Meyer v. Butcher Company, Inc. et al

Filing 7

ORDER denying 6 Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 9/6/2012. (mab)THIS TEXT ENTRY IS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. NO FURTHER DOCUMENTATION WILL BE MAILED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DENNIS MEYER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE BUTCHER COMPANY, INC., a
corporation, INDUSTRIAL SOAP
COMPANY, a corporation, MACK
MOLDING COMPANY, INC., a
corporation, and DIVERSEY, INC., a
corporation
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO. 12-858-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Dennis Meyer’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 6).
On July 30, 2012, Plaintiff, filed an original action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois for personal injuries Plaintiff incurred at Memorial Hospital in
Belleville, Illinois (Doc. 2). A district court’s “first duty in every suit” is “to determine the existence
of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Wattenbarger, 361 F.3d 991, 992 (7th Cir. 2004). Indeed,
“[j]urisdiction is the ‘power to declare law,’ and without it the federal courts cannot proceed.” Hay
v. Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ruhrgas v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999)).
The Court carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s sixty-one page complaint and failed to find a single
paragraph dedicated to establishing this Court’s federal subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly,
on August 17, 2012, the Court dismissed the case for want of federal subject matter jurisdiction
Page 1 of 3

(Doc. 5). Plaintiff now asks the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 59(e), to reconsider
its prior Order dismissing this case and allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint (Doc. 6).
Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider contains a lengthy explanation of how this case arrived here
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. However, this lengthy
explanation has nothing to do with the problem here, which is that Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) did
not contain even a hint of how this Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s motion
(Doc. 6) then posits two arguments for why the Court should reconsider its prior Order dismissing
this case.
First, Plaintiff contends that since he checked the diversity jurisdiction box on the civil cover
sheet, the check mark should have alerted the Court that Plaintiff filed this original action in
contemplation of diversity jurisdiction (Doc. 6). The complaint, however, is the operative document
which initiates a lawsuit. Simply checking a box on a civil cover sheet does nothing to establish
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 6)
contains several facts Plaintiff should have alleged in the complaint. These allegations include
several Defendants principal place of business and state of incorporation. Yet the facts, as
articulated in Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, would still fall short of establishing federal subject
matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff fails to allege the state of incorporation for Defendant Genesis
Products, Inc., and for Defendant Mack Molding Company, Inc. (See Doc. 6, p. 2-3). As Plaintiff
surely knows by now, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, both “[t]he state of incorporation and the principal
place of business must be alleged in the complaint.” McMillan v. Sheraton Chicago Hotel &
Towers, 567 F.3d 839, 845 n.10 (7th Cir. 2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“a corporation
shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where

Page 2 of 3

it has its principal place of business”).
Second, Plaintiff claims the statute of limitations on his claim expired on August 4, 2012
(Doc. 6). Therefore, a dismissal of this case would cause Plaintiff manifest injustice (See Doc. 6).
The solution here is the saving statute cited by Plaintiff in his papers. In any “act . . . where the time
for commencing an action is limited, if . . . the action is dismissed by a United States District Court
for lack of jurisdiction . . . then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires
during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action within one year
or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, after . . . the action is dismissed
by a United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction . . . .” 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (2012). The
dismissal of this case will not cause Plaintiff a manifest injustice.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 59 (Doc.
6) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 6, 2012
/s/ ZA ctàÜ|v~ `âÜÑ{ç
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

Page 3 of 3