Woodson v. Quinn et al

Filing 5

ORDER : The complaint (Doc. 1 ) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to comport with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and (d)(1), with leave to amend. On or before May 6, 2013, Plaintiff Woodson shall file his "Amended Complain t," so captioned. Failure to file an amended complaint by the prescribed deadline will be construed as a failure to prosecute this action and a failure to comply with an order of the Court, and this action will be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). (Action due by 5/6/2013). Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 4/5/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DWAYNE M. WOODSON, # N10392,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PAT QUINN, et al.
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv00240-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Dwayne M. Woodson, currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3)
and 1986.1 This case is now before the Court for a threshold review of the complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.

Synopsis of the Case
Plaintiff brings suit against 28 named individuals, including the governor of Illinois, past
and present directors of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), prison officials at
every institutional level, doctors, nurses, Wexford Health Sources, Inc.—the prison health care
provider, and its owners and directors. It is alleged that, from January 2010 to the present,
Plaintiff and “unassigned general population, maximum security prisoners over the age of 45,
1

“Section 1983 creates a federal remedy against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives
‘any citizen of the United States . . . of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.’” Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State
Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, Section
1985(3) is the vehicle used for conspiracies to deny a person or class of people equal protection
of the laws due to class-based animus. Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282, 287 (7th Cir. 2012);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Section 1986 is used to bring an action for
failing to prevent a Section 1985(3) conspiracy. Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1363 n. 4 (7th
Cir. 1985).
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who suffer from chronic illnesses” have been subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement,
denied adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and denied their First
Amendment right to seek redress. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), Plaintiff also invokes this
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims for civil conspiracy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, respondeat superior liability, and indemnification. Plaintiff
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, a mediated settlement, declaratory judgment,
appointment of a “research methodologist” and special master, and injunctive relief. Plaintiff
proposes that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, this action proceed as a class
action, but he has not formally moved for class certification.2
The allegations in the complaint present a causal chain beginning with prison
overcrowding (117% of capacity), leading to the deterioration of the conditions of confinement,
staff indifference and inmate violence, and resulting in excessive lockdowns (in terms of
frequency, length and degree of restriction). The lockdowns during the relevant three-year
period were principally triggered by “volatile incidents” and staff assaults, although brief
lockdowns were due to other causes, such as “the weather.” During a lockdown, inmates are
confined to their cells for 23 hours per day (sometimes longer), unable to exercise or get
sunlight; also, passes to the health care unit are cancelled, so needed medical care is not received.
2

“[U]ntil certification there is no class action but merely the prospect of one; the only action is
the suit by the named plaintiff.” Morlan v. Universal Guar. Life Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 609, 616 (7th
Cir. 2002)). Furthermore, this Court is unaware of any class action that was allowed to proceed
with a pro se prisoner as the class representative. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). See also Hagan v.
Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[P]ro se litigants are generally not appropriate as
class representatives.”); Holmes v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 805 F.2d 1034 (6th Cir. 1986)
(“[P]ro se prisoners are not adequate class representatives able to fairly represent the class.”);
Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is plain error to permit this
imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class
action.”)

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By Plaintiff’s calculation, Menard was on lockdown for 181 days in 2010, 118 days in 2011, and
147 days in 2012. The lockdown conditions were made even worse when heat indexes soared to
134 degrees on repeated days during the summer, particularly since inmates do not have access
to cold water or air conditioning, and the cellblocks have little air flow.
Plaintiff asserts that the combined effect of the lockdowns, inadequate medical care,
deprivation of medications, and the lack of exercise caused him to have a near-fatal hemorrhagic
stroke in August 2010. After returning from the hospital, Plaintiff was purportedly denied proper
after-care because the prison was on lockdown. Also, with respect to his individual claims,
Plaintiff’s efforts to pursue an investigation of his own innocence, and his efforts to support
legislation for various “innocence projects,” were hampered—which he characterizes as a denial
of access to the courts. He also alleges that he was repeatedly hindered in his attempts to file
grievances regarding all of these issues by a lack of grievance forms.
Plaintiff contends that all of the defendants, though their actions, inaction, enforcement
of policies, and deliberate indifference conspired to retaliate against him and the other members
of the proposed class by allowing the aforementioned conditions of confinement and deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.
Pleading Standards
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates that a complaint must provide a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” which is
sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis. FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). See also Appert v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012). Although the Court is obligated to
accept factual allegations as true, some factual allegations may be “so sketchy or implausible”

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that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). The allegations in the complaint must “actually suggest that the plaintiff has
a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level.”
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581. At the same time,
however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed.

See

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
After fully considering the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court concludes that,
for the reasons explained below, this action is subject to dismissal without prejudice and with
leave to amend, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and (d)(1).

Plaintiff’s

complaint is 78 pages in length, with 25 pages of accompanying exhibits (Docs. 1, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3).
Put succinctly, a prolix and confusing complaint, such as Plaintiff’s, warrants dismissal with
leave to amend because it makes it difficult for a defendant to file a responsive pleading and for
the Court to conduct orderly litigation. See Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc., 20
F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994).
Although the basic factual scenario described in the complaint is fertile ground for
constitutional claims (particularly Eighth Amendment claims), the complaint—despite being 78
pages long—does not sufficiently plead any federal claims, which are necessary to secure this
Court’s jurisdiction and provide a basis for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims. Even affording the complaint the liberal construction that a pro se
pleading deserves, certain pleading standards must still be met and the Court cannot shoulder the

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full burden of fashioning a viable complaint for a pro se plaintiff.
The section headings within the complaint illustrate the problem. The complaint contains
a “Preliminary Statement,” “Statement of Claims and Allegations,” “Statement of Claims and
Recent Facts,” “Allegations of Fact-Defendants’ Misconduct,” as well as 13 numbered counts.
Paragraphs 1-38 of the complaint, which include the “Preliminary Statement” and “Statement of
Claims and Allegations,” describe a myriad of factual allegations, but do not mention any
defendants by name (Doc. 1, pp.14-31). Similarly, paragraphs 120-153, containing Count I-XIII,
do not mention any specific defendants (Doc. 1-1, pp. 23-36). Only Count I even vaguely
suggests possible defendants:

“Lockdown coordinator (“John Doe’s [sic]), medical staff,

doctors[,] etc.”
The “Allegations of Fact-Defendants’ Misconduct” section, paragraphs 107-119, does
associate specific defendants with factual allegations, but the allegations are too vague to form
the basis of a claim, or they are wholly speculative (Doc. 1-1, pp. 13-22). These allegations can
broadly be described as the “conspiracy claims.” For example, Plaintiff baldly asserts that
Governor Quinn and IDOC Directors Godinez, Randle and Taylor had overall authority to
prevent all of the alleged wrongs. The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to
Section 1983 actions. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff must allege that a defendant is “personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that there was a broad conspiracy; he even identifies
the defendants involved, but then he merely recites the elements of a conspiracy claim: “These
Defendants’ [sic] and their coconspirators … in pursuance of a common plan or design, acting in
concert, under the colors [sic] of state law, and by agreement[,] either expressly or tacitly devised
a scheme in furtherance of their objectives….” (Doc. 1-1, p. 17, ¶ 112).

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The “Statement of Claims and Relevant Facts, paragraphs 39- 106, provides the most
detailed allegations, associating named defendants with factual allegations, from which a few
claims might be extrapolated (Doc. 1, pp. 32-41; Doc. 1-1, pp. 1-12). However, the Court is left
to fill in too much on its own—merely guessing—which is beyond liberally construing a pro se
complaint. Again, many of the allegations are confusing, or too vague to form the basis of a
claim, or they are wholly speculative. Some allegations have nothing to do with any potential
claim, while others state viable claims against individuals who are not named defendants.

For

example, Plaintiff describes in detail his difficulties with a nurse at St. Louis University Hospital
during the time he was hospitalized following his stroke (Doc. 1-1, pp. 5-6, ¶ 82). Also, in
anticipation of pursuing class-wide allegations, Plaintiff has sometimes made it difficult to
discern in which events he was personally involved.
Joinder and Severance Considerations
Plaintiff should consider George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007) and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 when drafting his amended complaint. In George, the Seventh
Circuit emphasized that unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits,
“not only to prevent the sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also
to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (“PLRA”). 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007), citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (g). “Unrelated
claims against different defendants belong in different suits[.]”

George, 507 F.3d at 607.

Otherwise, prisoners easily could sidestep the requirements of the PLRA, Pub.L. No. 104–134,
110 Stat. 1321 (1996), in particular the PLRA’s provisions regarding filing fees. See George,
507 F.3d at 607.
Rule 18 provides that “[a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-

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party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an
opposing party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a). Accordingly, “multiple claims against a single party are
fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against
Defendant 2.” George, 507 F.3d at 607. However, under Rule 20, persons may be joined in one
action as defendants if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in
the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). Both of the requirements of Rule 20(a) must be
satisfied in order to sustain party joinder under the rule. See Intercon Research Associates., Ltd.
v. Dresser Industries, 696 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1982). Rule 20 applies with as much force to
cases brought by prisoners as it does to any other kind of case. See George, 507 F.3d at 607.
Accordingly, “[a] buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person—say, a suit
complaining that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a
debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions—should be rejected if filed by a
prisoner.” George, 507 F.3d at 607.
If Plaintiff is unable to plead a conspiracy claim or some other nexus between his varied
claims, severance of (many) claims may be warranted. As it is, there is no apparent reason to
join a claim regarding how hot the cellhouse gets in summer with a request for medication being
delayed or denied.
Disposition
For the reasons stated, the complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to comport with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and (d)(1), with leave to amend.
On or before May 6, 2013, Plaintiff Woodson shall file his “Amended Complaint,” so captioned.

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The amended complaint shall include a short plain statement of each claim, in conformity with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Plaintiff must also resubmit any exhibits he desires to have
appended to the amended complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint by the prescribed
deadline will be construed as a failure to prosecute this action and a failure to comply with an
order of the Court, and this action will be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall not count as one of his allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was
incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable,
regardless of whether Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 5, 2013
s/ G. Patrick Murphy
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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