Ross and Baruzzini, Inc. v. Estopinal Group, LLC
Filing
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ORDER denying 35 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 2/5/13. (klh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROSS & BARUZZINI, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
12-cv-00152-DRH
THE ESTOPINAL GROUP, LLC,
f/k/a THE ESTOPINAL GROUP, INC.
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge
I. Introduction and Background
Now before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
amended complaint (Doc. 35). Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff fails to state a claim for
tortious interference with business expectancy. Plaintiff opposes the motion
(Doc. 36). Based on the following, the Court denies the motion.
On July 7, 2012, plaintiff Ross & Baruzzini, Inc. (“R&B”) filed a onecount amended complaint against The Estopinal Group, LLC (“TEG”). Both
parties are architecture and design firms. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a
state law claim of tortious interference with R&B’s business expectancy with
Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center (“Sarah Bush”), a nonprofit Illinois
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hospital. Specifically, R&B alleges that TEG tortiously interfered with
R&B’s expected business with Sarah Bush by: 1) bringing a “frivolous and
bad faith” action against R&B employee Stan Lamaster out of spite or ill
will and (2) threatening reprisal against Sarah Bush in the event Sarah
Bush continue its business relationship with Lamaster and/or R&B.
According to the complaint, Lamaster was a former employee of
TEG. On December 21, 2011, after TEG discovered that Sarah Bush and
R&B were in contact regarding architectural services, TEG moved for a
temporary restraining order against Lamaster, asserting breach of nonsolicitation agreement and other claims. On December 23, 2011, TEG’s
motion was denied in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, though it
remains pending. Plaintiff asserts that TEG’s action was frivolous, as there
was no valid contract between Lamaster and TEG, and, moreover, that
TEG knew that it was frivolous. On or about January 4, 2012, Sarah Bush
notified R&B that it intended to seek a different firm for its architectural
needs, expressing concern about TEG’s action against Lamaster. Plaintiff
requests actual, compensatory, and punitive damages.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
A 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of
Police Chicago Lodge 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, –––
U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 749, 175 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009). The United States
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Supreme Court explained in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
is warranted if the complaint fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.”
In making this assessment, the district court accepts as true all wellpled factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's
favor. See Rujawitz v. Martin, 561 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2009); St. John's
United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1032, 128 S.Ct. 2431, 171 L.Ed.2d 230
(2008).
Even though Twombly (and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)) retooled federal pleading standards,
notice pleading remains all that is required in a complaint. “A plaintiff still
must provide only ‘enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and, through his
allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he
is entitled to relief.’ ” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th
Cir. 2008). The level of detail the complaint must furnish can differ
depending on the type of case before the Court. So for instance, a complaint
involving complex litigation (antitrust or RICO claims) may need a “fuller
set of factual allegations ... to show that relief is plausible.” Tamayo, 526
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F.3d at 1083, citing Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Illinois,
520 F.3d 797, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has offered further direction on
what (post- Twombly & Iqbal ) a complaint must do to withstand dismissal
for failure to state a claim. In Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th
Cir. 2008), the Court reiterated: “surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion requires
more than labels and conclusions;” the allegations must “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Similarly, the Court remarked in
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010): “It is by
now well established that a plaintiff must do better than putting a few
words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest
that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”
Judge Posner explained that Twombly and Iqbal:
require that a complaint be dismissed if the allegations do not
state a plausible claim. The Court explained in Iqbal that “the
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. This is a little unclear
because plausibility, probability, and possibility overlap....
But one sees more or less what the Court was driving at: the
fact that the allegations undergirding a plaintiffs claim could be
true is no longer enough to save it. .... [T]he complaint taken as
a whole must establish a nonnegligible probability that the
claim is valid, though it need not be so great a probability as
such terms as “preponderance of the evidence” connote....
After Twombly and Iqbal a plaintiff to survive dismissal “must
plead some facts that suggest a right to relief that is beyond the
‘speculative level.’ ” In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 905
(7th Cir. 2009).
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Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added). See also Smith v. Medical Benefit Administrators Group, Inc., 639
F.3d 277, 281 2011 (Plaintiff's claim “must be plausible on its face,” that is,
“The complaint must establish a nonnegligible probability that the claim is
valid....”). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to plaintiff’s
complaint.
III. Analysis
Under Illinois law, to establish a prima facie claim for tortious
interference with business expectancy, a plaintiff must show: (1) a
reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship; (2) the
defendant’s knowledge of the expectancy; (3) an intentional and unjustified
interference by the defendant that induced or caused a breach or
termination of the expectancy; and (4) damage to the plaintiff resulting from
the defendant’s interference. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d
1296, 1299 (Ill. 1996); See also Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
300 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. 1973). If the interference complained of does
“not rest on some legitimate interest, or if there is sharp dealing or
overreaching or other conduct below the behavior of fair men similarly
situated, the ensuing loss should be redressed. . . .” Rock Falls, 300 N.E.2d
at 333 (citing 45 Am.Jur.2d Interference § 1).
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At issue is whether plaintiff has stated a claim of tortious interference
with business expectancy upon which relief can be granted. Specifically,
defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to allege conduct sufficient to
support a claim of tortious interference. To survive dismissal, a complaint
of tortious interference must allege “facts sufficient to demonstrate that
defendant acted intentionally and lacked justification,” but need not include
averments of “any animosity or other manifestations of ill-will between the
parties.” Roy v. Coyne, 630 N.E.2d 1024, 1034 (Ill. App. 1994), (citing HPI
Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672 (Ill.
1989)). Moreover, where a “complaint does not assert nor imply that
defendants acted pursuant to any privilege while interfering with plaintiffs’
business relationships, it is incumbent on defendants to justify their
actions.” Roy, 630 N.E.2d at 1034 (emphasis added); See also Int’l Mktg.,
Ltd. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Inc., 192 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir.
1999).
Assuming plaintiff’s assertions to be true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in its favor, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleges that defendant
tortiously interfered with its business expectancy when, in addition to the
“frivolous” lawsuit filed, defendant “impliedly and/or overtly threaten[ed]
reprisal against Sarah Bush should Sarah Bush contract with or provide
work to Lamaster and/or R&B . . . .” (Doc. 33, ¶ 46). Further, plaintiff
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alleges that such conduct was motivated solely by spite or ill will and that
any contractual claims that defendant has tried to assert with respect to
Lamaster’s communications with Sarah Bush are without merit. As a result
of defendant’s conduct, R&B’s business expectancy with Sarah Bush was
disappointed. At this stage of the litigation, the Court finds that the alleged
facts contained in the amended complaint sufficiently demonstrate that
defendant intentionally and without justification interfered with plaintiff’s
business expectancy. Plaintiff has adequately pleaded the elements of
tortious interference with business expectancy, and the facts alleged in the
amended complaint are sufficient to withstand dismissal.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 33).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 5th day of February, 2013.
Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2013.02.05
14:39:27 -06'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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