Kirkpatrick v. Johnson et al

Filing 8

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), this action is DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous. Plaintiff Ryan Charles Kirkpatrick is advised that the dismissal of this case counts as a "strike" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk of Court will enter judgment in accordance with the attached order. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 1/20/2012. (jhs)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RYAN CHARLES
IDOC # K83724,

KIRKPATRICK, )
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
YOLANDE JOHNSON, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CIVIL NO. 11-1013-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Ryan Charles Kirkpatrick, a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”) who currently is incarcerated in the closed maximum security prison at the
Tamms Correctional Center (“Tamms C-Max” or “Tamms supermax”), brings this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights by persons acting under color
of state law. This case is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
provides, in relevant part:
(a) Screening. – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event,
as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. – On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint –
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted[.]
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint is plausible on its face
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Though the Court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, “some factual allegations will
be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to defendants of the plaintiff’s
claim.”

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).

Also, courts “should not

accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal
statements.” Id. The factual allegations of a pro se complaint must be liberally construed.
See Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972)).
In Kirkpatrick’s pro se complaint, Kirkpatrick alleges that his confinement in segregation at
Tamms C-Max constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
and asks that the Court order him to be transferred to the Psychiatric Unit at the Dixon
Correctional Center (“Dixon”). Named as Defendants are Yolande Johnson, the former warden of
Tamms C-Max, and S.A. Godinez, the current director of IDOC. This Court has acknowledged that
conditions of confinement at Tamms C-Max are such as to give prisoners in IDOC custody a
due process liberty interest in avoiding transfer to Tamms supermax without a hearing.
See generally Westefer v. Snyder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ill. 2010). However, the Court has
never held, and is unaware of any authority holding, that confinement in a supermax prison is
ipso facto cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and
unusual punishment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). There is no static test
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by which a court can determine whether conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment
and instead a court must examine the totality of the conditions of confinement. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). A prisoner is not entitled to “the amenities, conveniences and
services of a good hotel[.]” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988). Thus,
unpleasant inconvenience does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation; instead a
prison official’s “act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
See also Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1579 (7th Cir. 1994) (the Eighth Amendment protects
prisoners from conditions that “exceed[ ] contemporary bounds of decency of a mature, civilized
society”). In sum, the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to maintain minimal sanitary and
safe prison conditions, as well as to provide minimal exercise, showers, clothing, and sanitary eating
conditions. See DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1988); Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d
1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1985).
With respect to the penological justification for supermax prisons, in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545
U.S. 209 (2005), the Court explained that “[t]he use of Supermax prisons has increased over the
last 20 years, in part as a response to the rise in prison gangs and prison violence. About 30 States
now operate Supermax prisons, in addition to the two somewhat comparable facilities operated by
the Federal Government.” Id. at 213 (citation omitted). The Wilkinson Court went on to say,
Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop
of the State’s interest [in maintaining supermax prisons]. Clandestine, organized,
fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of
disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less than to
control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls. Murder of an
inmate, a guard, or one of their family members on the outside is a common form of
gang discipline and control, as well as a condition for membership in some gangs.
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Testifying against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite one’s own
death sentence. It is worth noting in this regard that for prison gang members serving
life sentences, some without the possibility of parole, the deterrent effects of ordinary
criminal punishment may be substantially diminished.
Id. at 227 (citations omitted). Concerning Tamms C-Max, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has explained that “Tamms is the highest security prison in Illinois. IDOC
designed the conditions there to be harsh, so that the threat of being transferred to Tamms would
deter prisoners throughout the system from disobeying prison rules.” Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d
570, 573 (7th Cir. 2005).

In determining that IDOC prisoners have a liberty interest in

avoiding transfer to Tamms C-Max, this Court concluded, based on, inter alia, the testimony of
IDOC’s then-director Michael Randle, that Tamms supermax has accomplished its unique, albeit
unpleasant, purpose in the IDOC system:
It is undisputed among the parties to this case that the supermax prison at Tamms is
the highest security prison in Illinois, featuring uniquely restrictive conditions of
confinement designed both to control the most high-security inmates in the IDOC
system and to encourage inmates at lower-security prisons to comply with IDOC
rules to avoid being transferred to the supermax prison. Consistent with the unique
role that the supermax prison at Tamms is meant to play in the IDOC system, the
prison was never intended to be full and has been approximately half-full since its
opening in 1998. IDOC Director Randle testified that it is “a good thing” that
Tamms operates at about half capacity “because it shows that our staff and inmates,
for the most part, are doing the right things and our prisons are safe. If Tamms were
full, I would be concerned about the 27 other prisons in the IDOC system because it
would indicate that there is some bad things happening out there.” It appears that
Tamms has succeeded in its purpose. According to IDOC Director Randle,
“incidents of inmate-on-inmate assaults, inmate-on-staff assaults, gang related
activities, the number of lock down days, all of those indicators that we look at in
terms of providing a safe environment in the other 27 prisons have all gone down and
that directly correlated with the opening and operation of Tamms.” It is equally
apparent to the Court from the testimony it heard from IDOC inmates, including
present and past inmates of Tamms, that the inmates genuinely fear the supermax
prison and do not want to be confined there.
Westefer, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (citations and brackets omitted).
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In his complaint Kirkpatrick does not allege that he has been deprived of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities at Tamms C-Max and, as the Court is well aware from
presiding over the protracted Westefer litigation, those necessities (showers, food, etc.) are indeed
furnished to the inmates of Tamms supermax. Similarly, it cannot be said that the prison regime at
Tamms C-Max, though harsh, is inflicted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Lunsford, 17
F.3d at 1581.

Accordingly, this case falls within the rule that, subject only to the

Eighth Amendment, “a state can confine a prisoner as closely as it wants, in solitary confinement if
it wants; a prisoner has no natural liberty to mingle with the general prison population.” Smith v.
Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1991). To the extent Kirkpatrick is alleging that Johnson and
Godinez have been deliberately indifferent to Kirkpatrick’s serious medical needs, this claim fails
as well. As discussed, Kirkpatrick claims that he suffers from mental illness that requires him to be
transferred away from Tamms C-Max. It is well settled, of course, that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
instructed, the Eighth Amendment “imposes upon prison officials the duty to ‘provide humane
conditions of confinement,’ including the obligation to provide medical care to those whom [they
have] incarcerated.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 832). A prisoner raising a claim against a prison official for deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s serious medical needs must satisfy two requirements. The first requirement compels the
prisoner to satisfy an objective standard:

“[T]he deprivation alleged must be, objectively,

‘sufficiently serious[.]’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
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(1991)). Therefore, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). The second
requirement compels the prisoner to satisfy a subjective standard: “[A] prison official must have a
‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” one that amounts to “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health
or safety[.]” Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). An objectively serious medical need “is one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d
588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).
In this instance, Kirkpatrick does not allege that he has been diagnosed with mental illness,
nor does he allege that Johnson or Godinez, both of whom are highly-placed IDOC officials, knew
or had any reason to know of Kirkpatrick’s mental condition. Perhaps most importantly, assuming
that either Johnson or Godinez was aware that Kirkpatrick suffers from mental illness, as he claims,
nothing in Kirkpatrick’s complaint suggests that Johnson or Godinez, as medical laypeople, had
reason to believe that Kirkpatrick was not receiving adequate medical care at Tamms C-Max for his
condition. A prison official must reasonably respond to a prisoner’s complaints, through the
investigation and referral of a plaintiff’s complaints, in order to be insulated from liability. See
Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1011 (7th Cir. 2006). However, “[i]f a prisoner is under the
care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that
the prisoner is in capable hands.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). “This follows naturally from the division of
labor within a prison. Inmate health and safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various
aspects of inmate life among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a non-medical
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prison official liable in a case where a prisoner was under a physician’s care would strain this
division of labor.” Id. “Prison administrators, having no medical expertise, must rely on health care
professionals to assess the needs of prisoners and initiate treatment.” Williams v. Cearlock, 993
F. Supp. 1192, 1197 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that a prisoner’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that
a prison provided defective medical care did not extend to a warden and an assistant warden, who
did not have direct responsibility for the prisoner’s medical care). “Because deliberate indifference
requires actual knowledge of a serious risk of harm, [a plaintiff] may not sue the non-medical
personnel who denied his grievances. Except in the unusual case where it would be evident to a
layperson that a prisoner is receiving inadequate or inappropriate treatment, prison officials may
reasonably rely on the judgment of medical professionals.” Bond v. Aguinaldo, 228 F. Supp. 2d
918, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (dismissing deliberate indifference claims against a grievance officer, a
warden, and two assistant wardens who had no reason to know that a prisoner’s medical treatment
was inadequate). Said differently, “[a] layperson’s failure to tell the medical staff how to do its job
cannot be called deliberate indifference; it is just a form of failing to provide a gratuitous rescue
service.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Here Kirkpatrick does not allege
that he has been diagnosed with mental illness, much less that Johnson and Godinez were aware of
Kirkpatrick’s mental illness and that the medical care Kirkpatrick received at Tamms C-Max for his
mental illness has been so plainly inadequate as to be obvious to medical laypeople. Kirkpatrick
cannot maintain a claim against Johnson and Godinez for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs.1 This case will be dismissed.

1.
It also should be noted also that an injunction directing IDOC officials to transfer
Kirkpatrick from Tamms C-Max to the Psychiatric Unit at Dixon is beyond the Court’s authority to
grant. See Westefer, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 788-89.
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To conclude, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice as
frivolous. Kirkpatrick is advised that the dismissal of this case counts as one of his three allotted
“strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance
with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 20, 2012

/s/ G. Patrick Murphy
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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