Simpson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, the Court GRANTS BCBSs motion to dismiss (Doc. 22 ) andDIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly. The Court further DENIES Simpsons motions to appoint counsel (Docs. 27 & 28) as moot.Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 9/13/2013. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
IDA SIMPSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 12-cv-673-JPG-SCW

BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois’
(“BCBS”) motion to dismiss (Doc. 22). Plaintiff Ida Simpson filed her response (Docs. 30 & 31)
to which BCBS replied (Doc. 32). For the following reasons, the Court grants BCBS’s motion.
1. Background
Simpson, a former BCBS employee, filed her pro se complaint alleging that BCBS
improperly deducted $20,831.85 from her pension. Simpson fails to thoroughly explain the facts
surrounding this deduction or the cause of action under which she proceeds. Simpson attached
the affidavit of Rhonda Rolandson, the Financial Benefits Manager for HealthCare Service
Corporation (“HCSC”).1 Rolandson’s affidavit is from a BCBS filing in another case Simpson
filed in the Northern District of Illinois. See Simpson v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ill., Case
No. 97-C-2680 (N.D. Ill. 1997). From Simpson’s complaint, including Rolandson’s attached
affidavit, the Court can glean the following relevant facts.
In 1986, HCSC changed its pension program and offered employees the option of taking
the benefit that accrued to them in the old pension plan in a lump sum or rolling it into an
annuity. Simpson chose the lump sum option and received a payment of $6,437.51 in December

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 BCBS is a division of HCSC. 

1986. Simpson received a letter in April 2001 detailing her pension benefits (Doc. 16, pp.8-10).
That letter reflected a $20,831.85 deduction, which Rolandson explained represented the
$6,437.51 payment multiplied by the immediate annuity projection of 3.23601. The $20,831.85,
representing the present value of the benefit already paid, was deducted from $70,189.06, which
represented the value of what Simpson’s pension would have been had she not elected to receive
a lump sum payment in December 1986.
Upon receipt of this letter reflecting a $20,831.85 deduction, Simpson mistakenly thought
the deduction represented an offset for a settlement she had received from BCBS in an age
discrimination case. See Simpson v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ill., Case No. 97-C-2680
(N.D. Ill. 1997). She then filed a motion to reinstate the age discrimination case to recover the
deduction. That district court held an evidentiary hearing on Simpson’s motion to reinstate and
ultimately denied her motion on August 13, 2002, after considering Rolandson’s affidavit.
In sum, it appears that based upon this April 2001 letter indicating a $20,831.85
deduction, Simpson believes BCBS improperly deducted funds from her pension. Simpson filed
the instant complaint on May 31, 2012, alleging this deduction was improper and seeking
damages in the amount of one million dollars. BCBS filed its motion to dismiss arguing
Simpson’s complaint must be dismissed because Simpson fails to state a plausible claim for
relief and her ERISA claim is clearly barred by the statute of limitations. The Court will turn to
consider whether Simpson’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
2. Analysis
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all
allegations in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.

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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the
complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a
right to relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556).
In Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court rejected the more expansive interpretation of Rule
8(a)(2) that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at
561–63; Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d at 777. Now “it is not enough for a complaint to
avoid foreclosing possible bases for relief; it must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to
relief . . . by providing allegations that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”
Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d at 777 (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555).
Even after applying a liberal construction to Simpson’s complaint, she fails to provide
sufficient details to put BCBS on notice of the nature of the claim against it. See Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94 (pro se documents to be liberally construed). Simpson clearly believes the deduction
from her pension was erroneous but she fails to provide enough detail from which BCBS could

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understand the claim. Simpson’s allegations simply fail to raise her right to relief above a
speculative level
Normally, the Court would grant leave for Simpson to amend her complaint. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a); Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Mun. Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 687
(7th Cir. 2004) (leave to amend should be freely given unless amendment would be futile).
However, amendment in this instance would be futile because Simpson’s complaint clearly
demonstrates any cause of action applicable to her case is outside of the statute of limitations.
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals based on the statute of limitations are considered “irregular”
because complaints are not required to anticipate affirmative defenses. United States v. N. Trust
Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004). However, the Court may dismiss a complaint where a
plaintiff pleads herself out of court by making it clear that the claim is barred by the statute of
limitations. United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005).
After a liberal construction of the complaint, the Court presumes Simpson’s cause of
action arises under Section 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”), which allows a participant to bring a civil cause of action to recover
benefits under the plan. This section of ERISA does not specify a statute of limitations, and the
Court must borrow the most analogous state statute of limitations. Young v. Verizon’s Bell
Atlantic Cash Balance Plan, 615 F.3d 808, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010). In Illinois, the ten-year
statute of limitations for written contracts is the most analogous. Daill v. Sheet Metal Workers’
Local 73 Pension Fund, 100 F.3d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1996). A claim arising under § 502(a) “accrues
upon a clear and unequivocal repudiation of rights under the pension plan which has been made
known to the beneficiary.” Id. at 66.

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Here, it is clear that Simpson learned of the 1986 deduction at least by 2001. From the
documents attached and amended to her complaint, she received a letter indicating the 1986
deduction from her pension in 2001 and then filed a motion to reinstate her age discrimination
claim based upon that deduction. On April 1, 2002, BCBS responded to her motion to reinstate,
attaching Rolandson’s affidavit explaining how the deduction resulted from Simpson’s 1986
election to receive a lump sum payment. Simpson has waited well beyond ten years after she
gained knowledge of the allegedly improper deduction to file an action to recover her benefits.
Accordingly, it is clear from the face of Simpson’s complaint and attachments to that complaint
that her claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
3. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS BCBS’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 22) and
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly. The Court further DENIES
Simpson’s motions to appoint counsel (Docs. 27 & 28) as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED: September 13, 2013
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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