March v. Cross
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION denying 1 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of respondent. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 2/20/2014. (jmt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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DAMARCIS MARCH,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN T. RATHMAN
Respondent.
Civil No. 12-cv-198-CJP 1
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
Damarcis March filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§2241challenging the loss of 41 days of good conduct credit imposed as a
sanction pursuant to a prison disciplinary proceeding. (Doc. 1).
Correct Respondent
At the time he filed the petition, March was in custody at FCI Greenville. He
has now been transferred to FCI Talladega. (Doc. 22). The transfer does not
divest this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Moore v. Olson, 368 F.3d 757,
759 (7th Cir. 2004). Respondent waives the issue of venue. See, Doc. 16, p.2.
Therefore, the warden of FCI Talladega, John T. Rathman, is substituted as
respondent. See, Bridges v. Chambers, 425 F.3d 1048, 1049-50 (7th Cir.
2005).
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This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 27.
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Relevant Facts and Procedural History
March is serving a 360 month sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine
base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and carrying and use of a
firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. His projected release date is in
September, 2026. See, Doc. 16, Ex. A.
On March 25, 2011, a correctional officer found a 6.5 inch metal rod with a
sharpened end in March’s cell at FCI Greenville.
According
to
the
incident
report, the weapon was found under a locker near the sink. March and one other
inmate were assigned to the cell. The officer stated in his report that the weapon
was found in a common area and “was easily accessible to both inmates assigned
to the cell.” Doc. 16, Ex. B, p.1. March appeared before the Unit Disciplinary
Committee and stated that the weapon was not his. The UDC referred the matter
to a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). Id.
A disciplinary hearing was held on April 20, 2011. March denied having
any knowledge of the weapon. He pointed out that his previous cellmate had left
two or three days before the weapon was found. He admitted having received and
read a copy of the prison handbook. Ex. B, p. 4. The DHO found that March’s
new cellmate had not yet moved into the cell.
He acknowledged that it was
possible that the weapon had belonged to March’s prior cellmate, but noted that
“ultimately you are responsible for any contraband found in your assigned areas
and you had ample time to search your cell to ensure it was free of any
contraband.” The DHO found him guilty of a violation of Code 104, possession,
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manufacture or introduction of a weapon. Ex. B, p. 5.
March exhausted his remedies using the BOP’s Administrative Remedy
Program.
At the administrative level, he alleged that there was insufficient
evidence that he possessed the weapon. Doc. 16, Ex. C.
Claims Raised in the Petition
Petitioner claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he actually
or constructively possessed the weapon for the following reasons:
1.
The weapon was not found in his locker or on his person, and it was
not fingerprinted.
2.
The weapon was found under the empty locker that had been used
by his former cellmate and it was found “by a trained specialist
utilizing tools unavailable to inmates.”
3.
There was no evidence that petitioner knew the weapon was in the
cell.
4.
Constructive possession was not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Applicable Legal Standards
Inmates in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons can challenge the loss of
good conduct credit by way of a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2241. Jackson v. Carlson, 707 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1983).
Inmates retain due process rights in connection with prison disciplinary
proceedings, but such proceedings “are not part of a criminal prosecution, and
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”
Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974). The minimum requirements
of due process in such proceedings are (1) receipt of written notice of the charges
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in advance of the hearing, (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial
decision maker, (3) the right to call witnesses and present evidence where same
will not be unduly hazardous to safety or correctional goals, and (4) a written
statement as to the evidence relied on and the reason for the decision. Wolff, 94
S.Ct. at 2978-2980; Henderson v. U.S. Parole Commission, 13 F.3d 1073,
1077 (7th Cir. 1994).
The findings of the disciplinary hearing officer must be supported by “some
evidence in the record.” Superintendent v. Hill, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773 (1985).
This Court can overturn the decision “only if no reasonable adjudicator could
have found [petitioner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence
presented.” Id.
Under the “some evidence” standard, this Court does not reweigh the
evidence or determine credibility. Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir.
1996). The evidence need not be sufficient to logically exclude any result except
the one reached by the prison decision maker. Viens v. Daniels, 871 F. 2d
1328, 1334-1335 (7th Cir. 1989). Further, only evidence that was presented to
the hearing officer is relevant to the determination of whether there was “some
evidence.” Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992).
Analysis
Petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding
that he violated Code 104 must be rejected under binding Seventh Circuit
precedent.
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Petitioner’s claims are based on a misunderstanding of the quantum of
proof that was required at the hearing. He refers to the preponderance of the
evidence standard in his petition. However, that is not the applicable standard.
The findings in prison disciplinary proceedings need only be supported by “some
evidence.” Superintendent v. Hill, supra. “The ‘some evidence’ standard is less
exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, requiring only that the
decision not be arbitrary or without support in the record.”
McPherson v.
McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir.1999).
The evidence before the DHO indicated that there were only two inmates
assigned to the cell, and the weapon was found in an area that “was easily
accessible to both inmates assigned to the cell.”
Doc. 16, Ex. B, p.1.
evidence satisfies the “some evidence” standard.
That
“The proposition that
constructive possession provides ‘some evidence’ of guilt when contraband is
found where only a few inmates have access is unproblematical.” Hamilton v.
O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1992). In Hamilton, the Seventh Circuit
held that the decision finding the petitioner guilty was supported by “some
evidence” where weapons were found in a cell occupied by four inmates.
Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 346. The evidence here is even stronger, as March had
only one cellmate.
March argues that he was denied due process because it was not proved
that he either actually possessed the weapon or that he actually knew the weapon
was there.
He is incorrect.
The prison may apply a rule of “collective
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responsibility,” as was done here. The Seventh Circuit held in Hamilton, supra,
that collective responsibility does not violate the Constitution. “No later decision
in the circuit has held otherwise.” Shelby v. Whitehouse, 399 Fed. Appx. 121,
122 (7th Cir. 2010).
Lastly, March argues that the weapon was accessible only by using
specialized tools. Presumably, his point is that he could not access the weapon
because he did not have such specialized tools. There are two problems with this
argument.
First, according to the Regional Office response to his grievance,
March did not raise this issue before the DHO or present any evidence that tools
were used to gain access to the weapon. Doc. 16, Ex. C. The forum for litigating
March’s guilt was the DHO hearing, and he cannot “relitigate his guilt in federal
court.” Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 347. The second problem is that this argument
is completely unsupported by the record. March points to no evidence that tools,
specialized or otherwise, were used by the officer who discovered the weapon.
The incident report says that the weapon was easily accessible to both inmates,
which indicates that no specialized tools were required to access the weapon.
Conclusion
Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was denied due process in
connection with the disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATE: February 20, 2014.
s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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