Mack v. Gordinez et al

Filing 130

ORDER DENYING RULE 59(e) MOTION. For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion (Doc. 120 ) is DENIED, and his motion for status (Doc. 128 ) is MOOT. See attached for details. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 8/31/2015. (jls)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HENRY L. MACK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAMUEL NWAOBASI,
MAGID FAHIM, and
JOHN SHEPHERD,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12–cv–0986–MJR–SCW

ORDER DENYING RULE 59(e) MOTION
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
This § 1983 civil rights case comes before the Court on the pro se Plaintiff’s
motion to alter or amend the judgment. Plaintiff filed his complaint in September 2012,
broadly alleging deliberate indifference to various medical conditions. Several
Defendants were dismissed on § 1915A review, several more because Plaintiff did not
exhaust administrative remedies against them, and the Court granted summary
judgment to Defendants Nwaobasi, Fahim, and Shepherd in January 2015. The instant
motion targets the order granting summary judgment. That order analyzed Plaintiff’s
medical complaints as follows:
1. As to Plaintiff’s hip pain, the record showed Defendants provided Plaintiff
constitutionally adequate treatment, including pain medication and a low
bunk permit;
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2. As to Plaintiff’s rectal bleeding, Defendants’ course of action was at most
negligent; and
3. As to Plaintiff’s shoulder pain (which resulted from a fall in July 2011),
Plaintiff received constitutionally adequate treatment including diagnosis (in
the form of X-rays) and treatment (exercises and pain medication).
Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is not an appropriate forum for rehashing
previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been heard during
the pendency of the previous motion. Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir.
2014); Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s motion seeks nothing more than that.
Plaintiff renews his argument that a low gallery permit (in addition to the low
bunk permit and drugs) was necessary, and that his subsequent fall proved as much.
But the federal courts will not interfere with a doctor’s decision to pursue a particular
course of treatment unless that decision calls into question whether the doctor actually
was exercising his professional judgment. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir.
2014). That Defendants’ professional judgment was ultimately proven wrong does not
put that judgment out of constitutional bounds.
Regarding his rectal bleeding, Plaintiff now says Defendants should have given
him a special diet, and assessed his “fiber accessibility”—that they failed to do so,
according to Plaintiff, means they did “nothing.” Plaintiff further claims that he sent
several complaints to Defendant Fahim requesting special cafeteria meals. Again,
Defendants are entitled to deference in their medical decisions, and here—where the
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record reflects multiple examinations, multiple stool samples, regular monitoring, and
an eventual recommendation of dietary change—the record simply reflects
disagreement between the prisoner and his doctors. That does not suffice to establish a
constitutional violation. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff takes issue with summary judgment as to his shoulder-related
claims because (he argues) had his hip problems been treated correctly (i.e., with a low
gallery permit), he never would have fallen and hurt his shoulder. In other words, any
constitutional claim regarding his shoulder injury is wholly dependent on
constitutional inadequacy of treating his hip. Under the summary judgment standard,
as discussed above, a factfinder could infer Defendants were incorrect or negligent
when they declined to give Plaintiff a low gallery permit. But given the abundant
record that Defendants did monitor and assess Plaintiffs’ hip problems, that factfinder
could not conclude that recommending a low bunk permit and prescribing painkillers
(but no low gallery permit) was “so significant a departure from accepted professional
standards or practices that it calls into question whether the doctor was exercising his
professional judgment.” Id.
MOTION (Doc. 120) DENIED. This Order renders MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for
Status (Doc. 128).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: August 31, 2015

s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge, U.S. District Court
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