Underhill et al v. Coleman Company

Filing 174

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, Denying 143 MOTION in Limine to Bifurcate the Trial filed by Coleman Company, Inc. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 1/29/14. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PAULA UNDERHILL, Individually and as
Special Administrator of the Estate of Galen
Underhill, and SEAN UNDERHILL,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 12-cv-129-JPG

vs.
COLEMAN COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Coleman Company, Inc.’s (“Coleman”)
motion in limine to bifurcate the trial (Doc. 143) to which plaintiffs Paul Underhill and Sean
Underhill have responded (Doc. 157).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that “[f]or convenience, to avoid
prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more
separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” However, “[t]he
piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single lawsuit . . . is not to be the usual course.” 9 Charles
A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2388 (1995); see also
Real v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 626 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“An order of separate trials is
the exception, not the rule.”). In considering bifurcation, the district court must be mindful that
the Rules “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Prior to a decision to bifurcate a trial, the district court must first determine whether “the
separation would prevent prejudice to a party or promote judicial economy.” Chlopek v. Federal
Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007). After the court determines one of these criteria is

satisfied, it may bifurcate the trial “as long as doing so will not prejudice the non-moving party
or violate the Seventh Amendment.” Id.
Coleman seeks to bifurcate the liability and compensatory damages phases of trial from
any punitive damages phase of trial in an effort to avoid prejudice to Coleman. Specifically,
Coleman argues that the evidence necessary to support a punitive damages award would
improperly influence the jury’s liability and compensatory damages decisions. Coleman further
argues that bifurcation would promote judicial economy because the relevant issues in
determining liability and punitive damages are different.
The Court does not find Coleman’s argument in favor of bifurcation persuasive. It is true
in many cases that the evidence relevant to liability and compensatory damages are different
from the relevant evidence in determining punitive damages. Bifurcating trials on this basis
would make bifurcation the rule rather than the exception. Coleman presents no evidence that
this particular case is different than the run-of-the-mill design or manufacturing defect claim.
Further, there is no doubt that some of the evidence relevant to liability on the design and
manufacturing defect claims will overlap with the evidence relevant to punitive damages. As
such, bifurcation in this matter would delay this trial and fail to serve the ends of judicial
economy.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Coleman’s motion to bifurcate the trial
(Doc. 143).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 29, 2014
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

2