Koontz v. Austin

Filing 18

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Koontz's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1 ) is DENIED and this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice. Furthermore, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 2/27/2014. (kbl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEVIN L. KOONTZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
LISA MADIGAN, Illinois Attorney
General, 1

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CIVIL NO. 12-100-DRH-CJP

Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Petitioner, Kevin Koontz, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming the evidence presented against him at his criminal
trial was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Doc. 1).
Respondent contends that Koontz is barred by § 2254(d) from re-litigating this
claim (Doc. 14). For the reasons stated below, the habeas petition is denied, and
the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
1

When Petitioner Kevin Koontz filed his habeas petition, he named Glen Austin, who was the
warden of Jacksonville Correctional Center at that time, as Respondent. However, Koontz was
released from incarceration on the same day that he filed his habeas petition, and thus Glen Austin
is no longer the proper respondent. According to the Entry of Appearance filed on September 11,
2012, Brad Curry, the Chief of Parole for the Illinois Dept. of Corrections was substituted as
Respondent because Koontz had been placed on mandatory supervised release (See Doc. 12).
However, it is not clear to the Court if Koontz is still serving his term of mandatory supervised
release, or whether Koontz’s entire sentence has been discharged—it was previously indicated that
Koontz’s sentence was expected to be discharged on February 2, 2014 (Doc. 10). Therefore,
pursuant to the Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts, the Attorney General of Illinois, Lisa Madigan, has been
substituted as Respondent. According to the Advisory Committee Notes, she “is in the best position
to inform the court as to who the proper party respondent is. If it is not the attorney general, [s]he
can move for a substitution of party.”
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I.

BACKGROUND

Following a bench trial in 2009 in the Third Circuit Court in Madison
County, Illinois, Kevin Koontz was convicted on two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse (Doc. 14-6, p. 58). He was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment
followed by two years of mandatory supervised release (Doc. 14-6, p. 79).
The following facts regarding Koontz’s conviction and sentence are taken
from the Illinois Appellate Court’s Rule 23 Order denying Koontz’s direct appeal
(Doc. 14-3). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the facts are presumed to be correct for
the purposes of habeas review as Koontz neither contests them nor points to clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary (See Doc. 1). 2
According to the testimony of the victim, on the afternoon of October
26, 2007, she and her younger sister were dropped off at their
grandmother’s house in Alton, Illinois, to do laundry. The victim,
who was then 16 years old, was sitting on a futon in the “sitting room”
off the living room talking on the phone to her boyfriend. Her sister
was sitting on the couch in the living room. While she was talking on
the phone, she heard [Koontz] come into the kitchen and say
something about aluminum.
Next, [Koontz] came over to her in the sitting room and said, ‘give your
cousin Kevin a hug.” The victim did not hug [Koontz] because she was
on the phone and pushed him away. She claimed that [Koontz] tried
to hug her two more times and then she thought he left the room.
[Koontz], however, allegedly came up behind her and grabbed her
breasts and rubbed her vagina on top of her clothes. The victim
called her father to come and pick her up. She did not tell her
grandparents about the incident even though both of them were home
at the time. The victim’s younger sister, who observed parts of the
encounter from her seat in the living room, corroborated the victim’s
testimony. The victim’s father also testified that his daughter called
2

Koontz’s habeas petition provides a summary of the evidence that is entirely consistent with and
confirms the Illinois Appellate Court’s summary of the evidence. Compare (Doc. 1) with (Doc.
14-3).
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him crying saying that her cousin tried to touch her. He picked up his
daughter and drove her to her mother’s house. He stated he did not
go to the police because the incident was a family matter.
Everyone else in the house at the time of the alleged incident denied
[Koontz] was there. [Koontz] and his wife also claimed that [Koontz]
could not have touched his cousin as she alleged because he was at
work. [Koontz’s] wife owns several businesses and [Koontz] runs one
of the stores for her. They have video surveillance between the
businesses and [Koontz’s] wife testified that she observed him at the
store several times during the time frame of the alleged incident. In
addition, [Koontz] was on parole and wore an ankle bracelet and a
transmitter on his hip that monitored his location at all times. The
monitoring device showed a signal loss for [Koontz] during the time
frame of the alleged incident but at all other times during the day
reported that he was at his wife’s store. [Koontz’s] parole agent
testified that sometimes the device can be blocked by buildings and it
is not uncommon for the device to lose a signal inside a location, but as
long as it is exposed to the open sky, it will not lose a signal. By
stipulation, the director of product development for the company
responsible for the device that was used to track [Koontz’s]
whereabouts would testify, “Wrapping the * * * device in aluminum foil
would prevent the unit from receiving satellite signals and thus prevent
it from reporting the whereabouts of the offender.” The parties also
stipulated that the signal could be blocked by being inside a building.
[Koontz] and his wife believed the victim made the accusations against
him as part of a plan to extort money from [Koontz’s] wife. An inmate
with [Koontz] at the time of his incarceration also testified that he had
dated the victim during the time frame in question and that he heard
the victim state that she was about to come into some money as a
result of a lie that she had told on her cousin. The victim denied
having any relationship with the inmate and further denied any
involvement in an attempt to extort money from [Koontz] and his wife.
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court found
[Koontz] guilty of both counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and
sentenced [Koontz] to 10 years’ imprisonment. At the hearing on
[Koontz’s] motion for a new trial and motion to modify sentence,
[Koontz] continued to maintain his innocence.
The court
subsequently reduced the sentence to eight years.
(Doc. 14-3).
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Koontz directly appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court arguing
that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt (Doc. 14-1). According to Koontz, the State’s entire
case rested upon the testimony of the victim and her younger sister, but their
testimony was contradicted by the other adults present in the home who said
Koontz was not at the house that day; by his wife who testified Koontz was at work;
and by his ankle bracelet which also placed him at work (Doc. 14-3). The Illinois
Appellate Court reviewed all of the evidence presented at Koontz’s criminal trial,
rejected his argument, and affirmed his conviction (Doc. 14-3). The Appellate
Court stated:
Contrary to [Koontz’s] assertions, his entire case did not just rest
solely on the testimony of the victim and her sister. The victim’s
mother and father fully corroborated her testimony as well.
Moreover, minor discrepancies in a victim’s testimony do not render
that testimony unbelievable or incompetent. We also note that there
was a signal loss from [Koontz’s] monitoring device at exactly the time
[Koontz] allegedly sexually abused his cousin. And, there was
testimony about [Koontz] needing or having aluminum foil when he
entered the home with supporting testimony that aluminum foil could
prevent the unit from receiving satellite signals and prevent it from
reporting the whereabouts of the wearer of the device. Again, we are
not to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In reviewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we therefore must
conclude the evidence presented was sufficient to support [Koontz’s]
convictions.
(Doc. 14-3) (internal citations omitted). Koontz then filed a Petition for Leave to
Appeal (“PLA”) with the Illinois Supreme Court, but the PLA was denied on
November 30, 2011 (Doc. 14-5).

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Koontz filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 on February 2, 2012 (Doc. 1), the same day that he was paroled from
Jacksonville Correctional Center (Doc. 10). 3 In his habeas petition, Koontz again
claimed that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Doc. 1).
II.
A.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
1. Applicable Legal Standards
Koontz’s only claim in his habeas petition is that the evidence presented

against him at his trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. This claim was already adjudicated on the merits by the Illinois Appellate
Court. Therefore, Koontz is not entitled to habeas relief unless he demonstrates
the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 4
The clearly established federal law for insufficient evidence claims is the rule
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

3

In the event that Koontz’s entire sentence has been discharged, his habeas petition is not moot
because his claim challenges his underlying criminal conviction, and he is thus entitled to the
presumption that a live controversy still exists. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1998).

4

Koontz only invokes § 2254(d)(1), and § 2254(d)(2) is not applicable here. Under § 2254(d)(2),
habeas relief can be granted if the state court’s decision involved “an unreasonable determination of
the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Because Koontz has not challenged the factual findings set
forth by the Illinois Appellate Court (See Doc. 1), the facts are presumed to be correct, and that
presumption renders § 2254(d)(2) irrelevant.
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307 (1979). Under Jackson, a court reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim
can overturn a conviction only if “after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, [no] rational trier of fact could have found the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. This standard
requires the reviewing court to defer to the factfinder and not reweigh the evidence,
reassess the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder. See Id.
Moreover, on habeas corpus review, the federal court must defer to the state
court rulings. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (“AEDPA thus imposes a
highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).

The federal court “may not overturn a state court

decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal
court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if
the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Coleman v. Johnson, 132
S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). This double layer of deference means that
state prisoners asserting a sufficiency of the evidence claim “face a high bar in
federal habeas proceedings.” Id.
Accordingly, within this framework, the precise legal question that this Court
must answer is: “Was it objectively unreasonable for the Illinois Appellate Court to
conclude that any rational trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the state, could have found the essential elements of [aggravated
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criminal sexual abuse] beyond a reasonable doubt.”

McFowler v. Jaimet, 349

F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir. 2003).
2. Analysis
Koontz argues that the trial court erred in relying upon the victim’s testimony
and the testimony regarding his ankle monitor in order to convict him, and
therefore, the Illinois Appellate Court also erred in affirming his conviction (Doc. 1).
Koontz claims that the only evidence that supported his conviction was the
testimony of the victim and her sister, and he argues that “there was overwhelming
evidence that contradicted their testimony” and the victim had “a motive to lie” as
evidenced by “the plot to extort [him] and his wife unfolded” (Doc. 1). Koontz also
asserts that “the evidence concerning the gps tracking device did not confirm [he]
had tampered with the device, nor that [he] was present within the home during the
alleged crime” (Doc. 1).
It is clear that in challenging to the sufficiency of the evidence, Koontz is not
contending that there was no evidence as to one or more elements of the crime. In
fact, Koontz states in his habeas petition that the evidence in his criminal case “was
closely balanced” (Doc. 1, p. 17), implicitly acknowledging that there was evidence
in the record that supported conviction. Koontz then goes on to admit that the
testimony of the victim and her sister, if believed, supported his conviction (Doc. 1,
p. 18) (“The only evidence that can be conceived reliable to support petitioner’s
convicted of two counts of criminal sexual abuse, was that of . . . the victim and her
sister.”)
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Instead, the gist of Koontz’s claim is that the trial court should not have
believed the testimony of the victim and her sister, and should have accepted the
defense’s version of events instead. He does nothing more than attack the trial
court’s determinations as to the credibility of the evidence and the inferences it
drew therefrom. Koontz’s disagreement with the trial court’s determinations does
not rise to a constitutional claim cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995) (“Under Jackson, the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the scope of review”); Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 326 (“[A] federal habeas court faced with a record of historical facts that supports
conflicting inferences must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such
conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.”)
It was up to the trial judge, as the trier of fact, to decide which witnesses to
believe, to reconcile discrepancies in the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The trial judge was entitled to discount or
outright reject the defense’s version of events. The judge was also entitled to credit
the testimony of the victim, despite the evidence negatively impacting her
credibility, and to infer from the evidence that Koontz had tampered with his ankle
monitor to prevent it from transmitting a signal and reporting his whereabouts.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court articulated a standard based on
Illinois case law that is comparable to the Jackson standard. The Appellate Court,
in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and giving the trial
judge’s credibility determinations the required deference, concluded that the
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evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This conclusion was not unreasonable given the evidence in the case. As such,
Koontz is not entitled to habeas relief based on his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, and his petition is DENIED.
B.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases provides that the district

court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final
order adverse to the applicant.”

A habeas petitioner is entitled to a certificate of

appealability only if he can make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.

Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). Under this standard, petitioner must demonstrate that, “reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”

Miller-El, 537

U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
Here, the Court denied Koontz’s sufficiency of the evidence claim based on
well-established precedent regarding the treatment of these claims on federal
habeas review. As such, reasonable jurors could not find the Court’s assessment
debatable or wrong. Consequently, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of
appealability.
III.

CONCLUSION

Kevin Koontz’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
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(Doc. 1) is DENIED and this matter is DISMISSED with prejudice. Furthermore,
the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 27th day of February, 2014.

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2014.02.27
15:20:45 -06'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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