Dresser v. Astrue

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. The final order of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 3/4/2013. (jmt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SETH DRESSER,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant. 1

Civil No. 12-cv-253-CJP

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Seth Dresser is before the Court,
represented by counsel, seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying him Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI). 2
Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for benefits in May, 2008, alleging disability beginning on January 1,
2007. (Tr. 113, 116). The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After holding
1

Carolyn W. Colvin was named Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Carolyn W. Colvin is automatically substituted as defendant
herein. No further action is necessary to continue this action by reason of the last sentence of 42
U.S.C. §405(g). ("Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive
notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social
Security or any vacancy in such office.")
2

This case was referred to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 20.
[1]

an evidentiary hearing, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas C. Muldoon denied the
application for benefits in a decision dated February 11, 2011. (Tr. 17-26). Plaintiff’s request
for review was denied by the Appeals Council, and the February 11, 2011, decision became the
final agency decision. (Tr. 2).
Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies and has filed a timely complaint in this
court.
Issue Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinion of his treating psychiatrist,
Dr. Mirza Baig. 3
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB or SSI a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the applicable
statutes. 4 For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). A “physical or
mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
The ALJ and the parties spell this doctor’s name as “Barg.” However, according to his office
records, his last name is spelled “Baig.” See, e.g., Tr. 367, 369. In addition, the Commissioner
refers to Dr. Baig as female, but he is male. See, http://wellspringresources.co/about/leadership,
accessed on February 27, 2012.
4
The statutes and regulations pertaining to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) are found at 42
U.S.C. § 423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. The statutes and regulations pertaining to SSI are
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1382c, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416. For all intents and purposes
relevant to this case, the DIB and SSI statutes are identical. Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925
detailing medical considerations relevant to an SSI claim, relies on 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, the
DIB regulations. Most citations herein are to the DIB regulations out of convenience.
3

[2]

techniques. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3) and 1382c(a)(3)(C). “Substantial gainful activity” is work
activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or
profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether a
claimant is disabled. It must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is presently unemployed;
(2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that is serious; (3)
whether the impairments meet or equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged to be
conclusively disabling; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether
the claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy, given his or her age,
education and work experience. Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1992); see
also, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b-f).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision is supported by
substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made.

The scope of review is limited.

“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must determine not
whether Mr. Dresser was, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by
substantial evidence and whether any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d
972, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)). This
Court uses the Supreme Court’s definition of substantial evidence, i.e., “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into
[3]

consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of
credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384,
1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court
does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921
(7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Muldoon followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He
determined that Mr. Dresser had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged
onset date. He was insured for DIB through June 30, 2009, which is relevant to the application for
DIB only. The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments of major depression, anxiety
disorder with panic-like episodes and borderline intellectual functioning. The ALJ further
determined that plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment.
ALJ Muldoon concluded that Mr. Dresser had the residual functional capacity to perform
work at all exertional levels, limited to simple, routine activity with few social demands. In
response to interrogatories, a vocational expert stated that he could perform jobs which exist in
significant numbers in the national and local economy. The ALJ accepted this evidence, and
found that he is not disabled. (Tr. 17-26).
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in formulating this
Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record is directed to the point raised by
plaintiff.
1.

Agency Forms
[4]

Plaintiff was born in March, 1986, and was 21 years old on the alleged onset date. (Tr.
143). He was 6 feet tall and weighed 150 pounds. (Tr. 146). He said that he was unable to
work because of confusion, bipolar disorder, stress, anxiety and depression. He said that he had
problems concentrating, remembering things, and accepting criticism and correction. (Tr. 147).
Plaintiff said that he stopped working in April 2008, because of his condition. (Tr. 147).
He worked part-time as a cook in 2008. (Tr. 133). He had worked as a bagger/cashier in a
grocery store and as a dishwasher in a restaurant. (Tr. 148). His earnings were always below the
level of substantial gainful employment. (Tr. 127-130).
Mr. Dresser graduated from high school in 2004. He was in special education classes.
(Tr. 152-153).
In a Function Report, plaintiff said that he lived with his family. He played computer
games, took long bike rides for exercise, walked his dog around the neighborhood and hung out
with friends. (Tr. 163). He mowed the lawn, vacuumed and cleaned his room. (Tr. 165). He
was able to go shopping for personal items and clothes. (Tr. 166). He had trouble with
concentrating, talking, getting along with others, understanding and following instructions. (Tr.
168).
2.

Evidentiary Hearings
Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing on February 2, 2010. (Tr. 32).
Mr. Dresser testified that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disease. He was taking

medication, which helped him. (Tr. 39-40). He did things over and over, like washing his hands
and checking the door locks. (Tr. 43). He felt that he could work part-time, but full-time work
would be overwhelming. (Tr. 45).
[5]

Plaintiff’s mother testified that he was easily frustrated. (Tr. 49-50). She felt it would be
hard for him to work full-time because he had “emotional outbursts.” (Tr. 54). He was taking
four medications for bipolar disease and depression, which helped, but she did not think he was
capable of full-time work. (Tr. 55-56).
3.

Medical Records
Plaintiff was treated at Prairie Counseling Center from January, 2005, through June, 2006.

He was referred there by “probation.” He had run away from home and had a car accident in
Columbia, Missouri. He left the scene of the accident and stole a Fed Ex truck, which he drove to
Colorado. (Tr. 278). There was a second incident in which he took his mother’s car and drove to
Texas. He was arrested for stealing gas on the way home. (Tr. 274). In February, 2006, he
reported that he was feeling better as he was working. (Tr. 271). The diagnosis was adjustment
disorder with mixed mood. He was discharged because his family was moving and he was
transferred to another provider. (Tr. 269).
In June, 2007, he was seen at Transitions Counseling after he felt rejected by a female and
then spontaneously drove to Kansas City. He had episodic feelings of depression. (Tr. 294).
Mr. Dresser began treatment at Tri-County Counseling on June 26, 2007. He reported
problems with depression, stress and impulsive behaviors. He had poor self-esteem and increased
irritability. He was not taking any medications, but had taken Prozac in the past. (Tr. 312). On
exam, he was cooperative and neatly groomed. His affect was flat. His thought processes and
content were appropriate. Long term and short term memory were intact. His insight and
judgment were poor. He was noted to be of average intelligence. The impression was bipolar
disease. (Tr. 315-316). On February 14, 2008, it was noted that he had stopped taking his
[6]

antidepressant because it caused sexual dysfunction. (Tr. 298). In March, 2008, he reported that
he had problems with impatience, anger, edginess and annoyance, but these occurred at home.
He was working 21 hours a week at Sonic as a cook. (Tr. 297).
On April 18, 2008, plaintiff was admitted to Gateway Regional Medical Center with
depression, paranoia and panic attacks. He had stopped taking his medications about a week and
a half earlier. On the prior day, he got lost while test driving a car, and drove around for 12 hours
before calling his father for directions. He was hospitalized to restart his medications and to start
Lamictal. (Tr. 328-330). He was discharged on April 29, 2008. The transcript does not contain
a formal discharge report. (Tr. 343)
Plaintiff’s last visit to Tri-County was on May 8, 2008. He reported that his probation
officer did not want him working. His mood had been “off and on,” but his medications were
working. (Tr. 296).
Dr. Baig first saw plaintiff on July 15, 2008. (Tr. 367). He treated him in conjunction
with counseling services he received at the Community Counseling Center in Alton, Illinois. The
transcript contains records of eight visits between July 15, 2008, and January 7, 2010. In
November, 2010, plaintiff told Dr. Vincent he was continuing to see Dr. Baig every three months,
but the transcript does not contain any records from later visits. (Tr. 551).
At the first visit, plaintiff told Dr. Baig that he was unhappy with Tri-County and therefore
switched to Community Counseling. He described his legal problems, including the episode in
which he left the scene of an accident and took a Fed Ex truck. On exam, he was alert and
oriented. His mood was euthymic, i.e., normal. See, http://medical-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/euthymic, accessed on February 27, 2013. His affect was appropriate.
[7]

He denied suicidal or homicidal thoughts. He was able to recall 3 out of 3 objects. His insight
was poor and his judgment was extremely poor. Dr. Baig referred him for a CT scan, examination
by a neurologist and IQ testing. He noted that he had a court date scheduled the next day. (Tr.
367-368).
An MRI scan of the brain was negative. (Tr. 411).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Rai, a neurologist, for evaluation. On his referral, a neuropsychological
evaluation was done in September, 2008. The psychologist who did the evaluation noted several
times in his report that plaintiff’s effort was questionable. He also said that plaintiff confabulated
responses to some questions. However, he was able to follow three-step directions and had no
difficulty with attention or concentration. He displayed some problems on memory testing, but
his effort was noted to be questionable. The psychologist concluded that he had some cognitive
difficulties, but the extent could not be assessed because of Mr. Dresser’s questionable effort.
(Tr. 425-431).

Dr. Rai concluded in September, 2008, that plaintiff had borderline intellectual

impairment but did not identify a neurological problem. (Tr. 409, 416-417).
On September 5, 2008, Stephen G. Vincent, Ph.D., performed a consultative psychological
evaluation. Dr. Vincent reviewed records from IQ testing that was done in 2001 while plaintiff
was still in school. He tested in the mildly mentally retarded range at that time, but Dr. Vincent
felt that those scores were not indicative of his level of functioning. He noted that Mr. Dresser
had no difficulty in comprehending simple or detailed instructions and communicating effectively.
Dr. Vincent noted that plaintiff was on probation for possession of marijuana, and that plaintiff
told that he sometimes smoked to calm his thoughts down and relax. Mental status exam showed
that he was oriented, but his mood and affect were moderately depressed. His thought processes
[8]

were adequate and not consistent with his school IQ scores in the mildly retarded ranged. Dr.
Vincent administered IQ testing in the form of the WAIS-III test, which resulted in Verbal IQ of
81, Performance IQ of 86 and Full Scale IQ of 82. According to Dr. Vincent, he was functioning
in the low average to borderline range. His most problematic issue appeared to be mood
disturbances. (Tr. 440-443).
In September, 2008, plaintiff told Dr. Baig that he had a court date coming up. He said he
was taking his medication and was “feeling much better.” Dr. Baig noted that he had no
psychotic symptoms, no hallucinations, no ideas of reference, and no suicidal or homicidal
thoughts. He concluded that he seemed to be “making fair progress.” He continued him on
Cogentin, Celexa, Invega and Lamictal. (Tr. 380). In October, 2008, plaintiff reported that he
was feeling “much, much better” with medication and he thought he would not be in legal trouble
if he had been on medication before. He was alert and oriented. His mood was euthymic and his
affect was appropriate. He reported no major behavioral or management problems. His memory
had been fair. (Tr. 381).
On October 29, 2008, plaintiff was very happy that he had gotten probation on his pending
criminal charge. Dr. Baig wrote that his symptoms were in “in remission with medications” and
that he was “making good progress overall.” There were no positive findings on mental status
exam. (Tr. 382).
Dr. Baig saw plaintiff three more times. On each visit, Dr. Baig noted that he was doing
well on medication and his symptoms were controlled. No positive findings were noted on
mental status exams, except that, on the last visit, he reported problems with concentration and
some OCD symptoms such as washing his hands frequently. His bipolar disorder was described
[9]

as “in remission.” (Tr. 475, 476, 510).
On the date of the last visit, January 7, 2010, Dr. Baig completed a form assessing Mr.
Dresser’s limitations. He indicated that Mr. Dresser had moderate limitations in activities of
daily living; maintaining social functioning; concentration, persistence and pace; and episodes of
deterioration or decompensation. In answer to a question about how often plaintiff would be
absent from work due to his impairment or for medical treatment, Dr. Baig checked both “three
times per month” and “more than three times per month.” He attached a copy of the note from his
examination that same day, in which he stated that plaintiff’s bipolar disorder was in remission and
that he denied any mood swings. (Tr. 508-510).
On August 16, 2010, plaintiff presented to Gateway Regional Medical Center. He said he
wanted to be admitted because his parents did not understand him and he needed to get away from
them. He presented to the hospital at 5:49 p.m. (Tr. 521). He was sent home a few hours later
because he did not meet the criteria for admission and there were no psychiatric beds available.
(Tr. 527-528).
Plaintiff’s attorney requested that another consultative exam be done to resolve the
discrepancy in plaintiff’s IQ test results. (Tr. 237-238). The ALJ granted that request. Dr.
Vincent evaluated plaintiff again in November, 2010. The most recent medical record available
for review was the note from Dr. Baig’s exam on January 7, 2010. Dr. Vincent noted that, despite
his bipolar disease being described as “in remission,” plaintiff said that he had a recurrence of
symptoms of depression and panic attacks. On exam, he was oriented. His speech was slow.
His mood was depressed. Eye contact was good. He was concrete of thought and had difficulty
with processing information. Dr. Vincent administered the WAIS-IV on that date, which is
[10]

scored somewhat differently from the version that had been administered by him earlier. See,
http://www.pearsonassessments.com/HAIWEB /Cultures/en-us/Productdetail.htm?Pid
=015-8980-808, accessed on February 27, 2013. This test resulted in a Full Scale IQ of 71. Dr.
Vincent said that plaintiff was functioning in the borderline range of intellectual functioning. Dr.
Vincent completed a report in which he indicated that Mr. Dresser had moderate restrictions in
understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions and in interacting appropriately
with the public, supervisors and co-workers. Moderate difficulties are defined in the form report
as “more than a slight limitation in this area but the individual is still able to function
satisfactorily.” Dr. Vincent also indicated that plaintiff had marked restrictions in his ability to
make judgments on simple work-related decisions. Marked difficulties are “serious” and
represent “a substantial loss in the ability to effectively function.”
4.

(Tr. 548-554).

RFC Evaluation
A state agency psychologist evaluated plaintiff’s mental RFC in September, 2008, and

concluded that he was not significantly limited in his ability to understand, remember and carry out
short and simple instructions. He noted that, while plaintiff had a history of learning disability
and mental health issues, he was capable of performing simple, routine activities with few social
demands, and that his adaptive behaviors were adequate. (Tr. 458-460).
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in the weight he assigned to the opinions expressed by
Dr. Baig in his report of January 7, 2010.
The Court notes that, to the extent that Dr. Baig was opining as to plaintiff’s RFC, such
opinions are not entitled to any special weight because the issue of RFC is an issue that is reserved
[11]

to the Commissioner. See, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(e). SSR 96-59 explains:
However, treating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the Commissioner
are never entitled to controlling weight or special significance. Giving controlling
weight to such opinions would, in effect, confer upon the treating source the
authority to make the determination or decision about whether an individual is
under a disability, and thus would be an abdication of the Commissioner's statutory
responsibility to determine whether an individual is disabled.
SSR 96-5p, at *2. See also, Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2010).
Dr. Baig’s medical opinion, as opposed to his opinion as to RFC, is, of course, not
automatically entitled to controlling weight. Rather, it is entitled to controlling weight only
where it is supported by medical findings and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in
the record. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2000); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881
(7th Cir. 2001).
With regard to the assessment of treating source opinions, the version of 20 C.F.R.
§404.1527(d)(2) in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision states:
Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these
sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,
longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations. If we find that a treating
source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your impairment(s) is
well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case
record, we will give it controlling weight. [Emphasis added]
Here, ALJ Muldoon gave little weight to Dr. Baig’s opinion because it was not
well-supported by “clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and it was “inconsistent with
other substantial medical evidence in the case record.” (Tr. 23). However, because the ALJ
relied on a mistaken view of the medical evidence and only selectively considered Dr. Vincent’s
[12]

second report, his assessment of Dr. Baig’s opinion cannot stand.
ALJ Muldoon misunderstood the medical evidence. He said that plaintiff was
hospitalized for only one day in 2008. See, Tr. 21. In fact, plaintiff was hospitalized from April
18, 2008, through April 29, 2008. See, Tr. 326, 343. He noted that a psychologist who evaluated
plaintiff in 2008 said that plaintiff “yawned through some tasks and confabulated multiple
responses.” The ALJ concluded that this observation damaged Mr. Dresser’s credibility. See,
Tr. 19. The ALJ evidently did not understand that confabulation is a term of art in the practice of
psychology. It means “confusion of imagination with actual memories, or the formation of false
memories, due to a psychological or neurological disorder.” See,

http://psychcentral.com/

encyclopedia/2008/confabulation-2, accessed on February 28, 2013. Importantly, confabulation
is not the conscious or deliberate telling of a falsehood; rather, the falsehood is genuinely believed
by the person telling it. See, http://www.academia.edu/188810/ Faultless_ignorance_strengths_
and_limitations_of_epistemic_definitions_of_confabulation, accessed on February 28, 2013.
More importantly, ALJ Muldoon gave short shrift to Dr. Vincent’s second evaluation in
November, 2010. He noted only that plaintiff’s IQ results were in the borderline range and that
Dr. Vincent said that he had no difficulty following simple instructions. (Tr. 20, 22). The ALJ
ignored the parts of Dr. Vincent’s report that were favorable to plaintiff’s application and which
tended to support Dr. Baig’s opinion. After noting that plaintiff was taking his medications, Dr.
Vincent said that, despite the fact that plaintiff’s bipolar disease had been described as “in
remission” in January, 2010, Mr. Dresser was again having signs and symptoms of depression as
well as panic attacks. (Tr. 551-552). Test results indicated that his mood was depressed with
underlying anxiety. (Tr. 552). Further, Dr. Vincent opined that he had “limitations in

13

conceptual, practical and social intelligence” and that those limitations “would compromise his
capacity to engage in functional activities, academics and function independently, as well as relate
to others and self-direct.” (Tr. 553). Results from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory-II indicated “high levels of anxiety, depression, as well as problems with feeling
alienated from self, as well as others, and distrust in others.” (Tr. 553). Dr. Vincent diagnosed
major depression and generalized anxiety disorder with panic-like episodes. (Tr. 554). Lastly,
Dr. Vincent rated Mr. Dresser’s ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions as
markedly limited. (Tr. 548). ALJ Muldoon discussed none of these findings.
An ALJ’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ’s discussion of
the evidence must be sufficient to “provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his
conclusions.” Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2009), internal citations omitted.
In considering the evidence, the ALJ must “confront evidence that does not support his conclusion
and explain why it was rejected.”

Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2004).

ALJ Muldoon failed to build the requisite logical bridge by selectively discussing Dr. Vincent’s
second report, ignoring the parts that conflicted with his decision. Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672,
678 (7th Cir. 2009); Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000).
This is not to say that the ALJ was required to accept Dr. Vincent’s opinion, or that
acceptance of Dr. Vincent’s opinion would mandate the conclusion that Mr. Dresser was disabled.
However, Dr. Vincent’s report tended to support Dr. Baig’s opinion. The ALJ rejected Dr. Baig’s
opinion because it was not supported by clinical and laboratory techniques and it was inconsistent
with other medical evidence. He could not legitimately reach that conclusion without a full
consideration of Dr. Vincent’s November, 2010, report. Further, the ALJ’s conclusion rested in

14

part on his view that the medical evidence showed that plaintiff improved with treatment. That
conclusion ignored Dr. Vincent’s observation that plaintiff was having significant symptoms
despite taking his medications in November, 2010.
Because of the ALJ’s errors, this case must be remanded. The Court wishes to stress that
this Memorandum and Order should not be construed as an indication that the Court believes that
Mr. Dresser is disabled or that he should be awarded benefits. On the contrary, the Court has not
formed any opinions in that regard, and leaves those issues to be determined by the Commissioner
after further proceedings.
Conclusion
The Commissioner’s final decision denying Seth Dresser’s application for social security
disability benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for rehearing and
reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 4, 2013.
s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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