Davis v. Shah et al

Filing 12

ORDER, DENYING 11 MOTION for Reconsideration re 9 Order Dismissing Case, filed by Joseph Davis.Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 4/30/2013. (mmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOSEPH DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. SHAH,
DR. LARSON,
DR. SCHMIDT,
DR. GARCK1,
DR. BALER2,
BENTON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12 -cv-01068-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Joseph Davis is before the Court seeking reconsideration of the Court’s
Order dated January 9, 2013, and the corresponding judgment, dismissing his civil rights
complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend (Doc. 11).
1. Procedural History
Plaintiff Davis, an inmate in Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brought this
action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). Davis
alleged that health care providers at Pinckneyville were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they failed to carry out medical
orders, falsified medical records and did not timely or properly diagnose what turned out to be a
rectal prolapse.

Plaintiff further claimed that his grievance s regarding his medical treatment

1

A review of the complaint and the medical records submitted by Plaintiff indicates that “Dr.
Gark” is actually Dr. Garcia.
2
A review of the complaint and the medical records submitted by Plaintiff indicates that “Dr.
Baler” is actually Dr. Baker.
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were not fully address, thereby denying him due process and equal protection in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Upon preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, all
claims against all defendants were dismissed with prejudice, and leave to amend was denied
(Doc. 9). Final Judgment was entered January 9, 2013 (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff Davis now argues that there were “errors upon the record,” and that he
will have no adequate remedy if his complaint is dismissed (Doc. 11). Plaintiff resubmits several
of the documents that were appended to the complaint, and he reargues the merits of his
deliberate indifference claims.
2. Applicable Standard of Review
Technically, a Amotion to reconsider@ does not exist under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. But such motions are routinely filed, and they generally are treated as motions
to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or motions for relief from judgment/order under
Rule 60(b). See, e.g., Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994).
Different standards and time-tables govern Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions.
So, for instance, Rule 59(e) permits a court to amend a judgment only if the movant
demonstrates a manifest error of law or presents newly discovered evidence that was not
previously available. See Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2007). By
contrast, Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from an order or judgment based on these
reasons, inter alia: mistake, surprise or excusable neglect by the movant; fraud or misconduct by
the opposing party; a judgment that is void or has been discharged; or newly discovered evidence
that could not have been discovered within the deadline for a Rule 59(b) motion.

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In Borrero v. City of Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2006), the Court of
Appeals declared that district courts should analyze post-judgment motions based on their
substance as opposed to the date on which the motion was filed. The Seventh Circuit reiterated
this in Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493-94 (7th Cir. 2008): Awhether a motion Y should
be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of the motion, not on the
timing or label affixed to it.@ Therefore, this Court assesses motions to reconsider (especially
those drafted by pro se litigants) based on their substance B i.e., the reasons for relief articulated
by the movant—as opposed to the title the movant chose for the motion or merely the date on
which he filed the motion.3
Although Borrero and Obriecht direct the Court to focus on the substance of the
motion, the timing of the motion is still relevant. Rule 59(e) is only applicable to motions filed
no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment. By contrast, a motion under Rule 60(b)(1)
alleging mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, may be filed within one year after
the entry of judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). Because Plaintiff filed his motion eight days
after judgment was entered, neither avenue of relief is immediately precluded.
Based on both the timing and the substance of Plaintiff’s motion, Rule 59(e) is
applicable. “Courts may grant Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend the judgment if the movant
presents newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial or if the movant
points to evidence in the record that clearly establishes a manifest error of law or fact. This rule
enables the [district] court to correct its own errors and thus avoid unnecessary appellate
3

Only motions filed within the 28-day deadline set forth in Rule 59(e) toll the time for filing an
appeal. Motions filed after the 28-day period do not suspend the finality of any judgment. See
York Group, Inc. v. Wuxi Taihu Tractor Co., Ltd., 632 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2011).

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procedures. But such motions are not appropriately used to advance arguments or theories that
could and should have been made before the district court rendered a judgment, or to present
evidence that was available earlier.” Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 683 F.3d 805, 813 (7th Cir.
2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Analysis
Plaintiff Davis does not present newly discovered; rather, he points to evidence in
the record that he asserts clearly establishes a manifest error of law and fact. However, Plaintiff
is actually only reasserting the same arguments made in his complaint, based on the same
evidence.

Plaintiff presents nothing more than a difference in perspective, with no actual

analysis or citation to error in the Court’s Order.
Upon review of the record, the Court remains persuaded that its ruling dismissing
the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A was correct.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 11) is
DENIED; the Court’s Order of dismissal (Doc. 9) and Judgment (Doc. 10) shall stand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 30, 2013
s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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