Anderson v. Rednour et al

Filing 12

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED, without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing his claim for loss of good conduct credit in a properly filed habeas corpus action should he wish to do so, but only after he has exhausted his state court re medies. This dismissal shall not count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiffs obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350 remains due and payable. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 7/9/2012. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TYJUAN ANDERSON, # R-19940,
Plaintiff,

vs.
WARDEN REDNOUR,
REBECCA COWAN,
CHARLES PARNELL, and
BETSY SPILLER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-0111-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
I.

Introduction

Plaintiff Tyjuan Anderson, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center,
brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), located within this Judicial District. Plaintiff is serving a 50-year sentence
for murder. This § 1983 case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if
feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after
docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall
identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint–

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(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see
Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim.
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a
pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint and any supporting exhibits, the
Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A. This action is subject
to summary dismissal.
II.

Summary of Complaint Allegations

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

On

January 31, 2010, Plaintiff allegedly assaulted Correctional Officers (“C/Os”) Opolka
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and Hudson in the dining room at Menard (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 12). On February 3, 2010,
after a disciplinary hearing, Defendant Parnell imposed the following penalties on
Plaintiff for his January 31 assault of C/O Opolka: (a) 1 year demotion to C-grade
status, (b) 1 year in disciplinary segregation, (c) revocation of 3 months good conduct
credit, (d) 1 year commissary restriction, and (e) 6 months contact visit restriction (Doc.
1, p. 9).
These exact punishments were repeated for Plaintiff’s assault of C/O
Hudson and ordered to run consecutively (Doc. 1, p. 12). As a result, Plaintiff’s total
punishment added up to two years in disciplinary segregation and a loss of six months
of good conduct credit, for example. Plaintiff asserts that he received improper double
punishment when two disciplinary reports were issued for a “single incident” (Doc. 1, p.
5).
Defendant Rednour signed off on these punishments, and Defendant
Cowan delivered a copy of the adjustment committee’s final report to Plaintiff (Doc. 1,
pp. 10, 13). Plaintiff grieved these punishments to various unnamed parties as well as
to Defendant Spiller, to no avail (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6).
Plaintiff

requests

compensatory

damages

for

each

day

“served

excessively in confinement” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
III.

Analysis

Plaintiff claims that he was deprived of six months good conduct credit,
given two years’ segregation, and subjected to other punishments as a result of
Defendant Parnell violating Illinois Administrative Code tit. 20, § 504.110(a).

The

Counseling Summary in response to Plaintiff’s inquiry clarifies that the disciplinary

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committee determined that the two assaults should be treated as separate incidents,
which meant that Plaintiff’s punishment for each infraction would be served
consecutively (Doc. 1, p. 14).
When a plaintiff brings an action under § 1983 for procedural due process
violations, he must show that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected
interest in “life, liberty, or property” without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 125 (1990). In Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984),
the Seventh Circuit held that the filing of false disciplinary charges by a correctional
officer does not state a Fourteenth Amendment claim when the accused inmate is given
a subsequent hearing on those charges and the inmate is afforded the procedural
protections outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (advance written notice
of the charge, right to appear before the hearing panel, the right to call witnesses if
prison security allows, and a written statement of the reasons for the discipline
imposed). Additionally, the decision of the disciplinary board must be supported by
“some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994). The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that prisoners have a right “to be free from arbitrary actions of prison
officials,” Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140, but the procedural protections outlined in Wolff
provide the appropriate protection against arbitrary actions taken by a correctional
officer, such as issuing the inmate a fabricated conduct violation.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not suggest that he was deprived of any
Wolff protections. Rather, Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant Parnell failed to abide by
an Illinois administrative regulation regarding prisoner discipline. Plaintiff’s argument
rests on his interpretation of Illinois Administrative Code tit. 20, § 504.110, which states:

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a) When an offender has been found in violation of more
than one offense arising from a single incident, the maximum
penalty shall not exceed the maximum penalty for the most
serious offense the individual is found to have committed.
b) When an offender has been found in violation of more
than one offense arising from separate incidents, the
maximum penalty for each offense may be imposed, and
such penalties shall run consecutively. For example, an
offender who is found guilty of assaulting several persons
within a short period of time has committed multiple offenses
that would be punishable consecutively.
Plaintiff contends that his assaults should be analyzed under subsection
(a), but the attachments to Plaintiff’s complaint suggest that Plaintiff was found guilty of
assaulting two guards within a short period of time, placing his punishment in the
context of subsection (b) (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 12, 14). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations of a due
process violation are unfounded.
Furthermore, even if Defendant Parnell erred in imposing consecutive
punishments on Plaintiff, the violation of an administrative rule, by itself, does not give
rise to a constitutional claim. See Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 935 n. 1 (7th Cir.
2004); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (§ 1983 provides a remedy
for constitutional violations, not violations of state statutes and regulations). Assuming,
arguendo, that Parnell violated Plaintiff’s procedural rights in failing to comply with the
Illinois Administrative Code, Plaintiff still must show that he was deprived of a
constitutionally-guaranteed liberty interest as a result of Parnell’s missteps.
A – Disciplinary Segregation
Although Plaintiff does not state a due process claim based on the
Defendant’s interpretation of the Illinois Administrative Code, the length of his
segregation term (two years) would raise a potential claim if Plaintiff’s disciplinary
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hearing had lacked the procedural protections described in Wolff, and if the conditions
of his segregation were unduly harsh. See Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d
693, 694 (7th Cir. 2009) (where prisoner alleged several procedural violations in his
disciplinary hearing, his 240-day segregation term was “sufficiently long to implicate a
cognizable liberty interest if the conditions of confinement during that period were
sufficiently severe”).
However, because Plaintiff has not alleged any irregularities in the
conduct of his disciplinary hearing, he has failed to state a cognizable due process
claim related to the imposition of segregation.

Thus, this claim shall be dismissed

without prejudice.
B – Revocation of Good Conduct Credit
A loss of good time credit does implicate a liberty interest, because such a
loss potentially affects the length of Plaintiff’s sentence. As such, Plaintiff may have a
cognizable due process claim regarding good time credit revoked in the February 3,
2010, disciplinary proceeding.

However, the proper method for challenging the

revocation of good time credit is habeas corpus, and that can be done only after Plaintiff
has exhausted his remedies through the Illinois state courts.

See, e.g., Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1994).
The Illinois courts have recognized mandamus as an appropriate remedy
to compel prison officials to award sentence credit to a prisoner. See Turner-El v.
West, 811 N.E.2d 728, 733 (Ill. App. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Franzen, 417 N.E.2d 242,
247, aff'd on reh'g, 420 N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1981)). The State of Illinois must first be
afforded an opportunity, in a mandamus action pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/14-101, et seq.,

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to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed without
prejudice to Plaintiff bringing his claims in a properly filed habeas corpus action, after
he has exhausted his state court remedies.
C – Other Punishments
Plaintiff claims that he was demoted to C-grade, lost commissary
privileges, and lost visitation privileges as a result of the February 3, 2010 disciplinary
hearing. However, these allegations do not present a viable constitutional claim. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n.8 (7th Cir. 1997) (and cases cited therein)
(no protected liberty interest in demotion to C-grade status and loss of commissary
privileges). Additionally, prisoners do not have a fundamental right to visitation arising
directly from the Constitution. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
“The denial of prison access to a particular visitor ‘is well within the terms of
confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,’ and therefore is not
independently protected by the Due Process Clause.”

Id. at 1909 (citing Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)).
As Plaintiff has no liberty interest in these other facets of his punishment,
he has failed to state a due process claim with regard to these particular actions taken
by the disciplinary review board. Therefore, this claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.
D.

Defendants Rednour, Cowan, and Spiller

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Rednour, Cowan, and Spiller all arise
out of their alleged failure to adequately address Plaintiff’s grievances over the February
3, 2010 disciplinary action. However, “a state’s inmate grievance procedures do not
give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”

Antonelli v.

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Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1995). The Constitution requires no procedure
at all, and the failure of state prison officials to follow their own procedures does not, of
itself, violate the Constitution. Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992);
Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff mentions no conduct
by these three Defendants other than their involvement in the grievance procedures.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendants Rednour, Cowan, and
Spiller upon which relief may be granted.
IV.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED, without
prejudice to Plaintiff bringing his claim for loss of good conduct credit in a properly filed
habeas corpus action should he wish to do so, but only after he has exhausted his
state court remedies.
This dismissal shall not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the
time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350 remains due and payable. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED July 9, 2012.

s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN___
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge

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