Pyles v. Gaetz et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 118 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons explained herein, summary judgment is granted, and Defendants Greathouse, Whiteside, Delong, and Baig are dismissed without prejudice via the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See attached for details. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 12/12/2014. (jls)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHRISTOPHER PYLES,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD GAETZ,
DAVID REDNOUR,
WILLIAM SPILLER,
MICHAEL ATCHISON,
RICK HARRINGTON,
KIM BUTLER,
GLADYSE C. TAYLOR,
MICHAEL P. RANDLE,
SALVADORE GODINEZ,
TY BATES,
BRAD THOMAS,
REBECCA CREASON,
JAMES R. BROWN,
JOSEPH COWAN,
CHAD E. HASEMEYER,
JACQUELINE A. LASHBROOK,
DOUG LYERLA,
RICHARD D. MOORE,
PAUL OLSON,
BRIAN THOMAS,
DR. BAIG,
MISS GREATHOUSE,
MISS WHITESIDE,
MISS DELONG,
DR. KOWALKOWSKI, and
WILLIAM REES,
Defendants.
No. 13-cv-0299-MJR-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
On March 21, 2013, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Christopher
Pyles filed a complaint alleging that Menard Correctional Center carried out
unconstitutional lockdowns.
(Doc. 1).
Plaintiff originally included claims against
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unknown mental health professionals, but later filed an Amended Complaint
identifying the unknown mental health professionals as (among others) Defendants
Baig, Greathouse, Whiteside, and Delong. Plaintiff alleged these Defendants were (in
violation of the Eighth Amendment) deliberately indifferent to the impact of the
lockdowns on his mental health, and that they (in violation of state law) intentionally
inflicted emotional distress upon him. Defendants Baig, Greathouse, Whiteside and
Delong now bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. (Doc. 118). The motion is ripe for ruling.
In his Response, Plaintiff indicates he agrees that Defendants Greathouse,
Whiteside, and Delong should be dismissed. (Doc. 124). Though Defendant Baig filed a
Reply on July 1, 2014, the Court will not consider that reply, since (contrary to local
rule) Baig failed to plead the exceptional circumstances justifying it. See SDIL-LR
7.1(c). The Court has determined that Baig's motion raises only legal issues and does
not require a hearing.
1. Summary Judgment Standard
The instant dispositive motion is brought pursuant to the regime announced in
Pavey v. Conley, the case in which the Seventh Circuit announced the procedures for
determining whether a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies. In Pavey,
the Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury, but are to
be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2008). A
Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Pavey typically requires a hearing to
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determine any contested issues regarding exhaustion, and (unlike standard summary
judgment motions) a judge may make limited findings of fact at that time. Id. at 742.
The case may proceed on the merits only after any contested issue of exhaustion is
resolved. Id. A hearing is not required where “there are no disputed facts regarding
exhaustion.” Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905, 912 (S.D.Ill. 2009). Here, no hearing
is required, since Plaintiff's failure to respond acts as an admission of the merits (or,
rather, the factual bases) of the motions.
2. PLRA’s Exhaustion Requirement
Suits brought by prisoners are governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C § 1997e. PLRA requires a prisoner to first exhaust all
administrative remedies available before he is able to bring an action concerning the
conditions of the prison. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement of the PLRA
is dependent upon the procedures established by the state in which the prison is
located. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Unexhausted claims may not be
brought to court. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211 (citing Porter v. Nussell, 534 U.S. 516, 524
(2002)).
The Seventh Circuit requires strict compliance in regards to exhaustion. “Unless
a prisoner completes the administrative process by following rules the state has
established for that process, exhaustion has not occurred.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286
F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). This includes the filing of “complaints and appeals in
the place, and at the time, the prison’s rules require.” Id. at 1025. If the prisoner fails
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to comply with the established procedures, including time restraints, the court will not
consider the grievance. Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903.
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is two-fold. McCarthy v. Madigan,
503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). First, it gives the prison officials the chance to address the
prisoner’s claims internally, before any litigation becomes necessary. Kaba v. Stepp,
458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89-90 (2006). Second,
it “seeks to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter, 534
U.S. at 524. See also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737 (2001) (noting that PLRA’s
requirement will help “filter out some frivolous claims.”).
Exhaustion is a prerequisite to filing a suit, so a prisoner must wait until he has
completed the established process and may not file in anticipation that administrative
remedies will soon be exhausted. Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs., 182 F.3d 532, 535
(7th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C § 1997e(a)); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th
Cir. 2004). A suit filed prior to exhaustion of available remedies will be dismissed even
if the remedies become exhausted while the suit is pending. Perez, 182 F.3d at 535.
Because Plaintiff is an Illinois inmate, whether he has fulfilled the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA’s) exhaustion requirement depends on the prison
grievance procedures set forth in Illinois law. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218
(2007).
3. Exhaustion Requirement under Illinois Law
Inmates confined in the Illinois Department of Corrections must adhere to the
Department’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders in order to properly exhaust claims;
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anything less is a failure to exhaust. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810. The prisoner must
first speak with their Counselor about the issues they raise, and if the dispute is not
resolved, the grievance must be filed within sixty days of the events or occurrence with
the Grievance Officer. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(a). The grievance must:
Contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s
complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name of
each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the
complaint. The provision does not preclude an offender from filing a
grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the
offender must include as much descriptive information about the
individual as possible.
20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(b). The grievance officer must then review the grievance
and report findings and recommendations to the Chief Administrative Officer
(“Warden”). 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.830(d). The prisoner then has the opportunity to
review the Warden’s response, and if he is unsatisfied, he may appeal to the Director
through the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) within 30 days of the Warden’s
response. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.830(d); 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.850.
The ARB is then required to provide a written report to the Director of its
recommendation on the grievance and the Director “shall review the findings and
recommendations of the Board and make a final determination of the grievance within
6 months after receipt of the appealed grievance, where reasonably feasible under the
circumstances.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.850(e), (f).
PLAINTIFF’S GRIEVANCES
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Response concedes that he did not properly
identify Delong, Greathouse, or Whiteside and requests that those Defendants be
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dismissed. (Doc. 124, p. 1). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Delong, Greathouse
and Whiteside without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiff has stated that his January 7, 2013 grievance is the only relevant
grievance for determining whether he exhausted remedies as to Defendant Baig. (Doc.
124, p. 8).
That grievance addresses allegedly unconstitutional lockdowns that
occurred from December 9 through December 13, 2012. (Doc. 124, p. 8). The grievance
lists a number of individuals who are presently defendants in this lawsuit, and also
refers to an unnamed “Mental Health Administrator” and miscellaneous John or Jane
Doe IDOC employees.
(Doc. 124, p. 9).
The grievance alleges that the listed
individuals conspired to keep him on lockdown for unconstitutional reasons. (Doc. 124,
p. 9). The grievance also alleges that Plaintiff has suffered from psychological injuries,
including severe anxiety and panic attacks, worsening depression and manic episodes,
stress, paranoia, lack of concentration, decreasing motivation, disassociation, vertigo,
and delirium without hallucination. (Doc. 124, p. 9).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff's January 7 grievance contains neither the requisite detail about
Defendant Baig nor allegations inviting officials to fix the problems about which he has
sued. He did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to Baig.
Plaintiff must name all Defendants in properly-exhausted grievances prior to
filing suit pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Code.
Alternatively, if the
defendant’s name is unknown, a prisoner may describe the "as much descriptive
information about the individual as possible." 20 Ill. Admin Code § 504.810(b). The
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primary purpose of the requirement to name those involved is not to provide notice to
that individual, but to alert prison officials of the problem alleged in the grievance, so
that there is an opportunity for it to be handled internally. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
219 (2007) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)); Maddox v.
Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir. 2011).
The Seventh Circuit has said that, “a
grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is
sought.” Id. (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that the mental health services at
Menard are inadequate to begin with, and that the lockdown practices at Menard
exacerbate mental health injuries and Plaintiff’s bi-polar disorder. (Doc. 70, p. 17).
He specifically alleges that Dr. Baig “failed to report . . . abusive conditions
confinement despite having been advised by the plaintiff about said injuries from the
violations.” (Doc. 70, pp. 17-18).
mental
health
defendants
The Amended Complaint further alleges that the
should
be
reporting
and
providing
professional
recommendations regarding the unconstitutional lockdown practices. (Doc. 70, p. 18).
Plaintiff argues that he has adequately named Baig because he included the
“Mental Health Administrator” and “John and Jane Doe Defendants.”
But the
allegations in the grievance do not mirror the Amended Complaint as to the mental
health professionals.
The Amended Complaint states that the mental health
administrators were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental health issues because
they knew that the lockdowns exacerbated his issues but did nothing to report or
change the lockdown conditions. On the other hand, Plaintiff's January 2013 grievance
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alleges that all the listed parties actually conspired to put the prisoners on lockdown
for non-penological reasons.
While the grievance alleges that the lockdowns have
caused psychological symptoms, at no time does it indicate that some of those
conditions were pre-existing or exacerbated by the lockdown (i.e., that any prison
workers could have been deliberately indifferent to his pre-existing psychological
needs). The grievance does not allege that anyone treated Plaintiff for those conditions
or failed to take into account the effect of the lockdowns on the conditions.
The
allegations in the grievance generally do not match the allegations in the Amended
Complaint against the mental health professionals.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s naming of the “Mental Health Administrator” or “John
and Jane Doe IDOC employees” does not suffice to identify Baig. Plaintiff has not
alleged that Baig is the Mental Health Administrator, so that name cannot stand in for
Baig in the grievance. Plaintiff’s response also makes clear that he put in the “John or
Jane Doe IDOC employees” as a catch-all, and that he thought naming—or describing
in detail—all the relevant parties would be unduly burdensome to the person reviewing
the grievances. Plaintiff misunderstands the purpose of the grievance requirement and
the scope of Illinois law. Unless he fully names all parties that he holds responsible for
his wrongs, or at the very least provides as much descriptive detail as possible, the
prison cannot attempt to address the situation. See 20 Ill. Admin Code § 504.810(b).
Plaintiff also states that Baig has been his treating psychiatrist for years. It stands to
reason that Plaintiff should have been aware of Baig's identity when writing the
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grievance. The Court finds that Plaintiff's January 7, 2013, grievance does not suffice
to exhaust administrative remedies as to Defendant Baig.
CONCLUSION
Defendants Greathouse, Whiteside, and Delong are DISMISSED without
prejudice. Baig’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (Doc. 118). He is
likewise DISMISSED without prejudice. The case will proceed as to all remaining
Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
Chief Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: December 12, 2014
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