Walker v. Samuels et al

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. However, the dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing her claim for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of her allotted "strikes" under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 3/8/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JESSICA WALKER, # 25408-009,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR.,
PAUL LAIRD, TERRY MEAD,
SHAI FOSTER, STACY HERNANDE,
and CHERYL HENING,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-1296-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Federal Prison Camp in Greenville, brings this action for
alleged violations of her constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of federal
authority. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff is serving a
60 month sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See United States v. Walker,
Case No. 09-cr-18-JLH (E.D. Ark., sentenced June 30, 2010). Plaintiff claims Defendants have
violated her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
More specifically, Plaintiff claims she was placed in the Residential Drug Abuse Program
(“RDAP”) at Greenville on July 15, 2011, despite having been diagnosed with a mental illness, a
learning disability, and testing below an eighth grade educational level (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s limitations, yet placed her in the RDAP program in spite of the
requirement that participants should have at least an eighth grade level test score.

Upon

successful completion of the 500 hour program, an inmate should receive one year off her
sentence. Plaintiff remained in the program for 560 hours over eight months, but was expelled
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without receiving any sentence credit, because she was unable to fulfill the requirements1 (Doc.
1-2, pp. 1, 5, 7, 15-16, 41-42). She contends that her lack of success was due to her mental
illness and learning disability, which the Greenville program was not equipped to accommodate.
Plaintiff had requested a transfer to the federal facility in Carswell, Texas, which has a program
designed for inmates with the dual diagnosis of mental illness and a learning disability. At one
point it was determined that Plaintiff would be “an appropriate candidate for transfer” (Doc. 1-2,
p. 54). Ultimately, Plaintiff’s transfer was denied. However, another Greenville inmate with the
same diagnosis as Plaintiffs was allowed to transfer to the Carswell program. Plaintiff argues
that Defendants’ refusal to grant her transfer amounted to a denial of her right to equal
protection.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that the decision to keep her in the Greenville RDAP when
Defendants knew that she could not comprehend the program amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment. Plaintiff was belittled, embarrassed, discouraged, and degraded while participating
in RDAP because her mental illness, learning disability, and limited education prevented her
from success.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of
the complaint.

After fully considering the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court

concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a
constitutional claim for either an equal protection or a cruel and unusual punishment violation.
A “prison administrative decision may give rise to an equal protection claim only if the
plaintiff can establish that ‘state officials had purposefully and intentionally discriminated

1

Plaintiff has brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Walker v. Cross,
Case No. 13-cv-102-DRH-PMF, requesting that sentence credit be awarded to her. A reduction of
sentence is not an available remedy in a civil rights action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500
(1973) (habeas action is used to seek an immediate or speedier release from custody); (See Doc. 7).
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against him.’”2 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
935 (1987) (citing Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)). “[I]solated events
that adversely affect individuals are not presumed to be a violation of the equal protection
clause.” Shango, 681 F.2d at 1104 (quoting Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir.
1980)).

A “mere inconsistency in prison management” does not necessarily constitute a

cognizable equal protection claim. Id. (quoting Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir.
1978)).
Plaintiff’s claim that she was treated differently from another inmate who shared her
“dual diagnosis” and was granted a transfer appears to show inconsistency on the part of
Defendants. However, this differential treatment does not mean Plaintiff was denied equal
protection because of her membership in an identifiable group. Rather, both Plaintiff and the
other inmate were members of the same “group” of persons diagnosed with both a learning
disability and a mental illness.
The gravamen of equal protection lies not in the fact of deprivation of a right but
in the invidious classification of persons aggrieved by the state's action. A
plaintiff must demonstrate intentional or purposeful discrimination to show an
equal protection violation. Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that a
decisionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected
his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects
on the identifiable group.
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d
1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982) (internal citations omitted)). The facts outlined by Plaintiff do not
show that her “group” was singled out for disparate treatment, only that her transfer request had

2

A Bivens action is the federal equivalent of a § 1983 civil rights action. See Glaus v. Anderson, 408
F.3d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 2005); Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).
Therefore, the reference to “state officials” applies equally to federal officials in the analysis of Plaintiff’s
claim.
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a different outcome than someone who had similar needs to Plaintiff’s. This does not state a
constitutional claim.
As to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, the difficulties and emotional distress she
describes, while unpleasant, do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth
Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and punishment grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
However, only deprivations of basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and
physical safety will implicate Eighth Amendment concerns. Id.; see also James v. Milwaukee
Cnty., 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992). To state a constitutional claim, a complaint must
outline an unquestioned and serious deprivation of a basic human need, or denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; accord Jamison-Bey v. Thieret,
867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987).
The emotional harm described by Plaintiff falls far short of an objectively serious
deprivation or punishment contemplated in the above precedents. Moreover, the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.), as amended in 1996 by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), strictly limits an inmate’s recovery for mental or emotional
injury:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e). Because Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any physical injury
whatsoever, she can recover nothing for her emotional injuries.

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Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, this civil rights action is DISMISSED with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. However, the dismissal is without
prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing her claim for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of her allotted “strikes” under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A dismissal without prejudice may count as a strike, so
long as the dismissal is made because the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim.
See Paul v. Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the
action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable.
§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 8, 2013
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G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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See 28 U.S.C.