Dupree v. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE why claims against USPS should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely effect service; Granting 32 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support filed by National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO. Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 6/11/13. (bkl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TRACY DUPREE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 12-cv-576-JPG-DGW

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER
CARRIERS, AFL-CIO, and UNITED STATES
POSTAL SERVICE,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant
National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (“NALC”) (Doc. 32). Plaintiff Tracy Dupree has
responded to the motion (Doc. 35), and NALC has replied to that response (Doc. 39).
I.

Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d
392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath,
211 F.3d at 396.
II.

Facts
As a preliminary matter, NALC argues the Court should disregard certain statements contained

in Dupree’s affidavit in opposition to summary judgment because they are speculative, conclusory or
hearsay. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court considers only evidence that would be

admissible or usable at trial. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009). Hearsay
cannot be used to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Id. Affidavits must be based on personal
knowledge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). To the extent statements in Dupree’s affidavit are hearsay or
otherwise not based on her personal knowledge, the Court will disregard them.
That being said, the competent evidence in the file, viewed in Dupree’s favor, establishes the
following relevant facts for the purposes of this motion.
Dupree is a member of NALC Branch 319 and worked for the defendant United States Postal
Service (“USPS”) in its East St. Louis, Illinois, post office. NALC is the exclusive bargaining
representative of Dupree and others in the collective bargaining unit with respect to their employment
with the USPS. NALC and the USPS had negotiated a national collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) that required just cause for discipline or discharge, CBA Art. 16 § 1 and provides that
unresolved grievances may be arbitrated, CBA Art. 15 § 3.
On November 8, 2010, Dupree was unable to report to work because of a medical problem. She
called in sick and requested eight hours of sick leave. Fourteen other employees also called in sick that
same day. The absence of so many employees adversely impacted the operations at the East St. Louis
post office. After Dupree returned to work the following day, her supervisor asked her for medical
documentation to support her request for sick leave, although the CBA only required medical
documentation for absences of more than three days. Dupree offered to go to the doctor immediately,
but her supervisor told her that was not necessary.
At some point, the USPS began to suspect that Dupree had organized a “sick-out” – organized
action where multiple employees call in sick on the same day – on November 8, 2010, to protest car
thefts from the East St. Louis post office property. The USPS Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”)
investigated the matter, speaking with numerous witnesses including Dupree and coworker Willie
Frazier. The OIG eventually issued a lengthy report summarizing its investigation. The report noted
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that three witnesses had stated Frazier had solicited them to participate in the sick-out. The report
further stated that it was possible that Frazier had sent a November 7, 2010, text message encouraging
employees to call in sick. Some statements in the report also implicated Dupree as an instigator of the
sick-out.
Information uncovered by the OIG’s investigation was the basis for the USPS’s decision to
terminate Dupree and eleven other bargaining unit members. In early May 2011, the USPS issued
Dupree a Notice of Removal telling her she would be terminated from her job for conduct unbecoming of
a postal employee. The Notice specifically cited untruthful answers she provided to the OIG during her
first of two interviews and her contacting employees to inform them to call in sick on November 8, 2010.
NALC grieved this discipline all the way through arbitration claiming that there was no just cause for
Dupree’s discharge.
NALC designated Kenneth R. Miller, an experienced arbitrator, to represent Dupree at the
arbitration hearing. Miller also represented five other bargaining unit employees in their arbitration
over discipline issued as a result of the sick-out, all of which had occurred prior to Dupree’s hearing. In
preparation for Dupree’s hearing, he familiarized himself with Dupree’s grievance file and with the OIG
report. Miller also met with Dupree in person one time the week before the hearing for about a half
hour. 1 At that meeting, he read the two statements Dupree had given during the OIG investigation,
listened to her explain what happened from November 6 to November 8, 2010, and advised her how to
dress for the hearing. He also told her that the statements others had made against her in the OIG
investigation did not matter because the arbitrator would base his decision on the credibility of the
witnesses at the hearing. Miller was aware that Ed Hawkins had stated the OIG coerced him into
making a statement against Dupree.
Later, Miller spoke on the phone with Dupree to convey a settlement offer from the USPS: it
1

Miller and Dupree disagree about how Miller prepared her for the hearing, but on summary judgment,
the Court must accept Dupree’s version of the events.
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would drop the sick-out participation charges against bargaining unit employees Hawkins (a male) and
John Frawley (a white male), both accused of participating in the sick-out, if Dupree and Reenai Mason,
another bargaining unit employee suspected of instigating the sick-out, would voluntarily resign.
NALC encouraged Dupree to accept the settlement, but she refused. Miller states that Dupree’s race
played no role in his representation of her and that there was no “secret deal” between NALC and the
USPS to benefit other bargaining unit members.
Prior to the arbitration hearing, several employees who had received Notices of Removal were
allowed to return to work, including Hawkins and Frawley.
Dupree’s arbitration occurred on February 10, 2012. While NALC and the USPS had the right
to request that a court reporter transcribe the proceedings, neither did, which was the standard procedure
in arbitration hearings. Miller did not know which witnesses the USPS would call prior to the hearing.
At the hearing, Miller argued that Dupree provided medical documentation of her November 8, 2010,
absence but the USPS lost it; Dupree did not organize the sick-out; the only evidence Dupree was an
organizer of the sick-out was inconsistent, circumstantial and/or suspect evidence; discharge was too
harsh of a penalty even if Dupree did something wrong; and the Notice of Removal was not timely.
Dupree testified at the hearing, but Miller did not call any other witnesses to testify in her favor
because, in light of the potential witnesses’ statements in the OIG report, which was admitted at the
hearing, Miller thought their testimony might be detrimental to Dupree’s cause. Miller only
cross-examined one of the five USPS witnesses. 2 He did not cross-examine Frazier, who gave
testimony inconsistent with some of the statements he had made to the OIG during the investigation, or
Jane Moeller, who could have testified that there was no legitimate reason to wait to request medical
documentation until Dupree returned to work. In addition, seven people who gave statements in the
OIG’s investigation, including Dupree, submitted written statements in the case file saying that the OIG
2

Again, the Court must accept Dupree’s version of the events at the hearing.
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report did not represent their statements accurately. Miller submitted a post-hearing brief, which was
beyond the normal practice.
On April 1, 2012, the arbitrator found in favor of the USPS and denied Dupree’s grievance. The
arbitrator found that Dupree (1) had not provided medical documentation of her November 8, 2010,
illness because there was none in the record and (2) was actively involved in organizing the November 8,
2010, sick-out. The arbitrator further found (3) the penalty of discharge was not excessive in light of
Dupree’s abuse of sick leave and conspiratorial action intended to cause an inappropriate work stoppage,
(4) the circumstantial or derivative nature of some evidence was overcome by the persuasiveness of
sworn statements and live testimony regarding Dupree’s conduct, and (5) the six-month delay between
Dupree’s conduct and the Notice of Removal was reasonable in light of the lengthy OIG investigation
and report and in light of the lack of prejudice to Dupree. The arbitrator noted at one point in the award
that NALC “left no stone unturned in the defense of this Grievant.” Arb. Award at 11.
In May 2012, Dupree filed this lawsuit. In Count I of the amended complaint (Doc. 17) she
seeks to vacate the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10. In
Count II, she alleges NALC breached its duty of fair representation in failing to negotiate a CBA
provision requiring transcripts of arbitration hearings and in conducting the arbitration in a manner that
was arbitrary, discriminatory and in bad faith. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
Presumably, these claims also include a claim against the USPS for breach of the CBA – a hybrid claim
– since, in the grievance-arbitration context, a claim against a union for breach of duty cannot succeed
unless the plaintiff also proves a case against the employer for breach of the CBA under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554 (1976); Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980). An “employee’s claim
against the union and his claim against the employer are interlocked: neither claim is viable if the other
fails.” Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1241 (7th Cir. 1997); accord DelCostello
5

v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983)
NALC asks the Court for summary judgment on Count II for breach of the duty of fair
representation on the basis that NALC’s representation of Dupree was reasonable and that Dupree
cannot show that but for NALC’s alleged breach, the results of the arbitration would have been different.
NALC also asks for summary judgment on Count I to vacate the arbitration award because Dupree has
no standing under the FAA to bring such a claim.
III.

Analysis
A.

Count II: Duty of Fair Representation

An employee may bring a claim for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation for a union’s
conduct in pursuing a grievance or for negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. Air Line Pilots
Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); see Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (negotiation); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944). This duty arises because the union is the exclusive agent of all bargaining unit members and
must therefore “serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, . . .
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and . . . avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca,
386 U.S. at 171; see Steele, 323 U.S. at 202 (“[T]he exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of
others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf.”).
A union violates its duty of fair representation when its conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory or in
bad faith. O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 67 (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190). To withstand a motion for or
summary judgment, a plaintiff must point to evidence of at least one of these elements. Filippo v.
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Corp., 141 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1998). In addition, the plaintiff must show
she was actually harmed by the union’s conduct. Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1176-77
(7th Cir. 1995). For example, in the grievance context, the plaintiff must show that had the union acted
differently – say, called different witnesses, examined evidence better, conducted cross-examination,
6

spent more time preparing for the arbitration – the outcome of the arbitration would probably have been
different. Id. at 1177
“[A] union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of
the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness,’ . . . as to be
irrational.” O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 67 (quoting Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338). If there is any rational reason
for the union’s conduct, it cannot be found to be arbitrary. Filippo, 141 F.3d at 748. In the context of
pursuing a grievance on behalf of an employee, “a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191. On the contrary, it “must
provide some minimal investigation of employee grievances, but the thoroughness of this investigation
depends on the particular case, and only an egregious disregard for union members’ rights constitutes a
breach of the union’s duty.” Filippo, 141 F.3d at 748 (internal quotations omitted). It may also
consider things like the allocation of its own limited resources and its relationship with other employees
and the employer. Neal v. Newspaper Holdings, Inc., 349 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2003). This standard
is extremely deferential to the union’s judgment and requires more than mere negligence or malpractice.
Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990)); Garcia, 58 F.3d at
1176. Even if it is clear in hindsight that the union should have done things differently, there is no
breach of the duty of fair representation unless the union’s conduct was irrational. Id. at 1177.
A union violates the duty of fair representation if its discrimination against a worker is
“intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Elec.
Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971); see Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997) (discrimination must be invidious). Finally, bad faith generally
connotes “[d]ishonesty of belief or purpose.” Black’s Law Dictionary 149 (8th ed. 2004). The bad
faith determination requires inquiry into the subjective motivation behind a union’s conduct. O’Neill,
499 U.S. at 74-75.
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The Court now turns to the specific ways Dupree alleges NALC was deficient. She criticizes
Miller for not spending enough time preparing her for the arbitration, for recommending Dupree accept a
settlement offer that benefitted two other employees, for not requesting a transcript of the hearing, for
not calling any witnesses on her behalf, and for only cross-examining one of the USPS witnesses. She
also suggests NALC was deficient in its collective bargaining on behalf of the bargaining unit by failing
to obtain a CBA clause providing for transcripts of arbitrations.
1.

Preparation for Arbitration

Dupree believes Miller’s thirty-minute meeting with her, mostly focusing on what she should
wear, one week before the arbitration was insufficient to prepare her for the arbitration. In that meeting,
he reviewed her two prior statements in the OIG investigation and listened to her explain her version of
the events. He also told her the statements would not matter because the arbitrator would concentrate
on the credibility of the witnesses at the hearing.
This preparation was reasonable. Miller was by that time familiar with the OIG report and the
relevant evidence, having represented five other employees in arbitrations about the same incident prior
to Dupree’s arbitration. He reviewed with her the key evidence that might be used to discredit her live
testimony – her two prior, somewhat inconsistent, statements – and confirmed her current version of the
events, which presumably reflected how she would testify at the hearing. He also advised her how to
dress at the hearing, a factor which, for better or for worse, can influence a fact-finder’s credibility
decision. His strategic judgment call about Dupree’s best chance for a favorable arbitration result was
not to worry about the prior OIG investigation statements of others, for that was water under the bridge
that could not be changed, and to focus instead on maximizing Dupree’s credibility at the hearing. This
was a reasonable strategy. That it was not successful does not mean it was irrational at the time.
Dupree also suggests Miller gave her short shrift in arbitration preparation because of her gender

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and race. 3 She alleges Miller “took great care” in preparing the arbitration case for Frawley, a white
male employee who won his arbitration and was returned to work. Even assuming Dupree had personal
knowledge of Frawley’s interactions with Miller such that she could testify about that contact, Dupree
has not pointed to anything from which a reasonable juror could find the additional preparation was
because of sex or race. There is no direct or circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer
discrimination. Dupree and Frawley were not similarly situated in a number of ways. 4 For example,
Frawley’s arbitration occurred before Dupree’s. It is reasonable to expect Miller to prepare more for
Frawley’s case and not to have to repeat the same preparation for Dupree’s case involving many of the
same events. Additionally, there was evidence Dupree was an organizer of the sick-out and had already
given inconsistent statements to the OIG, while Frawley was only accused of being a participant in the
sick-out. Dupree has not pointed to anything demonstrating that Miller’s preparation of each was based
on sex or race as opposed to a decision to devote union resources to the earlier arbitration of an employee
with a better chance of having his discipline reversed. Dupree has simply not provided any evidence
Miller selected his level of preparation based on sex or race.
Additionally, although Dupree claims Miller “never prepared [her] for the hearing,” she has not
even suggested how additional or different preparation would have had a reasonable probability of
changing the result of the arbitration. For these reasons, the Court finds Dupree has failed to present
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Miller’s preparation of Dupree for the arbitration
hearing breached NALC’s duty of fair representation because it was arbitrary or discriminatory.

3

Dupree does not state in her complaint or her summary judgment response what her race is. However,
because she compares herself to white employees, the Court gathers she is non-white.
4
While this is not an employment discrimination case, the Court notes that jurisprudence in that area has
crafted a way to establish discrimination where there is no direct or circumstantial evidence. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). That provides useful guidance, but not
a hard rule, about what can establish discrimination in other contexts. One essential element of the
McDonnell Douglas test is different treatment of a similarly situated person. The Court finds that to be
an appropriate inquiry in this case as well.
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2.

Settlement Offer

Dupree believes Miller’s negotiation for the USPS’s offer to reemploy Hawkins and Frawley,
accused sick-out participants, in exchange for the voluntary resignation of Dupree and Mason, accused
sick-out organizers, was arbitrary. The Court disagrees. The allegations in Dupree’s Notice of
Removal demonstrate that the OIG report contained substantial evidence that Dupree and Mason were
the organizers of the sick-out, thus were likely to be regarded as more culpable in the work stoppage than
Hawkins and Frawley, mere participants. Although pursuing Dupree’s grievance, NALC represents the
union as a whole, and where there are conflicting concerns among union members, NALC sometimes
has to make choices favorable to some members and detrimental to others. So long as these choices are
not arbitrary or discriminatory, they do not breach the duty of fair representation. Here, NALC
negotiated a deal to ensure two less culpable members would be returned to work at the expense of two
likely more culpable members. The deal guaranteed two workers’ reemployment, allowed two workers
to avoid getting fired, and erased the risk of losing all four. While this might not have been the best deal
for Dupree, it was not an irrational deal for the union as a whole. Furthermore, as discussed in the prior
section, Dupree has not pointed to anything to show that NALC’s judgment in recommending this
settlement offer was based on gender or race.
3.

Transcript

Dupree believes Miller’s representation was irrational because he failed to request a transcript of
the arbitration proceeding, which would have helped her overturn the arbitration award. This decision
was not irrational. It saved NALC and the USPS the costs of transcript preparation and was the
standard practice in any arbitration. Dupree has not suggested why her case was so out of the ordinary
that it warranted departure from the standard practice. Furthermore, she has not demonstrated how
having the transcript would have likely led to a different result. NALC satisfied its duty of fair
representation as to this matter.
10

By the same token, NALC’s failure to bargain for a CBA provision requiring that a transcript be
prepared in every arbitration was reasonable. Transcripts are expensive and would complicate the
grievance procedure, which is designed to quickly and smoothly resolve workers’ complaints. It was
reasonable to forego an additional expense for the sake of efficiency.
4.

Witnesses

Dupree argues Miller’s representation of her at the hearing was perfunctory since he did not call
any witnesses (other than Dupree) and only cross-examined one of the USPS witnesses. She notes he did
not even know who the USPS witnesses would be before the arbitration began so he could prepare an
adequate cross-examination. No evidence suggests Miller’s representation was perfunctory or was not
a good faith effort on behalf of NALC to represent Dupree.
The decision not to call additional witnesses in Dupree’s favor was not irrational. Miller was
familiar with the massive OIG report containing multiple statements from various witnesses implicating
Dupree. In his judgment, their testimony might have hurt Dupree’s case. For example, they might
have confirmed statements they made to the OIG against her. They also might have been able to
explain inconsistencies that would make their prior statements against Dupree appear more credible or to
give further inconsistent statements that would make their prior statements in Dupree’s favor less
credible. Miller appreciated these risks and thought it was not worth it to roll the dice. Additionally,
Dupree has not specified what witnesses Miller could have called, what their testimony would have been
and how that would have created a reasonable probability that the result of the arbitration would have
been different. Without this information, the Court cannot say NALC violated its duty of fair
representation by failing to call more witnesses.
As for the decision to cross-examine only one of five witnesses, that too was not an irrational
decision. Dupree argues Miller should have cross-examined Frazier about his efforts to solicit
participation in the sick-out or about the OIG’s conclusion that Frazier could have sent one of the text
11

messages soliciting participants. Again, there were risks that Frazier could have confirmed statements
detrimental to Dupree about their conversation prior to the sick-out, and no guarantee that Miller had a
basis for impeaching him. Additionally, evidence about Frazier’s participation in soliciting sick-out
participants and that he could have been responsible for the text message was already in the OIG report.
Raising this again at the hearing would have been redundant. As for the origin of text message, the
arbitrator noted Miller argued the evidence was too circumstantial to support the discipline of
termination. The arbitrator ultimately agreed with Miller that the text message would not have
supported termination without other, more direct evidence like sworn statements and testimony.
Miller’s decision to focus on the circumstantial nature of the text message, an argument the arbitrator
accepted, rather than highlight the issue with an unpredictable – or at least a predictably unfavorable –
witness was a reasonable decision and not at all irrational.
Dupree also argues Miller was deficient for failing to cross examine Moeller, one of Dupree’s
supervisors, who could have testified that there was no legitimate reason to wait until Dupree returned to
work to ask for medical documentation of her November 8, 2010, illness. This is an irrelevant issue.
The rationale for when Moeller asked Dupree for her medical documentation is irrelevant to the main
issue regarding her absence: whether she provided medical documentation. Miller’s choice not to
spend time on a purely collateral issue was reasonable.
Viewing Dupree’s arguments as a whole, she seems to believe essentially that NALC did not
represent her fairly because Miller was not able to come up with favorable evidence or to defuse
unfavorable evidence, yet she has not specified how he could have done any of this such that there is a
reasonable probability the arbitrator would have reached a different result. Miller played the hand he
was dealt, and did not play it in a perfunctory, irrational or discriminatory way. The arbitrator, who is in
the best position to judge representation performance at an arbitration hearing, even noted that Miller left
no stone unturned when defending Dupree. There is simply no basis for finding a breach of the duty of
12

fair representation in this regard.
In sum, Dupree has not pointed to any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find NALC’s
representation was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Accordingly, she cannot prevail on her
claims against NALC for breach of the duty of fair representation or against the USPS for breach of the
CBA.
B.

Count I: Vacating Arbitration Award

Dupree asks the Court to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4),
on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed his power that a mutual,
final and definite award was not made. NALC argues that Dupree lacks standing to challenge the
arbitrator’s award because only a party to the arbitration may seek vacation of an award, and only NALC
and the USPS were parties to Dupree’s arbitration. Dupree did not respond to this argument and has
therefore waived any objection.
Individual employees do not have standing to challenge the result of arbitration proceedings
between their union and their employer unless there was fraud or deceit or the union did not fairly
represent them. Anderson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 1985); see Shores v.
Peabody Coal Co., 831 F.2d 1382,1383-84 (7th Cir. 1987). The FAA authorizes the Court to vacate an
arbitration award “upon the application of any party to the arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). The
arbitration award in this case clearly shows that the parties were the USPS and NALC, not Dupree.
Dupree does not allege fraud or deceit, and the Court has determined as explained above that NALC
fairly represented Dupree in that proceeding. Accordingly, Dupree lacks standing to challenge the
arbitration award.
C.

USPS

There is no evidence in the record that service of process has been effected upon the USPS within
120 days after the filing of the complaint, as prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
13

Accordingly, the Court will order Dupree to show cause why her claims against the USPS should not be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely effect service.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
•

GRANTS NALC’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 32);

•

ORDERS Dupree to SHOW CAUSE on or before June 25, 2013, why her claims against the
USPS should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely effect service. Failure to
respond in a timely manner to this order will result in dismissal of those claims; and

•

DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 11, 2013

s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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