Hamilton Memorial Hospital District v. Toelle et al

Filing 147

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, denying 134 MOTION for Reconsideration re 123 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Hamilton Memorial Hospital District and 136 MOTION for Reconsideration re 121 Memorandum & Order. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 7/28/2014. (jdh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HAMILTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL DISTRICT, an
Illinois governmental municipality,
Plaintiff/Counter-defendant,
No. 12-cv-1004-JPG-PMF
v.
APRIL TOELLE,
Defendant/Counterclaimant,
and
DEACONESS HOSPITAL, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on two motions to reconsider:


plaintiff/counter-defendant Hamilton Memorial Hospital District’s (“HMH”) motion for
reconsideration (Doc. 134) of the Court’s April 11, 2014, order (Doc. 123) granting in part
and denying in part defendant/counterclaimant April Toelle’s and defendant Deaconess
Hospital, Inc.’s (“Deaconess”) joint motion for summary judgment on damages (Doc. 82);
and



defendant/counterclaimant April Toelle’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 136) of the
Court’s April 7, 2014, order (Doc. 121) granting in part and denying in part her motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 69).
The details of this case are set forth in the Court’s April 7, 2014, memorandum and order

(Doc. 121) and will not be repeated here.
“A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own . . . in any circumstance,
although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances
such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’”
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (quoting Arizona v.

California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n. 8 (1983)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (providing a non-final order “may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’
rights and liabilities”). The decision whether to reconsider a previous ruling in the same case is
governed by the law of the case doctrine. Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570,
571-72 (7th Cir. 2006). The law of the case is a discretionary doctrine that creates a presumption
against reopening matters already decided in the same litigation and authorizes reconsideration
only for a compelling reason such as a manifest error or a change in the law that reveals the prior
ruling was erroneous. United States v. Harris, 531 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2008); Minch v. City of
Chicago, 486 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 2007).
I.

HMH’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 134)
HMH asks the Court to reconsider its ruling (Doc. 123) that HMH is not entitled to

damages for lost goodwill and lost revenue. The Court based this ruling on the fact that HMH had
only submitted evidence at the summary judgment stage supporting a calculation that had been
barred earlier in this case. Toelle has responded to the motion (Doc. 142), and HMH has replied
to Toelle’s response (Doc. 145).
Whether to allow HMH’s calculation of goodwill and lost revenue has been an issue in
numerous filings before the Court (See Docs. 63, 78 & 112 and the briefing that led to those
rulings). After thorough consideration of the pertinent facts and circumstances, the Court barred
HMH from using its belatedly disclosed calculation to support its damage claim for lost goodwill
and lost revenue. HMH offered nothing but this barred calculation in response to Toelle’s
summary judgment motion, and the Court granted the motion on this issue as a consequence.
Thus, HMH has forfeited its opportunity to present evidence of a non-barred calculation for lost
goodwill and lost revenue. In its current motion, HMH has not presented any extraordinary
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circumstances that would justify revisiting this thoroughly litigated issue. Instead, it rehashes
arguments that it made and that the Court rejected after careful consideration. The Court will not
revisit the issue at this time. HMH’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 134) will be denied. The Court
further warns HMH that any attempt to present evidence to support the barred lost goodwill and
lost revenue calculation to the jury at trial may be viewed as contempt of Court and sanctioned
accordingly.1
II.

Toelle’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 136)
Toelle asks the Court to reconsider its ruling (Doc. 121) on a number of issues:


that Toelle may have waived the right to payment under § 5.5 of the Agreement for her
supervision of nurse practitioners Tara Vogel and Sharon Atwell by failing to object to the
failure to make those payments and by continuing to work despite not receiving those
payments;



that Toelle may not have been Atwell’s primary supervising physician; and



that HMH’s failure to pay Toelle under § 5.5 of the Agreement may not have been a
material breach justifying her non-performance.

The Court notes that on each of these issues, the Court found there were genuine issues of material
fact and that the claims relating to these issues should proceed to trial. It did not make definitive
findings against Toelle but merely found the questions should be decided at trial. HMH has
responded to Toelle’s motion (Doc. 144), and Toelle has replied to that response (Doc. 146).
In the pending motion, Toelle reiterates arguments she already made in her summary
judgment motion (e.g., that HMH waived the waiver argument, that Toelle did not by her conduct
Even had the Court allowed HMH to present evidence of its lost goodwill and lost revenues, the
Court is skeptical that it would have been sufficient to support a damage award, much less one of
the size HMH seeks. As a preliminary matter, lost goodwill and lost revenue are generally
difficult to prove. Furthermore, the evidence proffered by HMH, while showing it lost revenue,
does little to establish a substantial causal connection with Toelle as opposed to the myriad of other
factors that impact the financial health of a hospital at any point in time.
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waive her right to payment under § 5.5 of the Agreement, that Toelle was Atwell’s primary
supervising physician, that the failure to pay Toelle under § 5.5 of the Agreement was a material
breach of the Agreement) or makes, for the first time, arguments she should have raised in support
of her summary judgment motion (e.g., that employees cannot waive claims to payment under the
Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”), 820 ILCS 115 et seq.). With one
exception, none of this constitutes the kind of exceptional circumstances that justify revisiting the
Court’s earlier decisions. The one exception is the IWPCA waiver argument. The Court
declined to rule on the issue at the summary judgment stage because the parties had not briefed it,
and since then the Court has announced it will entertain trial briefs (Docs. 126 & 133). The
parties have filed documents the Court construes as trial briefs on the IWPCA issue (Docs. 132,
135 & 141) and should be prepared to address the issue at the final pretrial conference, currently
scheduled for August 29, 2014. Because of the uncertainty of this issue and its impact on the trial,
if any, the parties may delay submission of the proposed Final Pretrial Order until after the final
pretrial conference.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motions to reconsider (Doc. 134 & 136).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 28, 2014
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

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