Carter v. Shawnee Prison Warden Martin et al

Filing 78

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, granting 74 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Scott Rhine. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 10/29/2013. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAM DALE CARTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 12-cv-205-JPG-PMF

SCOTT RHINE, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Scott Rhine’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 74) to which plaintiff William Dale Carter has responded (Doc. 77). For the
following reasons, the Court grants Rhine’s motion.
1. Background
Carter, currently on parole, was previously in the physical custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center
(“Shawnee”). Carter was convicted of armed home invasion and sentenced to twenty years
imprisonment. At trial, Carter was acquitted of aggravated criminal sexual assault.
On December 23, 2011, Carter was due to be released on parole. Carter, however, was
not released that day because prison officials violated his parole. The parole violation report,
prepared by IDOC parole agent Mark Schafer, states Carter’s parole was violated because the
Prisoner Review Board required he be supervised by electronic monitoring and IDOC was
unable to find a site to supervise the electronic monitoring. The parole violation report contains
the label “sex offender” and stated “yes” to the following question: “Is this current arrest or

alleged violation a sex-related offense?” The report also indicates Carter was placed in the
District 3 Sex Offender Supervision Unit.
Carter maintains he was never convicted of a sex offense and the only reason he signed
the parole violation report was because Rhine, a Shawnee field services representative, rushed
and deceived Carter into signing the report. Specifically, Rhine failed to explain the “sex
offender” label and informed Carter he was not a sex offender. Carter argues the erroneous “sex
offender” label will require him to register as a sex offender and endure harsher conditions of
parole in violation of his right to due process.
On March 5, 2012, Carter filed a complaint alleging as follows: (1) Count One - due
process violation for parole denial; (2) Count Two – due process violation for erroneously
labeling Carter a sex offender; (3) Count Three – defamation arising from the sex offender
classification; and (4) Count Four – false light invasion of privacy for his sex offender
classification. In its threshold review, this Court dismissed Count One and dismissed all
defendants except Rhine. Thereafter, the Court dismissed Counts Three and Four for failure to
state a claim. The only remaining claim is Count Two against Rhine.
Rhine filed the instant motion for summary judgment arguing he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law because (1) Carter cannot prove Rhine’s personal involvement in the violation
of Carter’s constitutional rights, (2) Carter cannot prove his due process rights were violated, (3)
Rhine is entitled to qualified immunity, and (4) Carter’s request for injunctive relief is barred.
The Court will now consider whether Rhine is entitled to summary judgment.
2. Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

2

R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels
Int’l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The reviewing court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v.
Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396. Where the moving party
fails to meet its strict burden of proof, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving
party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion.
Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992).
In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest
upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26;
Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 1996). A genuine issue of material
fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the
parties,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine
issue of material fact exists only if “a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving
party] on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The Court will consider Rhine’s first argument in which he contends Carter’s § 1983
claim fails because Carter cannot show Rhine’s personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violation. In order to succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show the state
actor was “personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation.” Doyle v. Camelot Care
Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir.
2009) (“public employees are responsible for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s”).

3

Rhine has submitted an affidavit in which he attests to the following information. Rhine
did not prepare the parole violation report or direct what statements should be contained within
the report. He has never worked in the parole division or had control over the parole division’s
decision to place Carter in the District 3 Sex Offender Supervision Unit. Rhine further states he
was never a member of and had no control over the Illinois Prisoner Review Board or the Sex
Offender Management Board. Rhine never labeled Carter a sex offender or required that he
register as a sex offender. Rhine argues he was merely a messenger of the parole violation report
in question. Carter does not dispute these statements. Rather, he argues Rhine is liable because
he rushed and deceived Carter into signing the parole violation report.
Here, Rhine has submitted his own affidavit which provides evidence that Rhine was not
personally responsible for placing Carter in the Sex Offender Supervision Unit, placing the label
“sex offender” on the parole violation report, or requiring that Carter register as a sex offender.
Carter fails to dispute these statements or produce any evidence to the contrary. Even if Rhine
rushed and deceived Carter into signing the parole violation report, there is no evidence that
Carter’s refusal to sign the report would have removed the “sex offender” label from the report
or impacted his placement in the Sex Offender Supervision Unit. Further, there is no evidence
that Carter has to register as a sex offender as a result of being rushed to sign this report.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Carter has
failed to establish that Rhine was personally involved in any alleged constitutional deprivation.
Accordingly, Rhine is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because Carter cannot establish
Rhine’s personal involvement, the Court need not consider whether his placement in the Sex
Offender Supervision Unit or the label “sex offender” on his report constituted a violation of his
right to due process.

4

3. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Rhine’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 74) and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 29, 2013
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

5