Gouge v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
Filing
23
ORDER denying 10 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 6/27/13. (klh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LARRY E. GOUGE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant.
No. 12-cv-1140-DRH
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
I. Introduction and Background
Before the Court is CSX Transportation, Inc.’s motion to dismiss pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) (Doc. 10).
Specifically, defendant
moves the Court to dismiss without prejudice plaintiff’s cause of action on the
grounds that venue is not proper or in the alternative to transfer this cause of
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. 19). As
the Court finds that venue is proper and that defendant has not met its burden of
demonstrating that the Eastern District of Tennessee is clearly more convenient,
the Court DENIES the motion.
On November 1, 2012, Larry E. Gouge, Jr., filed a complaint against CSX
Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”) for violations of the Federal Rail Safety Act, 49
U.S.C. § 20109 (“FRSA”) (Doc. 2). Gouge works as a conductor for CSX on its KD
subdivision which runs from Corbin, Kentucky to Etowah, Tennessee.
The
complaint alleges that CSX repeatedly harassed and discriminated against Gouge
because he filed a personal injury report and reported unsafe conditions at CSX.
The complaint alleges the following.
On December 2, 2009, Gouge
completed a Report of Personal Injury after he was struck and injured by
overgrown trees and vegetation while riding on the side of a rail car. As a result,
Gouge was out of work for about one year until November 17, 2010 when he
returned to work for CSX. Upon returning to work, CSX subjected plaintiff to
intimidation, harassment, discrimination, and unfavorable personnel actions.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 20109, plaintiff engaged in protected activities and CSX
was aware that activities were protected.
In April 2011, Gouge filed a complaint
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) claiming that
CSX retaliated against him in violation of FRSA because of his December 2009
workplace injury. Subsequently, Gouge amended his complaint with OSHA.
CSX moves to dismiss without prejudice this case for improper venue
arguing that Gouge filed the case here “solely because his counsel maintains an
office in this district.” CSX maintains that venue is not proper in this district
under the FRSA’s venue provision or the federal venue statute provision.
Alternatively, CSX moves the Court to transfer the Eastern District of Tennessee
where the parties reside and the relevant events occurred. Gouge responds that
venue is proper under the federal venue statute as CSX resides in this district
because it operates Rose Lake Yard in East St. Louis, Illinois and operates a
“major rail yard in East St. Louis, Illinois.” Also, plaintiff argues that CSX has
failed to show that the Eastern District of Tennessee is clearly more convenient.
The Court agrees with plaintiff.
II. Analysis
Rule 12(b)(3) provides that a party may move to dismiss based on improper
venue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for improper
venue, the court follows the same standard as for a Rule 12(b)(2) dismissal,
taking all the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Faulkenberg v. CB Tax Franchise Sys.,
LP, 637 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir.2011) (citing Kochert v. Adagen Med. Int'l, Inc.,
491 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir.2007)).
The defendant has the burden of showing
that venue is improper. Granader v. Peachtree Lane Assocs. ( In re Peachtree
Lane Assocs.), 150 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir.1998).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), applicable to civil actions wherein jurisdiction is
not founded solely on diversity, venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ..., or
(3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is
no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Furthermore, for the purposes of determining venue under
this provision, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
Clearly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in this judicial
district. CSX resides in this judicial district because it owns and operates rail
yards in East St. Louis, Illinois which are located in this judicial district.
Next, the Court must address defendant’s arguments as to the venue
provision contained in the FRSA. Defendant contends that under FRSA venue is
proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee as that is where the violations
occurred. Defendant maintains that while 49 U.S.C. §20109(d)(3) does not define
the “appropriate district court,” 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(2)(A)(iii) provides for the
Secretary of Labor the right to bring an action to enforce the orders entered by it
“in the district court … in which the violation occurred.”
Thus, according to
defendant, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee.
Plaintiff
responds that Congress did not promulgate a special rule for venue in FRSA.
49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3) provides:
De novo review.--With respect to a complaint under paragraph (1), if
the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 210
days after the filing of the complaint and if the delay is not due to the
bad faith of the employee, the employee may bring an original action
at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of
the United States, which shall have jurisdiction over such an action
without regard to the amount in controversy, and which action shall,
at the request of either party to such action, be tried by the court
with a jury
Clearly, § 20109(d)(3) does not contain a special rule for venue and does
not define “the appropriate district court.” The Court agrees with plaintiff that
Congress has been clear in promulgating venue in other federal statutes. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 1965; 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); and 28 U.S.C. §
1402. Since Congress failed to specify venue in FRSA, the Court finds that federal
venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) applies in this matter and that venue is
proper in this judicial district. Thus, the Court denies CSX’s motion to dismiss
for improper venue.
Therefore, the Court must address CSX’s alternative
argument regarding transfer.
Section 1404(a), which governs the transfer of an action from one federal
district court to another, provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.
The purpose of § 1404(a) is to prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to
protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and
expenses ….” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964). Defendant bears
the burden of establishing that the transferee forum is “clearly more convenient.”
Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1986).
In weighing these factors, a task committed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge, district courts must consider the statutory factors in light of all the
circumstances of the case. Id. at 219. When assessing convenience, courts
generally look to “each party’s access to and distance from resources in each
forum,” “the location of material events,” “the availability of and access to
witnesses,” and “the relative ease of access to sources of proof.” See Research
Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir.
2010).
As to the interests of justice, courts consider “docket congestion and likely
speed to trial in the transferor and potential transferee forums; each court’s
relative familiarity with the relevant law; the respective desirability of resolving
controversies in each locale; and the relationship of each community to the
controversy.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court stresses that “’unless the balance
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed.”” In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). Stated more plainly,
a tie goes to plaintiff. Id. at 665.
Here, defendant has not met is burden of demonstrating that the Eastern
District of Tennessee is clearly more convenient.
Although most of the incidents
alleged in the complaint occurred in Etowah, Tennessee and this action could
have been brought in the Eastern District of Tennessee, other factors mitigate
against the transfer to Tennessee.
Plaintiff also maintains that CSX’s ethics
department, located in Jacksonville, Florida, played a major role in the
investigation of CSX harassment and many of the records are located in
Jacksonville, Florida. Further, Gouge chose to litigate the case in this judicial
district. Unquestionably, the Southern District of Illinois is convenient for Gouge.
As to the convenience of this forum to CSX, CSX is headquartered in
Jacksonville, Florida and it owns and operates rail yards is East St. Louis (where
this Court sits).
Further, records, investigative reports and any other such
documents can easily be brought to this judicial district. The Court does not
believe that keeping the case in the Southern District of Illinois would be
especially inconvenient for CSX.
Thus, the Court is not persuaded that the
transferor district is any less convenient for CSX than the transferee district.
The same applies for the convenience of witnesses. CSX cites to witnesses
who reside in Georgia, Florida and Tennessee as demonstrating the Eastern
District of Tennessee is clearly more convenient. Specifically, CSX maintains that
CSX manager Michael Scharp lives in Tennessee and that CSX manager Shannon
Smith lives in Georgia and CSX manager Marcus McCant lives in Florida. In sum,
CSX argues transfer is warranted as the incidents at issue occurred in Tennessee
and it would be inconvenient for the witnesses to have to travel to this judicial
district to testify. The Court finds that any of these witnesses deemed necessary
to this case could be offered to the jury via deposition. Moreover, two of plaintiff’s
witnesses, Regina Gouge and Peter Spakosy, have stated that traveling to and
testifying in the Southern District of Illinois is convenient for them. As to the
convenience of witnesses, the Court finds that the Southern District of Illinois is
just as convenient to the witnesses as the Eastern District of Tennessee.
Lastly, the Court must consider the “interest of justice” component of the
transfer analysis. “Public interests” address the interest of justice and include: (1)
the speed of the proceeding; (2) the Court’s familiarity with applicable law; and (3)
the relation of the community to the occurrence and the desirability of resolving
the controversy in its locale. Plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law, thus, the
familiarity with the law is neutral. Likewise is the speed at which the case will
proceed to trial factor. Based on the most recent statistics, the median time from
the filing to trial in civil cases is 22.7 months in the Southern District of Illinois
and 26.7 months in the Eastern District of Tennessee. While this factor slightly
favors this forum, it is more or less neutral as well. While plaintiff is a Tennessee
resident, the Court notes that this district also has a strong interest in litigating
this case as defendant, an Illinois resident, employs citizens of this judicial
district as it operates rail yards in East St. Louis. Similarly to the convenience
factors, the interest of just inquiry demonstrates the weight of the factors is
balanced at best. Thus, defendant has not met its burden.
The Court notes that the Seventh Circuit has held that ease of access to the
sources of proof, easy air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents
and the abundance of law firms with nationwide practices, make it easy for cases
to be litigated with little extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas.
Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund v. Elite
Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000). The Southern District of
Illinois is located in the St. Louis metropolitan area, hence, this factor strongly
favors not transferring the suit.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) (Doc. 10).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 27th day of June, 2013.
David R. Herndon
2013.06.27
16:28:41 -05'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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