Southern Illinois Storm Shelters, Inc. v. 4semo.com, Inc.

Filing 276

ORDER denying 274 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/28/2018. (klh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
4SEMO.COM, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS STORM
SHELTERS, INC. et al.,

No. 13-0297-DRH

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ March 21, 2018 motion for
extension of time (Doc. 274). Specifically, defendants, through new counsel who
entered an appearance on March 21, 2018 (Doc. 273), move the Court to grant
them an extension of time of 30 days from the date of the motion for extension of
time to file an amended motion to alter judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motion
(Doc. 275). Based on the following, the Court agrees with plaintiff’s reasoning and
denies the motion.
Last summer, the Court held a three day bench trial. At the conclusion of
the bench trial, the Court directed the parties to file written closing arguments
(Doc. 246). On February 2, 2018, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Doc. 265). On February 6, 2018, the Clerk of the Court
entered Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants (Doc. 266).

On

February 9, 2018, defendants filed a motion to alter and/or amend the judgment

(Doc. 268). Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on February 14, 2018 (Doc.
269) and defendants filed a reply (Doc. 270). On March 20, 2018, after reviewing
the reply, the Court struck the reply because it did not state the exceptional
circumstances as to why the reply was needed (Doc. 272). On March 21, 2018,
attorney Courtney Cox, entered his appearance as defense counsel (Doc. 273) and
filed the motion for extension of time (Doc. 274). A day later, plaintiff filed its
opposition (Doc. 275). As the motion for extension of time is ripe, the Court rules
as follows.
In the motion for extension of time, defendants merely state: “[f]ollowing the
trial and decision in this matter, Defendants contacted the undersigned for the
purpose of engaging him and his firm as counsel in this matter.”

The motion

further states that during this time frame, Mr. Cox’s law firm merged with another
law firm which has an attorney, Douglas Churovich, that has expertise in litigating
trademark cases.

Defendants contend that Mr. Churovich agreed to assist in this

matter and will be entering his appearance but due to the merger and traveling, Mr.
Churovich has been unable to complete review of this case. 1 Further, the motion
states that Mr. Cox “has reviewed the pending Motion to Alter Judgment [Doc. 268]
and determined that it is necessary to file an Amended Motion to Alter Judgment in
order to fully present the issues and bases for such relief to the Court.”

Plaintiff

opposes the motion arguing that such motion is barred.
A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days from the entry of the
judgment. “This time limit is unyielding.”

Banks v. Chicago Board of Education,

1 As of this date, Mr. Churovich has not entered an appearance.

750 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2014)(citing Justice v. Town of Cicero, 682 F.3d 662
(7th Cir. 2012). “Rule 7(b)(1) provides that ‘[a]n application to the court for an
order shall be made by motion which … shall state with particularity the grounds
therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.’

See FED.R.CIV.P. 7(b)(1).

The standard for ‘particularity’ has been determined to mean ‘reasonable
specification.’ Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1977)(finding
that defendant’s Rule 59(e) motion ‘failed to state even one ground for granting the
motion and thus failed to meet the minimal standard of ‘reasonable specification’”).

Talono v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 760 (7th
Cir. 2001). “If a party could file a skeleton motion and later fill it in, the purpose
of the time limitation would be defeated.”

Id. at 761 (quoting Martinez, 556 F.2d

at 820); see also Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.

Wis., 957 F.2d 515, 516-517 (7th Cir. 1992)(“An empty motion cannot reserve time
to file an explanation after the … allowed by Rule 59.”).

“[A] district court may not

extend the time within a party may move to alter or amend a judgment under Rule
59(e).” Id. (quoting Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994)); see

also Riley v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 1 F.3d 725, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1993)(finding
that a timely, but not particularized, Rule 59(e) motion cannot be save by a
subsequent, untimely memorandum that attempts to supply the missing
particularity).
Here, defendants’ motion for extension of time cites no rule, statute or case
law that entitles them to the relief they seek. Clearly, the motion is inadequate as

it is untimely and it does not state with particularity the issues defendants intend to
pursue.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion for extension of time (Doc. 274).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
.

Judge Herndon
2018.03.28
12:44:44 -05'00'
United States District Court