Williams v. Baker et al

Filing 100

ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL. Attorney Gail G. Renshaw is appointed to represent Plaintiff Robert Williams for all further proceedings in this Court only. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 6/27/14. (car)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROBERT WILLIAMS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
M. BAKER and
CHEATAM
Defendants.

CIVIL No. 11-cv-1043-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
Previously, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for counsel and appointed attorney Jennifer
Hightower to this case. (Doc. 84). However, due to a conflict of interest, attorney Hightower had to
withdraw. (Doc. 97). But because the Court still finds that the circumstances warrant appointment
of counsel, the Court will reconsider the issue.
Civil litigants do not have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d
647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1), however, this Court has discretion to recruit counsel to represent indigents in appropriate
cases. Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). In evaluating whether counsel should
be appointed, this Court must examine (what are known as) the Pruitt factors and apply them to the
specific circumstances of this case. Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 760 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court
must ask: “‘(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been
effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff
appear competent to litigate it himself?’” Id. at 761, quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654.
The circumstances presented in this case warrant recruitment of counsel. See Santiago, 599

Page 1 of 3

F.3d at 765 (“The situation here is qualitatively different from typical prison litigation.”). First,
Plaintiff has shown that he tried to obtain counsel on his own. Moreover, as the Court previously
found this case now is at the point where the difficulty of the case exceeds Plaintiff’s ability to
“coherently present it to the judge or jury himself.” See Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655.
Accordingly, the Court APPOINTS Attorney Gail Renshaw of the firm Gori, Julian &
Associates, P.C. to represent Plaintiff for all further proceedings in this Court only.1 Attorney
Renshaw is encouraged to share her responsibilities with an associate who is also admitted to practice
in this district court. Attorney Renshaw shall enter her appearance on or before July 7, 2014.
Plaintiff is cautioned to consult with his counsel in this matter and to understand that it is
Attorney Renshaw who is the legal professional in this relationship. Without commenting on the
validity of the matter in litigation, counsel is reminded and plaintiff is advised that counsel, even
though appointed by the Court, has an obligation under the rules to refrain from filing frivolous
pleadings. As a consequence, counsel will likely, from time to time, advise Plaintiff against taking a
certain course of action. While Plaintiff may not totally agree with counsel’s advice, he should realize
that, in the long run, such advice will be in his best interest because it is in compliance with the law.
Also, counsel may advise Plaintiff to pursue additional claims or to abandon certain existing claims.
Counsel, of course, maintains an ethical obligation to fully and vigorously represent her client,
but only to the extent that it does not impede his ethical obligation to follow the rules of the Court and
the law. If Plaintiff wants to be represented by counsel, he will have to cooperate fully with counsel.
The Court will not accept any filings from Plaintiff individually while he is represented by
counsel, except a pleading that asks that he be allowed to have counsel withdraw from representation.
If counsel is allowed to withdraw at the request of Plaintiff, it is unlikely the Court will appoint other
1

The Local Rules of the Southern District of Illinois direct that every member of the bar of this
Court “shall be available for appointment by the Court to represent or assist in the representation of
those who cannot afford to hire an attorney.” SDIL-LR 83.1(i).
Page 2 of 3

counsel to represent him.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, if there is a monetary recovery in this case
(either by verdict or settlement), any unpaid out-of-pocket costs must be paid from the proceeds.
See SDIL-LR 3.1(c)(1). If there is no recovery in the case (or the costs exceed any recovery), the Court
has the discretion reimburse expenses. The funds available for this purpose are limited, and counsel
should use the utmost care when incurring out-of-pocket costs. In no event will funds be reimbursed
if the expenditure is found to be without a proper basis. The Court has no authority to pay attorney’s
fees in this case. Counsel is encouraged to enter into a contingent fee contract with Plaintiff to
address both the payment of attorney’s fees and costs should Plaintiff prevail.
Finally, counsel is informed that Plaintiff is currently incarcerated by Illinois Department of
Corrections at Stateville Correctional Center.

Information about the facility is available at

www.idoc.state.il.us. Counsel may use the Illinois Department of Corrections’s videoconferencing
system to confer with Plaintiff. The Court asks the Assistant General assigned to this case to facilitate
those arrangements.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order and the standard letter
concerning appointment of counsel to Attorney Renshaw immediately.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 27, 2014.
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge

Page 3 of 3