach Mining
“has never hired a single female for a mining-related position,” and “did not even have a
women’s bathroom on its mining premises.” (Doc. 32, p. 1-2). The complaint alleges that Mach
Mining’s Johnston City, Illinois, facility engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful
employment practices since at least January 1, 2006, in violation of Title VII, by engaging in sex
discrimination.
The procedural history of the lead case (EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 11-cv-00879-JPGRJD) is extensive and has been laid out in previous orders. As such, it will not be repeated here
other than to note that the lead case was consolidate with the recently filed matter of EEOC v.
Foresight Energy Services, et al., 16-cv-01306-JPG-RJD in order to facilitate a resolution of all
related issues between the parties.

After an extensive negotiation process, the parties came to the agreement currently under
consideration. On December 5, 2016, the EEOC filed its motion for approval of the consent
decree and the Court held a hearing on January 17, 2017. As directed at the hearing, the EEOC
filed clarification with regard to the cy pres funds on January 23, 2017. (Doc. 180.)
2. Analysis.
Approval of a consent decree is committed to the discretion of the district court. Madison
Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Thompson, 773 F.2d 834, 845 (7th Cir. 1985). In reviewing a consent
decree, the district court pays deference to the expertise of the agency and the policy encouraging
settlement. United States v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 644 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2011).
As such, a presumption in favor of approving the consent decree arises. Donovan v. Robbins,
752 F.2d 1170, 1177 (7th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, this Court “must approve a consent decree if
it is reasonable, consistent with [the agency’s] goals, and substantively and procedurally fair.”
George A. Whiting Paper Co., 644 F.3d at 372.
a. Procedural Fairness
A consent decree is procedurally fair if the negotiations in reaching it were open and at
arms-length. In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 1990) (a court determines
procedural fairness by examining “the candor, openness, and bargaining balance.”) Here, all
parties are represented by experienced counsel, and there is nothing suggesting this consent
decree was reached through anything but a procedurally fair negotiation process. As such, the
Court finds that the instant consent decree was the result of a procedurally fair process.
b. Substantive Fairness
A consent decree is substantively fair if it involves “corrective justice and accountability:
a party should bear the cost of the harm for which it is legally responsible.” Cannons, 899 F.2d
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at 87. Procedural fairness is relevant to the inquiry because “[t]o the extent that the process was
fair and full of adversarial vigor, the results come before the court with a much greater assurance
of substantive fairness.” Id. at 87, n.4.
The Court finds the instant consent decree substantively fair because it obtains a
significant civil penalty for the alleged noncompliance and requires the defendants to comply
with EEOC regulations and an injunctive protocol on future hiring. The Court has no reason to
believe the process was substantively unfair.
c. Reasonableness.
Considering a consent decree’s reasonableness is a “multifaceted exercise.” Id. at 89.
This Court finds the consent decree to be reasonable. The reasons this Court finds the consent
decree substantively fair also support the reasonableness of the agreement. It will compensate
the individuals harmed by the defendant’s hiring practices and set forth procedures for future
hiring. Nothing indicates this consent decree is unreasonable.
d. Consistency with EEOC policies.
The EEOC is responsible for the administration and enforcement of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, including employment
discrimination based on gender. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 & 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The proposed consent
degree provides for corrective practices in the defendants’ hiring practices, compensation for
those individuals harmed by the defendant’s previous hiring policies, and also injunctive relief
that would that will provide sufficient facilities for female employees at all of the covered
entities. Accordingly, the Court finds that the consent decree is consistent with EEOC’s goals.
3. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the EEOC’s Agreed Motion (Doc. 175)
for Approval of Consent Decree and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter the consent decree.
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Because the consent decree resolves all pending claims between the parties, once the consent
decree is entered, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 1/25/2017
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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