Holder v. Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice et al

Filing 66

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 56 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier on 12/18/14. (kos)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID HOLDER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE as operator of
The ILLINOIS YOUTH CENTER,
HARRISBURG,
Defendant.

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Case No. 3:12-cv-01085-PMF

ORDER
FRAZIER, Magistrate Judge:
Before the Court is defendant Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice’s (“IDJJ”) Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56). Plaintiff David Holder filed a response in opposition (Doc.
63). In his complaint Holder asserts that the IDJJ discriminated against him on the basis of his
race in violation of Title VII of the Human Rights Act of 1964 and retailed against him for filing
complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Holder’s second
amended complaint presents a haphazard intermingling of multiple causes of action into a single
count (“Count 1”). Such practice conflicts with Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b) (“If doing so would promote
clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence … must be stated in a
separate count…”). In the interest of clarity, Holder’s single count will be broken up into
separate claims. Holder’s asserts claims that: 1) he was terminated because of his race, 2) he was
terminated in retaliation for filing EEOC complaints, 3) he was not promoted because of his race,
4) he was not promoted in retaliation for filing EEOC complaints, 5) he was subject to
investigations, discipline, and a hostile work environment because of his race, 6) he was subject
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to investigations, discipline and a hostile work environment in retaliation for filing EEOC
complaints, and 7) he was paid less than Caucasian employees. For the following reasons, the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted for claims 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. The defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to claims 1 and 2. There are genuine issues
of material fact as to whether Holder was terminated because of his race and whether he was
terminated in retaliation for filing EEOC complaints.

I.

BACKGROUND

When presented with a motion for summary judgment, “the court has one task and one
task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of
fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994).
Without making any credibility determinations, the Court is required to view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).
With that standard in mind, defendant IDJJ operates the Illinois Youth Center in Harrisburg,
Illinois (“IYCH”), a medium security facility that houses male youth offenders. Plaintiff David
Holder is an African American who was hired by the IDJJ for the position of Juvenile Justice
Specialist at the IYCH in July, 1998. Holder is a veteran, has a bachelor’s degree in criminal
justice from Southern Illinois University, and speaks fluent Spanish. Holder contends that he was
subject to a series of discriminatory and retaliatory actions by the defendant, culminating in his
termination with the IDJJ on July 28, 2010.
The first dispute between the Holder and the IDJJ arose in regards to “Temporary
Assignment” (“TA”) positions at the IYCH. TA positions are, as their name suggests,

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assignments where an employee is temporarily promoted to the next employment grade level.1
Employees are not required to accept TA offers, but TA positions include an increase in wages
and they allow employees to become familiar with the tasks and responsibilities of the higher
level position. An employee with TA experience would be at a distinct advantage over those
without TA experience whenever a permanent promotion opportunity became available.
From 1998 through 2002 Holder was not offered any TA positions, and he filed a
complaint with the EEOC in December, 2002. In his complaint with the EEOC Holder alleged he
was being discriminated against on account of his race and his age. The Complaint stated:
“I have been employed by Respondent since 1998. I am currently a Youth Supervisor II.
On a continuing basis I have been denied T/A III assignments. Younger, less senior, nonBlack employees have been given assignments on a regular basis. Of the approximately
25-30 individuals given these assignments, only 1 is over age 40 and only 1 is Black. In
addition, in about March 2002 I was given unwarranted discipline for reporting a rule
violation committed by a non-Black Officer. No action was taken against this employee.
I believe that I have been discriminated against by Respondent because of my race,
Black, and my age, [46], in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.”

The Illinois Department of Corrections entered into a settlement agreement with Holder in May
of 2003, and he received seven TA positions in 2003 and one in 2007.
Despite the settlement agreement, tension continued between Holder and his supervisors.
On December 26, 2003 Holder filed another complaint with the EEOC. In the complaint he

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According to the affidavit of Hollie Zertuche, an IYCH employee from 1998 to 2012, the hierarchy of IYCH
positions are as follows:
Youth Supervisor Intern (Juvenile Justice Intern)
Youth Supervisor II (Juvenile Justice Specialist)
Youth Supervisor III
Youth Supervisor IV (Juvenile Justice Supervisor)
Chief of Security
Assistant Superintendent of Programs III
Assistant Superintendent of Operations II
Superintendent.

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stated that he was being retaliated against for filing the previous complaint. The second EEOC
complaint stated:
“I am employed as a Youth Supervisor II at Respondent. In December 2002, I filed an
EEOC charge of discrimination against Respondent. In May 2003, I entered into a
settlement agreement with Respondent. Since that time, I have been subjected to
harassment by a supervisor at Respondent. I was the target of an investigation of an
inappropriate written note and the confidentiality of information in my personnel files
was breached. On October 17, 2003, after I complained of harassment to the Governor’s
Whistle Blower Hotline, I was issued a disciplinary packet where I was cited for failure
to fully cooperate with an investigation and conduct unbecoming an officer. Also, I have
been told that I cannot speak Spanish to Spanish-speaking offenders at the facility.
I believe I am being retaliated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, and in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended.”
The defendant denied that any retaliation occurred and asserted that the disciplinary actions were
all warranted. The defendant asserts that Holder was investigated in regards to the note because it
was partially written in Spanish, and Holder speaks the language. The note was even sent to be
analyzed by handwriting experts at the Illinois State Police forensics laboratory. The
investigation was ultimately inconclusive, and it could not be proven that Holder drafted the
note. The defendant also stated that the prohibition on Spanish communications with offenders
was not specifically directed towards Holder, but was established under the theory that if staff
were to communicate in Spanish with the youth offenders it could undermine security. Holder
filed a union complaint over the Spanish issue, and sometime later he was allowed to
communicate in Spanish with the youth offenders.
The next several years of Holder’s employment were relatively uneventful, but Holder
did apply for Youth Supervisor IV positions in 2004 and 2005. On both occasions he was denied
the promotion. Then in 2008 the relationship between Holder and the IJCC began to worsen.
Around that time, Holder underwent treatment for bladder cancer. When he returned to work he

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was placed on light duty status, and he notified management that he should minimize the amount
of time he spends standing. Holder was still required to stand for roll call every morning, despite
the fact that another, Caucasian employee recuperating from cancer was allowed to sit through
roll call. Holder was also punished and had his pay docked for missing roll call, while the
Caucasian employee was never punished for missing roll call.
In 2009 Holder was investigated and reprimanded for multiple instances of alleged
improper conduct involving outside visitors. Family and friends of youth offenders frequently
visit the facility, and IYCH employees often interact with members of the public. Kurt Sutton, a
Juvenile Justice Supervisory at IYCH, investigated the incident. The reprimand stated that on
May 31, 2009 Holder spent 45 minutes reading a newspaper when he should have been
supervising offenders and visitors in the visitation room. He was also reprimanded for actions
that occurred on June 7, 2009, which included not inputting visitors into the computer database,
denying visitors access to the facility because of their clothing when Holder should have reported
his concerns to a supervisor, and conducting himself in an unprofessional manner with visitors.
The alleged unprofessional conduct was detailed by handwritten letters sent to IYCH by three
separate families. Additionally, Holder was reprimanded for insubordination during the
investigation of the above incidents, and he was suspended for 25 days.
After the visitor incidents, Holder was again reprimanded in July, 2009 for having an
unsecure vehicle in the facility parking lot. He had recently purchased a convertible from a
coworker, and on occasion he would leave the convertible top down. On two separate days
Holder’s vehicle was searched by IYCH security because the top was left down. Kenneth
Prather, the Chief of Security, even told Holder that he would continue to search his car.

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However, other employees frequently parked jeeps in the facility parking with doors removed,
and those employees did not have their vehicles searched or receive reprimands.
The last significant event prior to Holder’s termination was the “Crispin” incident. On
May 30, 2010 Holder was involved in an altercation with youth offender Cody Crispin. It was
movie night that evening, and the Level 1 youth offenders were in the dayroom watching a
movie. Crispin was also watching the movie, but he did not have Level 1 privileges and so he
was supposed to be in his cell. After noticing Crispin watching the movie, he was told by
Johnson and Holder to return to his cell. Holder escorted Crispin back to his cell, and sometime
around then the two engaged in a verbal dispute. The argument became heated, Crispin placed
Holder in a headlock, and Holder struck Crispin in the head. After the Crispin incident, the head
of IYCH security, Rocky James, was overheard saying “We got that boy now.” The decision to
punish Holder after the incident was made in large part due to the testimony of Juvenile Justice
Intern Tasha Johnson. However Johnson seemingly gave conflicting testimony to Rocky James
regarding the incident, and there were inconsistences between the statements of the other
witnesses.2 The matter was referred to the Department of Children and Family Services
(“DCFS”) along with the Illinois State Police. After investigating the incident, DCFS found
Holder not guilty of any violation. Information regarding to the incident was later presented to
the Saline County State’s Attorney’s Office for possible criminal charges to be filed against
Holder. The State’s Attorney declined to prosecute.

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In Rocky James’ May 30, 2010 “Investigational Interview” with Tasha Johnson, Johnson stated that she did not
observe Crispin acting in an insolent manner prior to Crispin returning to his cell. However, Johnson stated that she
went to the control room to wash her hands while Holder escorted Crispin to his cell. The inmate investigational
interviews are inconsistent in regards to whether Crispin was insolent on the way to his cell, and as to whether
Crispin or Holder initiated the physical altercation. For the purposes of summary judgment, factual disputes must be
resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, i.e., Holder.

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Around the time of the Crispin incident and investigation, IYCH began accepting
applications for two Juvenile Justice Supervisor positions. Holder applied for the promotion and
he was one of five applicants considered. According to the affidavit of Linda Butler, human
resources representative at IYCH, the 2010 promotion process consisted of a point based
evaluation of candidates, interviews, and a comparison of the candidates’ seniority. Candidate
interviews and scoring were conducted by Don Rumsey, Assistant Superintendent of Operations
at IYCH, Wes Wilt of Illinois Youth Center Murphysboro, and Pat Dement, also of Illinois
Youth Center Murphysbro. Patrick Mings and Eric VanZant ultimately received the promotions.
Mings and VanZant both had more seniority than Holder and both scored significantly higher in
the interview process.3
Holder’s employment was ultimately terminated on July 28, 2010. According to Robert
Price, who was the Superintendent at IYCH at the time of Holder’s discharge, the decision to end
Holder’s employment was based on several factors, including the Crispin incident, the incidents
with the facility visitors in 2009, four prior suspensions, and other reprimands and counselings.
It was also ICYH policy that the decision to discipline employees should only be based on the
employee’s conduct that occurred within the past two years. Thus, using the older reprimands
and counselings as a basis for Holder's termination was contrary to ICYH policy. And despite
his termination, Holder performed well on performance reviews. Except for one instance of
“needs improvement” in the area of time management, Holder’s performance reviews from
December, 2006 to April, 2010 stated that he always met or exceeded expectations.
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The “Juvenile Justice Supervisor Promotional Instrument” dated July 14, 2010, stated the following information
about the five candidates:
Test Score
Seniority Date Applicant Name
56.33
05/13/96 (2)
Patrick Mings (promoted)
50.66
11/09/99 (3)
Sonja M. Gregory
47.66
06/19/95 (1)
Eric VanZant (promoted)
40.33
04/01/96
Wendell Vaughn
18.33
09/21/98
David Holder III

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Around the time Holder worked at IYCH, there were several other instances of IYCH
staff members striking youth offenders. However, the other IYCH staff members who struck
youth offenders were either not terminated or were terminated and reinstated to their positions.
In 2000 Specialist Scott Dearing struck a youth offender in the mouth, in 2002 Ann Curd kicked
and struck a youth offender, in 2008 Specialist Mark Stucker struck a youth offender while on
camera, in 2011 Specialist John Smock and Bertis Trammel both struck youth offenders. None of
those instances were reported to DCFS or to the Illinois State Police.
On March 7, 2011 Holder filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC
issued Holder a right to sue letter on August 27, 2012. In Holder’s second amended complaint,
he asserts the seven previously stated claims. Defendant IDJJ now seeks summary judgment.
II.

ANALYSIS

When presented with a motion for summary judgment, “the court has one task and one
task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of
fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994).
Without making any credibility determinations, the Court is required to view the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).
Employers are prohibited from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). It is also unlawful for an
employer to retaliate against an employee who has filed a discrimination charge. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a). Additionally, Title VII EEOC complaints must be filed “[w]ithin three hundred days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. This means that
“if a plaintiff does not file a charge concerning a discrete act of discriminatory conduct within

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300 days of its occurrence, his claim is time-barred and he may not recover.” Roney v. Illinois
Dep't of Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109-110 (2002)). Holder filed his EEOC complaint on March 7, 2011,
and 300 days prior to that date is May 11, 2010.
Discrimination claims may be established using two methods; direct or indirect.4 Holder
may survive summary judgment under the direct method by “by presenting sufficient evidence,
either direct or circumstantial, that the employer's discriminatory animus motivated an adverse
employment action.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012) Direct evidence
typically takes the form of “smoking gun” type evidence. Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731
F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2013). This would essentially take the form of an admission that the
defendant discriminated against Holder because of his race or retaliated against Holder because
of his prior EEOC filings. The Seventh Circuit has remarked that “such admissions of illegal
discrimination and retaliation are rare.” Id. at 643. But a plaintiff can survive summary judgment
under the indirect method by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence. Such
evidence may include “(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior
toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected group; (2) evidence, whether or
not rigorously statistical, that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received
systematically better treatment; and (3) evidence that the employee was qualified for the job in
question but was passed over in favor of a person outside the protected class and the employer's

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The Seventh Circuit has suggested merging the direct and indirect method standards into one test. See Coleman v.
Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, concurring). The following standard was proposed; “[i]n order
to defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff one way or the other must present evidence showing that she is in a class
protected by the statute, that she suffered the requisite adverse action (depending on her theory), and that a rational
jury could conclude that the employer took that adverse action on account of her protected class, not for any noninvidious reason.” Id.

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reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 979 (7th
Cir. 2014) (internal cites and quotes omitted).
To survive summary judgment under the indirect method, Courts apply the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting analysis. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801,
(1973). Under this method, Holder must first establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that he
is a member of a protected class; (2) that he met IDJJ’s legitimate expectations; (3) that he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of the
protected classes were treated more favorably. Smiley v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 714 F.3d 998,
1002 (7th Cir. 2013). If Holder can establish a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to IDJJ to
“identify a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.” Id. If IDJJ can demonstrate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, then the burden shifts back to Holder
to produce sufficient evidence that the stated reason for termination was pretextual. Id.
Retaliation claims are also examined under the direct and indirect evidentiary
frameworks. Andrews v. CBOCS W., Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). However for
retaliation claims, the requirement that the plaintiff be a member of a protected class is instead a
requirement that the plaintiff have engaged in a protected activity. Id.

A. Wrongful Termination Claims
Holder argues that he can survive summary judgment for his retaliatory discharge claim
(Claim 1) and discriminatory discharge claim (Claim 2) under both the direct and indirect
methods. Turning to the direct method, Holder was clearly a member of a protected class,
African American, and engaged in protected activity by filing EEOC complaints.

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Holder can also establish causation under the “convincing mosaic” approach. He provides
several examples of circumstantial evidence to support causation. First, Holder provides
sufficient evidence to establish that similarly situated employees outside of the protective group
receive better treatment. An affidavit from fellow IYCH employee Hollie Zertuche states that
every other Youth Supervisor II / Juvenile Justice Specialists who struck an inmate was either
reinstated to their position or not punished. Scott Dearing is one such employee who struck an
inmate and was later reinstated to his position. Dearing also had 15 disciplinary actions against
him over eight years of employment, and he was finally terminated because he assaulted a police
officer outside of work. Details on Dearing and the other employees who hit youth inmates are
scant in the record, but Dearing appears to be similarly situated to Holder.
Another piece of circumstantial evidence is Rocky James’ statement of “We got that boy
now.” Use of the term “boy” to refer to an adult African American male may indicate racial
animus. The Supreme Court held that the term “boy” by itself may be used in a racially
pejorative sense, depending on factors such as “context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom,
and historical usage.” Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006).
The convincing mosaic is additionally supported by Holder’s unwavering assertions that
he struck Crispin in self-defense. Crispin’s testimony to DCFS lends credence to this argument.
Crispin stated that that he had Holder in a headlock prior to Holder striking him, and pursuant to
IYCH institutional directives, IYCH staff may justifiably use force “to protect oneself or any
other person from physical assaults, injury or death.” Holder’s assertions, combined with the fact
that the eyewitness testimony was inconsistent, support the mosaic. If the defendants’
explanation for Holder’s termination was beyond reasonable dispute, then summary judgment
would be appropriate on the wrongful termination claims. But Holder has demonstrated enough

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evidence on his discrimination and retaliation claims (Claims 1 and 2) based on his termination
from the IYCH to survive summary judgment. Because Holder can survive summary judgment
using the direct method, the indirect method need not be addressed.

B. Failure to Promote Claims
Defendant IDJJ is entitled to summary judgment on the failure to promote claims. Holder
argues that the 2010 hiring process was discriminatory because he was previously denied TA
positions, and because Rocky James ordered Hollie Zertuche to give Patrick Mings a stellar
performance evaluation. But the two candidates who were hired, Mings and VanZant, both had
more seniority than Holder. Mings and VanZant also scored significantly higher than Holder on
the candidate scoring system, with scores of 56.33 and 47.66, respectively, compared to Holder’s
score of 18.33. Furthermore, two of the three candidate interviewers/reviewers were from the
Illinois Youth Center in Murphysboro, thus appearing to limit potential bias. The 2010 hiring
process also appears to use a different scoring metric than the promotion reviews Holder
participated in during 2004 and 2005, and it is unclear to what extent the TA positions factored
into the promotion decisions. Even if Holder had prior TA experience at that promotion level,
Mings and VanZant would still have more seniority. And the disagreement between Hollie
Zertuche and Rocky James in regards to Mings’ performance evaluation is insufficient to create
an inference that the promotion decision was discriminatory or retaliatory. The Federal Courts do
not function as a “super-personnel department.” See Ballance v. City of Springfield, 424 F.3d
614, 621 (7th Cir. 2005), Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000) Jackson v.
E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 984 (7th Cir. 1999). Based on these facts, no reasonable jury

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could infer that Holder was retaliated against or discriminated against in regards to the 2010
promotion process. The defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Claims 3 and 4.

C. Other Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
Holder asserts that other conduct by the defendant was discriminatory, retaliatory, and
contributed to a hostile work environment. Discrete retaliatory or discriminatory acts that
occurred prior to May 11, 2010 are time barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. But earlier acts can be
used to support a hostile work environment claim. “Provided that an act contributing to the claim
occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be
considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). In sum, “the entire hostile work environment encompasses a
single unlawful employment practice.” Id. In order to survive summary a motion for summary
judgment on a hostile work environment claim, the employee must demonstrate that “(1) he was
subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on his race; (3) the harassment
was severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the employee's work environment by
creating a hostile or abusive situation; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Smith v.
Ne. Illinois Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2004). Hostile work environment claims must be
“both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).
Holder argues that the lack of TA positions, the 2003 note investigation, the Spanish
speaking issue, being required to stand for roll call in 2008, the visitor investigation in 2009, the
car searches in 2009, the denial of promotions, and the Crispin investigation were all

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discriminatory in nature. All of the individual incidents except for the Crispin incident and the
2010 failure to promote claim are time barred for the purposes of Title VII, unless those
incidents form the basis of a hostile work environment claim. But as a whole, no reasonable jury
could find that the defendant’s conduct constituted harassment so as to establish a hostile work
environment claim. The investigations of the note, the visitor incidents, and the Crispin incident,
along with the car searches, were all in response to legitimate institutional concerns. Holder may
have been offended, but he cannot establish that the actions were objectively hostile or abusive.
And Holder has failed to establish that the lack of TA positions, the denial of promotions, and
being required to stand for roll call while on light duty status, as a whole, was subjectively and
objectively hostile and abusive. The defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on
Claims 5 and 6.
D. Disparate Pay Claim
Holder’s disparate pay claim overlaps with his failure to promote claim in all pertinent
parts. In order to establish a Title VII disparate pay claim, the plaintiff must allege that their
lower pay was a result of discrimination. Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 656
(7th Cir. 2010). Holder’s disparate pay claim is based on the fact that he was paid less than
Caucasian employees because he was denied promotions because of his race. Because this claim
is essentially the same as his failure to promote claims, the defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on Holder’s disparate pay claim, Claim 7.

III.

CONCLUSION

“[A]ll employees, not only perfect employees, are protected by Title VII.” Perez v.
Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 700 (7th Cir. 2013). The record surrounding Holder’s termination

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from the Illinois Youth Center at Harrisburg is full of contested material facts that preclude
summary judgment. Therefore, he can proceed on his Title VII discriminatory discharge claim
(Claim 1) and his Title VII retaliatory discharge claim (Claim 2) against the defendant.
Defendant IDJJ is entitled to summary judgment on Holder’s other claims.
SO ORDERED.
DATED:

December 18, 2014 .
s/Philip M. Frazier
PHILIP M FRAZIER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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