Allied Waste Transportation, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 50
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 21 , striking 13 , denying 18 , granting 28 , denying 17 and confirming the Arbitrator's decision and award. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 10/10/2013. (jdh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ALLIED WASTE TRANSPORTATION, INC.
d/b/a Allied Waste Services of Edwardsville,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
Case No. 13-cv-268-JPG-PMF
v.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 50,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case arises following an arbitration decision in favor of defendant/counterclaimant
Teamsters Local Union No. 50 (“Union”) and against plaintiff/counterdefendant Allied Waste
Transportation, Inc. (“Allied”). Allied asks the Court to vacate the decision, and the Union asks
the Court to confirm it. This matter comes before the Court today on the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment (Docs. 18 & 28), to which the respective parties have responded (Docs. 28
& 30). The Court also considers the Union’s motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 (Doc. 17), to which Allied has responded (Doc. 20), and Allied’s motion to strike
(Doc. 21).
I.
Facts
Union member Bobby Reeves was employed as a driver by Allied, a commercial and
residential solid waste disposal company, since 2004. This employment was governed by a
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the Union and Allied. Under the CBA, Allied
retained “the right to suspend, discipline, or discharge for just cause . . .; [and] to make and enforce
reasonable rules and regulations . . . except as expressly abridged by the specific provisions of this
Agreement.” CBA Art. IV § 1. The CBA also contained the following provisions:
Section 1. The Employer shall not take any disciplinary action without just cause.
The Employer shall not suspend or discharge without first giving the employee two
documented warning notices of the complaint against such an employee, with a
copy of the same to the Union and Job Steward. No such written notice is required
prior to the suspension or discharge of any employee where cause is: . . .
recklessness or negligence resulting in an accident or injury while on duty, . . .
destruction of Company owned or leased property, . . . or the violation of a
Company rule or regulation established as required under Article IV of this
Agreement. The Company has the burden of proof in establishing violations.
Section 2. The employer shall furnish to the Union a copy of every written
warning and notice of every disciplinary suspension or discharge within two (2)
working days after the disciplinary action is taken. Except for written disciplinary
notices issued for preventable injury and/or accidents . . . , disciplinary notices shall
not be used as a basis for further step discipline after the expiration of nine (9)
calendar months from the date of issuance. Written disciplinary notices issued for
preventable accidents shall remain active for twelve (12) calendar months from
issuance.
CBA, Art. V. The CBA does not define “just cause” and does not expressly provide that an
employee will or must be terminated after three “preventable” accidents within a twelve-month
period.
The parties further agreed in the CBA to a grievance procedure that culminated in final
binding arbitration:
Section 2. Authority of the Arbitrator. The arbitrator shall have no right to
amend, modify, nullify, ignore, add to nor subtract from the provisions of this
Agreement. The arbitrator shall consider and decide only the question of fact as to
whether there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of the
specific provisions of this Agreement as submitted to him/her by the parties and
shall have no authority to make a decision on any issue not so submitted to
him/her/them.
The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the issue raised by the grievance as
submitted in writing. The arbitrator shall be without power to make decisions
contrary to or inconsistent with applicable federal or state law or applicable rules
and regulations of government agencies, having the force and effect of law.
Section 3. Decision of the Arbitrator. The decision shall be based solely upon
the arbitrator’s interpretation of the meaning or application of the specific terms of
this Agreement to the facts of the grievance presented, consistent with applicable
law. Consistent with these provisions, the arbitrator shall have the authority to
make an award and to order an appropriate remedy, if applicable. A decision
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rendered consistent with the terms of this Agreement shall be final and binding.
CBA Art. VI.
Reeves had been a safe driver for Allied since he began working there in 2004 until he had
a bad run of accidents in the fall of 2011. On October 25, 2011, he knocked over a telephone box
with the Allied truck he was driving. The following day, he was issued a written disciplinary
report for this incident, which Allied viewed as preventable. On November 5, 2011, he hit a
wooden enclosure with a dumpster he was hoisting with the Allied truck he was driving and caused
minor damage. Although Reeves reported the incident immediately, no disciplinary report was
issued for this incident at the time. On November 7, 2011, the Allied truck he was driving was
damaged while he was driving it through a wheel-washing facility. The arm of the truck was
down when it should have been up and was bent as Reeves drove through the washer. The next
day, he was issued another written disciplinary report for the wheel-washing accident, which
Allied also viewed as preventable. Reeves was suspended for three days pending an investigation
and then on November 14, 2011, was terminated. The Union grieved his termination and pursued
the issue to arbitration. After holding a hearing, the arbitrator decided in the Union’s favor,
approved the three-day suspension and ordered Allied to reimburse Reeves the pay and benefits he
suffered because of his termination.
In arriving at this decision, the arbitrator noted that the issues before him were whether
there was just cause to terminate Reeves and, if there was no just cause, what the appropriate
remedy was. He then acknowledged the relevant portions of the CBA, including but not limited
to the requirement of just cause before termination. He then reviewed the facts, including Reeves
disciplinary history during his employment, Allied’s current emphasis on safety and accident
prevention, the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the three accidents in the fall of 2011,
and the grievance proceedings between Allied and the Union. The arbitrator then explained the
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generally accepted meaning of “just cause” in the labor-management context, and accepted that
understanding in the absence of a definition of “just cause” in the CBA. He further noted that it
was Allied’s burden to show it had “just cause” for imposing discipline on Reeves.
The arbitrator concluded that Allied failed to follow its progressive discipline procedure of
“giving the employee two documented warning notices of the complaint against such an
employee,” CBA Art. V, § 1, before suspending or terminating him. The arbitrator construed this
provision to mean Allied has “a practice of giving lesser discipline for the first two ‘accidents’
while discharging an employee for the third offense.” Arb. Decision & Award at 13. The
arbitrator further found Allied’s finding of three preventable accidents to justify termination was
not supportable. He concluded that the October 25 and November 5, incidents were preventable
but that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that the November 7 incident was not.
In drawing this conclusion about the November 7 incident, the arbitrator gave little, if any, weight
to the Union steward’s testimony that multiple other trucks had had malfunctioning hydraulics that
caused arms to go down when they should be up. However, he found compelling the repair order
history for the truck Reeves’ was driving that showed the hydraulics in the arm on his truck needed
repair and Reeves’ long history of good driving. Because this accident was not preventable by
Reeves and because the November 5 accident was so minor, the arbitrator found there was not
“just cause” for terminating Reeves and reduced the discipline to a three-day suspension.
Allied filed this lawsuit in March 2013 seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s decision. In May
2013, the Union answered and filed a counterclaim to confirm the arbitrator’s award. The Union
then served on Allied a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 claiming
that Allied’s claims in this lawsuit are groundless and without legal precedent in light of the high
standard that must be met before a court will overturn an arbitrator’s decision. The Union filed
the motion with the Court after Allied failed to withdraw its complaint within 21 days after it
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received the motion. (Doc. 17). Allied then moved for summary judgment (Doc. 18). The
Union’s response to that motion contained a cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 28).
Allied responded to that filing (Doc. 30). Additionally, Allied asks the Court to strike a
memorandum filed by the Union ostensibly in support of its counterclaim to enforce the arbitration
award. The Court will address the summary judgment motions before turning to the other
motions.
III.
Analysis
A.
Legal Standards
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l-Ind.,
Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). Because there are no issues of material fact, this case
turns on which side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Here, the question is whether the Court should vacate or confirm the arbitrator’s award.
The Court’s role in reviewing an arbitration award is generally limited to considering whether the
arbitrator’s award “draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement” and is not a
dispensation of the arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice.” United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). To allow the Court plenary review of
the merits of an arbitration award “would make meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator’s
decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be final,” and would deprive the parties to a
CBA of what they bargained for in an arbitration clause – the arbitrator’s construction of the CBA.
Id. at 599.
Thus, the Court is generally limited to the question of whether the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of the authority conferred on him by the parties. Butler Mfg. Co. v. United Steelworkers,
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336 F.3d 629, 632-34 (7th Cir. 2003); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United Steel Workers of Am.,
243 F.3d 345, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court should uphold the award as long as the arbitrator
“is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,”
even if he made a serious error in his decision. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey,
532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curiam); see United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29, 38 (1987); Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782-83
(7th Cir. 2007) (neither serious error nor incorrect or whacky decision justifies vacating award).
The question “is not whether the arbitrator or arbitrators erred in interpreting the contract; it is not
whether they clearly erred in interpreting the contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in
interpreting the contract; it is whether they interpreted the contract.” Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
814 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987); accord Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. International Unions
of Painters & Allied Trades, Local 770, 558 F.3d 670, 677-78 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court should
vacate an arbitrator’s award only where “the arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of
the agreement and effectively dispenses his own brand of industrial justice.” Garvey, 532 U.S. at
509 (internal quotations omitted). “[O]nly if there is no possible interpretative route to the award,
so that a noncontractual basis can be inferred, may the award be set aside.” Ganton Techs., Inc. v.
U.A.W., Local 627, 358 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
B.
Analysis
Allied asks the Court to vacate the arbitrator’s award because his award was “arbitrary and
capricious” and exceeded his authority in a number of ways. First, Allied argues that the finding
with respect to the November 7, 2011, incident that the truck arm had extended on its own was
without evidentiary support and was contrary to Reeves’ own admission that the arm was fully
retracted at the time of the incident. Allied notes that the repair order history for the relevant truck
did not mention issues regarding the arm’s hydraulic system but spoke only of leaks in a
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completely separate hydraulic system. Allied also argues that the arbitrator was incorrect in
finding that Allied did not follow progressive discipline. It notes Reeves had three accidents
within a matter of weeks and had received two written disciplinary reports before his termination.
Allied also believes the arbitrator ignored Reeves’ admission that he understood Allied has the
right to determine whether an accident is preventable and exceeded his authority in determining
that the November 7, 2011, accident was not preventable. Finally, Allied argues the arbitrator’s
award is against public policy reflected in Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (“FMCSA”)
regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 391.11(a)-(b), because it allows Allied to place an unsafe driver back on
the road.
In response, the Union objects to numerous factual assertions by Allied in its motion and to
the introduction of evidence not used at the hearing regarding truck hydraulic systems. The
Union further maintains that the arbitration award was supported by the record and was not
contrary to witness testimony.
As a preliminary matter, Allied makes much of Reeves’ interpretation of the terms of the
CBA and alleged “admissions” at the arbitration hearing. However, the parties did not bargain
for Reeves’ interpretation but the arbitrator’s. Thus, Reeves’ understanding of the CBA is not
relevant. As Allied’s representative at the arbitration hearing said to Reeves about whether the
November 5, 2011, incident qualified as an accident, “Well, you and I are going to see this
differently, but we’ll let the Arbitrator decide how things come out.” Transcript of Arbitration
Hearing at 157:19-21. This observation applies equally to interpretation of the CBA.
The Court reminds the parties that the question now is not whether the arbitrator was
correct in his decision or whether the Court believes there was just cause to terminate Reeves. On
the contrary, the relevant questions are whether the arbitrator construed the CBA in making his
award and whether that award violated explicit, well-defined, dominant public policy
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ascertainable by reference to laws and legal precedents. See Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United
Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000). For the following reasons, the Court finds
the arbitration award was a result of the interpretation of the CBA and did not violate public policy
such that the award should be vacated.
Allied first claims there is no evidence in the record to support the arbitrator’s finding that
the truck arm extended by itself in the November 7, 2011, incident. It cites in support of its
position Detroit Coil Co. v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge
No. 82, 594 F.2d 575, 580-81 (6th Cir. 1979), which held that an award does not draw its essence
from the CBA where there is no support in the record for the arbitrator’s determinations. Allied is
simply wrong in its assertion. In this case, the arbitrator considered Reeves’ admission, relayed
through an Allied witness’ testimony, that his truck’s hydraulic arm was fully retracted “when he
came down the hill,” Transcript of Arbitration Hearing at 187:1-2, prior to the November 7, 2013,
accident. However, the arbitrator gave more weight to Reeves’ good driving history and the
truck’s repair order history showing a problem with one of the truck’s hydraulic systems to find
that the arm’s hydraulic system was likely malfunctioning at the time of the accident. That in
retrospect – and after consideration of evidence that Allied failed to present to the arbitrator at the
arbitration hearing to carry its burden of proof – it appears the arbitrator may have misunderstood
the evidence or been wrong in his factual determination about the arm does not mean his finding
found no support in the record or that his ultimate conclusion was not based in the CBA.
Allied next claims the arbitrator’s finding that the Union did not follow progressive
discipline was arbitrary and capricious where Reeves admittedly was involved in three accidents
and had received two prior written notices before his termination. Again, Allied’s argument is
nothing more than that the arbitrator interpreted and applied the CBA incorrectly, not that he failed
to interpret the CBA at all. See Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987).
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The arbitrator interpreted the CBA in light of the parties’ past practice to mean that the three
accidents that served as the basis for discharge must have been preventable. Otherwise, they
would not satisfy the requirement of “just cause” found in the CBA, especially where one of the
accidents was minor, as was the November 5, 2011, accident. The arbitrator’s decision in this
regard is neither arbitrary nor capricious but is based on the language of the CBA interpreted in
light of the parties’ past practices.
Noting Reeves’ admission that only Allied can determine whether an accident is
preventable (which, for the reasons stated above, the Court finds irrelevant), Allied argues that the
arbitrator’s decision that the November 7, 2011, accident was not preventable exceeded his
authority. In support of its argument, Allied points to Morgan Services, Inc. v. Local 323,
Chicago & Central States Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 724 F.2d
1217 (6th Cir. 1984), in which the court vacated an arbitrator’s award that ordered reinstatement of
an employee who had been discharged for insubordination where the CBA provided for immediate
discharge “without redress” for insubordination. The court reasoned that the arbitration award
found the employee to have been insubordinate, but ordered a remedy fundamentally at odds with
the plain and unambiguous terms of the CBA calling for a specific discipline as a remedy for
insubordination. Id. at 1122-23. The Court does not find Morgan Services persuasive in this
case. Unlike in Morgan Services, the arbitrator in this case did not find the condition that
triggered a prescribed remedy – there, insubordination; here, three preventable accidents.
Perhaps Morgan Services would have been helpful to Allied had the arbitrator found three
preventable accidents yet overturned the discharge, but that is not the case. Allied has not
demonstrated that the arbitrator in this case exceeded his authority by ignoring terms of the CBA.
In sum, the arbitration award in this case draws its essence from the CBA and is not a result
of the arbitrator’s dispensing his own brand of industrial justice. United Steelworkers of Am. v.
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Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Therefore, the Court will not vacate
the award.
The Court turns now to Allied’s final argument – that the award should be vacated because
it violates public policy even though it may be rooted in the CBA. Even if an arbitration award
draws its essence from the CBA, it may be overturned if it violates public policy. To justify
vacating an award for this reason, the public policy in issue must be “explicit, well defined and
dominant” and “ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.” Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he judiciary may
step in when the arbitrator has commanded the parties to violate legal norms (principally, but not
exclusively, those in positive law) but . . . judges may not deprive arbitrators of authority to reach
compromise outcomes that legal norms leave within the discretion of the parties to the arbitration
agreement.” George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
Essentially, if the parties could have legally agreed to the award between themselves, the arbitrator
can render the award without violating public policy. See, id. at 580-81.
In Eastern Associated Coal, an arbitrator ordered an employer to reinstate a truck driver
who had tested positive on random drug tests two times for marihuana use. Eastern Assoc. Coal,
531 U.S. at 60. The employer argued that the court should vacate the arbitration award because
reinstatement of a drug user violated a public policy against allowing workers who used drugs to
operate dangerous machinery. Id. at 61. The Supreme Court noted that the public policy
exception to enforcing arbitration awards is narrow and should be applied with caution where
Congress and the Executive Branch have established a detailed regulatory scheme governing the
policy field. Id. at 63. The Supreme Court held that the regulatory scheme contained in United
States Department of Transportation regulations, while evincing a policy of eliminating the use of
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drugs by truck drivers, was also concerned with other policies, such as rehabilitation of truck
drivers who have used drugs, and did not forbid reemployment of those who have tested positive
for drug use. Id. at 63-65. The regulatory scheme also advanced labor policy by leaving leeway
for the employer and the union to negotiate whether termination was an appropriate disciplinary
action in response to a positive drug test. Id. at 65. The Supreme Court concluded that
reinstatement of the truck driver who had twice tested positive for drugs did not violate any law or
regulation and was consistent with the policies underlying those rules. Id. at 66-67.
Similarly to the employer in Eastern Associated Coal, Allied argues that returning Reeves
to work would violate FMCSA regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 391.11(a)-(b), which prohibits a motor
carrier from allowing a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle unless they “[c]an, by reason
of experience, training, or both, safely operate the type of commercial motor vehicle he/she
drives.” 49 C.F.R. § 391.11(b)(3). This regulation requiring only safe drivers is not the sort of
regulation that expresses “explicit, well defined and dominant” policy that can justify vacating an
arbitration award. Eastern Assoc. Coal, 531 U.S. at 62. Unlike the question of whether a driver
is of a certain age or possesses a certain type of driver’s license, whether a driver can safely operate
a vehicle is a nebulous concept that requires judgment. Furthermore, the Court is mindful that the
field of commercial truck safety is covered by a detailed regulatory scheme that reflects various
competing policy interest. Finally, Allied has not demonstrated that the law would have
prohibited it from returning Reeves to work as a driver because of his three accidents. Indeed,
those accidents appear not to have prohibited Reeves’ next employer from sending him back out
on the road. What Allied would not be prohibited from doing, the arbitrator is able to order. See
George Watts & Son, 248 F.3d at 580-81.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court confirms the arbitration award in this case. It now
turns to whether it should sanction Allied under Rule 11 for bringing this case.
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IV.
Rule 11 Sanctions
The Union asks the Court to impose sanctions on Allied under Rule 11 for filing the
complaint in this lawsuit, which it believes is groundless and without legal precedent (Doc. 17).
Allied responded to the motion (Doc. 20). In a related request (Doc. 21), Allied asks the Court to
strike a brief filed by the Union captioned as a “Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s
Counter-Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award” (Doc. 13). The Union has not responded to the
motion to strike.
Rule 11 requires that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by
at least one attorney of record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), and that such a signature is a certification
that the filing is not frivolous and is not presented for an improper purpose, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
The Court may sanction an attorney or a party that is responsible for a filing that violates Rule
11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
A party seeking sanctions under Rule 11(c) must file a motion for sanctions separately
from other motions or requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee Cnty., 333
F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 74 F.3d 147, 151 (7th Cir. 1996).
It must serve the motion for sanctions on the opposing party prior to filing it with the Court, and it
can only file the motion if the opposing party fails to withdraw or correct the offending document
within 21 days after service or another time set by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2);
Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 804. “[T]he timely withdrawal of a contention will protect a party
against a motion for sanction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 comment (1993).
The Court first addresses the motion to strike (Doc. 21) before turning to the motion for
sanctions (Doc. 17). The memorandum of law Allied seeks to have stricken (Doc. 13) is a
20-page brief in which the Union attempts to refute arguments Allied made informally to the
Union in response to the Union’s pre-filing service of its Rule 11 motion. Ostensibly, the Union
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offered the memorandum in support of its counterclaim, but in reality its purpose was to support
the Union’s motion for sanctions. However, the Union has supported its motion for sanctions
with another lengthy (21-page) brief (Doc. 17-2). To allow 41 pages of briefing in support of a
motion for sanctions would contravene Local Rule 7.1(d), which limits briefs in support of
motions to 20 pages. For this reason, the Court will strike the “Memorandum of Law in Support
of Defendant’s Counter-Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award” (Doc. 13). The Court further
strikes the attachment to that memorandum, which was belatedly filed seven weeks after the
memorandum (Doc. 23).
Turning to the motion for sanctions (Doc. 21), the Union argues that the complaint is
“frivolous in whole or part,” which warrants sanctions under Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
precedent. See Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987). The Union
specifically points to Allied’s public policy argument, which it never advanced to the arbitrator in
the arbitration proceedings. It further argues that the arbitrator’s decision clearly found its
essence in the CBA. On the other side, Allied maintains it filed this case in good faith and with
support in the record and urges the Court to consider sanctioning the Union for filing its Rule 11
motion.
The Court considers the circumstances of the present case in light of Hill and other similar
cases and declines to issue sanctions. While Allied’s public policy argument is groundless, the
Court does not believe its other arguments are as frivolous as those found worthy of sanctions in
other cases. Furthermore, the Court does not believe it would be worthwhile to try to sort out
which of the Union’s attorney’s fees are attributable to its frivolous arguments, its colorable
arguments, or its superfluous filings (which have been stricken). See id. at 1200 (citing Miller
Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1168 (7th Cir. 1984)). For
these reasons, the Court will deny the Union’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 21) but cautions Allied
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that the Court of Appeals is unlikely to be so generous should that court consider this case. Allied
is warned that it appeals at its own peril.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
GRANTS Allied’s motion to strike (Doc. 21);
STRIKES the Union’s a “Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s
Counter-Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award” (Doc. 13) and its supporting exhibit (Doc.
23);
DENIES Allied’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 18);
GRANTS the Union’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 28);
CONFIRMS the Arbitrator’s Decision and Award dated December 26, 2012;
DENIES the Union’s motion for sanctions (Doc. 17); and
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 10, 2013
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE
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