Armstrong v. Unknown Party et al

Filing 48

ORDER denying 47 Motion for relief from judgment: For the reasons stated in the attached Order, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Order for details. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 3/13/15. (soh )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL ARMSTRONG,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BEN LOUDEN,
DANA YOAKUM,
GARY BECKER, and
THE CITY OF BELLEVILLE, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

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) Case No. 12-cv-01171-MJR-SCW
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
While confined at a local county jail, Michael Armstrong filed suit in
this under 42 U.S.C. 1983 naming as Defendants the City of Belleville,
Illinois, three unknown “John Doe” Belleville Police Officers, and a bus
company. Armstrong alleged that he was struck by a bus while out jogging,
that the three officers used excessive force in tasing him following the
accident, and that the City maintained an official policy or practice of
improperly supervising and training its police officers.
On threshold review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the
undersigned dismissed the bus company but found that Plaintiff had stated a
colorable excessive force claim against the three officers and a colorable
claim for improper supervision against the City (Doc. 6). The officers were
identified, the complaint was amended, and Defendants were served.

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In December 2013, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiff was notified of his duty to respond to the motion but failed to do so.
On April 30, 2014, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
moving Defendants.

Judgment was entered in favor of the moving

Defendants and against Plaintiff on May 1, 2014.
More than eight months after judgment was entered herein, Plaintiff
filed a “Motion to Alter Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule 59(E)” (Doc. 43).
In that January 12, 2015 filing, Plaintiff argued that he had good reason for
not responding earlier to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, so the
Court should vacate the judgment, reopen the motion, and allow Plaintiff a
period of time in which to file a memo opposing summary judgment. The
undersigned Chief Judge denied the motion to alter judgment in a sevenpage Order on January 27, 2015 (Doc. 26), which concluded:
Plaintiff’s … motion is timely under Rule 60(b) but does not set
forth extraordinary circumstances that justify vacating a
judgment entered on May 1, 2014.
At best, Plaintiff has
identified clerical confusion resulting from his own failure to
include (on his change of address notice) a case name or case
number. At that time, Plaintiff had two open pending lawsuits.
The notice was needed for (and correctly docketed in) Case No.
13-cv-0558; it did not also get docketed in the above-referenced
case.
Plaintiff offers no explanation for failing to place a case name
and caption on his notice of address change, tenders no reason
the change of address should have been filed in this case as
opposed to Case No. 13-cv-0558, and furnishes scant
explanation for the lengthy interim between his realization that
judgment had been entered (via the Court’s September 30, 2014
Order) and his filing of the motion to amend judgment (on
January 20, 2015). His lack of law library access in October
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2014 does not fully explain the latter. And a litigant’s
carelessness does not warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir.
2000).
Simply put, Plaintiff has not demonstrated mistake, excusable
neglect, misconduct by the opposing parties, or any other
ground rendering the judgment vulnerable to attack and
justifying altering or amending the judgment entered on May 1,
2014.
On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed in this closed case a second motion for
relief from the May 2014 judgment.

In the current motion (Doc. 47),

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(3) because, inter alia, (a) he did not immediately receive
Defendants’ summary judgment motion due to a prison transfer, (b) when
the Court warned Plaintiff of the need to provide address change
notifications to the Clerk’s Office, he was not specifically told that he had to
file a “separate notice of address change for each case” he had pending
before the Court (Doc. 47, p. 5-7), and (c) dismissal of his suit for failure to
oppose summary judgment was “a drastic measure” and too harsh of a
“sanction” (id., p. 8-11).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a district court to relieve a
party from a final judgment or order on certain grounds, such as mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud
or misconduct by the opposing party, if the judgment if void or has been
discharged, or any other reason justifying such relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
Motions under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time and, for
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the grounds specified in subsections (1), (2), and (3), no more than a year
after entry of the judgment or order.

FED. R. CIV. P. 60(C)(1).

Relief under Rule 60(b) is an “extraordinary remedy” which should be
granted “only in exceptional circumstances.” See, e.g., Kathrein v. City of
Evanston, 752 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2014); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.
Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 131 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1997).
See also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536-38 (2005)(movant
seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show “extraordinary
circumstances” justifying the reopening of a final judgment).
Plaintiff has not articulated any ground justifying this extraordinary
remedy here.

The Order granting summary judgment was a full merits-

based decision, not an Order “sanctioning” Plaintiff. The Court did note that
Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motion constituted an admission of the
merits of the motion under Local Rule 7.1(c) of this District. However, the
undersigned simply applied that to mean that Plaintiff had admitted the facts
as presented by Defendant. The Court proceeded to assess each argument
for summary judgment, discuss the evidence supporting the argument, and
analyze the law applicable thereto. There was no sudden, drastic “sanction”
imposed on Plaintiff.

In a detailed 12-page Order, the Court granted

Defendants’ summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff has advanced no ground

warranting Rule 60(b) relief from the judgment.

Accordingly, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s March 9, 2015 motion for relief from judgment (Doc. 47).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED March 13, 2015.
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge

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