Williams v. Baker et al

Filing 120

ORDER withdrawing 106 Motion for TRO; withdrawing 106 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; granting 112 Motion to Strike. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 5/21/2013. (anj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROBERT WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
C/O BAKER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-844-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 112). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to strike his Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 106) filed on April 10, 2013. Plaintiff’s motion
for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction sought an injunction ensuring that Plaintiff
not be returned to Menard Correctional Center, as the Defendants in this case are from Menard
Correctional Center. Plaintiff now seeks to strike that motion because he failed to file an affidavit
with the motion. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 112) and STRIKES the
motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction (Doc. 106).
The Court also notes that even with the affidavit, the Court would not have granted
the preliminary injunction that Plaintiff requests. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and
drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong , 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). Accord Winter v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc ., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right”). To win a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff
must show (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm

without the injunction, (3) that the harm he would suffer is greater than the harm a preliminary
injunction would inflict on defendants, and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. Judge v.

Quinn , 612 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). The “considerations are
interdependent: the greater the likelihood of success on the merits, the less net harm the injunction
must prevent in order for preliminary relief to be warranted.” Judge , 612 F.3d at 546.
The scope of the court’s authority to enter an injunction in the corrections context is
circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Westefer v. Neal , 682 F.3d 679, 683
(7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunction relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no
further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least
intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(2). See also Westefer, 682
F.3d at 683 (the PLRA “enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases
challenging prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary
authority over the institutions they manage”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has described injunctions like the one sought here, where an
injunction would require an affirmative act by the defendant, as a mandatory preliminary injunction.

Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997). Mandatory injunctions are
“cautiously viewed and sparingly issued,” since they require the court to command a defendant to take
a particular action. Id . (citing Jordan v. Wolke , 593 F.2d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 1978)). See also

W.A. Mack, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 260 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1958) (“A preliminary
injunction does not issue which gives to a plaintiff the actual advantage which would be
obtained in a final decree.”).
Here, Plaintiff would not be entitled to a preliminary injunction because he has not
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shown irreparable harm. The likelihood of Plaintiff being transferred back to Menard is very tenuous
nor has Plaintiff shown that he is likely to be transferred to Menard, so he has not shown he will suffer
irreparable harm at the hands of Defendants. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc ., 555 U.S.
7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (Finding that a preliminary injunction cannot be
entered based only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm). Further, such a request would
require the Court to become involved in the everyday activities of the prison system, something this
undersigned is reluctant to do. See Scraver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2006).
Directing IDOC where to house their inmates is something the Court is reluctant to do, especially
when there is no evidence that Plaintiff is likely to be transferred back to Menard. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiff would not be entitled to a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, like the one he sought in his original motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 21, 2013.
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge

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