Pyles v. Gaetz et al

Filing 9

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Defendants SHANNIS STOCK, HENRY BAYER, TONY FERRANTO, KEVIN HIRSCH, RICHARD PAULTER, AFSCME UNION LOCAL 1175, BRAD BRAMLETT, KNUST, C/O ELLIS and ELAINE BONIFIELD are DISMISSED from this action without prejudice. Only Counts 2 and 3 shall proceed. The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants DONALD GAETZ, DAVID REDNOUR, WILLIAM SPILLER, MICHAEL ATCHISON, RICK HARRINGTON, KIM BUTLER, GLADYSE C. TAYLOR, MICHAEL P. RANDLE, SLAVADOR E GODINEZ, TY BATES, BRAD THOMAS, MELISSA SAUERWEIN and REBECCA CREASON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 4/12/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHRISTOPHER PYLES, # R43795,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD GAETZ, et al.
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv00299-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Christopher Pyles, currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the complaint.
Synopsis of the Case
Plaintiff brings suit against 22 named individuals, a labor union, and an
assortment of unidentified prison employees and health care professionals. It is alleged that,
from May 18, 2005, to the present, Menard has been repeatedly placed on lockdown status for
extended periods of time without justification. 1

When the institution is locked down,

opportunities to leave one’s cell to go to the law library or for mental health treatment are
curtailed. In addition, privileges, such as outdoor exercise, telephone access, commissary access,
and the $10 per month state stipend, are suspended. Inmates are confined to their cells for up to
163 hours per week. Plaintiff asserts that these extreme, unjustified lockdowns are punitive and

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According to Plaintiff, Menard was on lockdown for: 60 days in 2005; 116 days in 2006; 170
days in 2007; 181 days in 2008; 112 days in 2009; 235 days in 2010; 195 days in 2011; and 222
days in 2012.
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have resulted in physical and mental injuries, including weight loss due to malnutrition, and
worsened episodes of depression and mania.
Plaintiff further contends he has been subjected to inhumane conditions of
confinement, in that cells are as small as 38 square feet for two occupants, which does not allow
sufficient room for exercise and forces inmates to “cope with their cellie’s bad habits,” which
can include poor personal hygiene, mental illness and aggressive behavior. Plaintiff himself has
had his mental health treatment sessions cancelled during lockdowns.
The limited or nonexistent ability to use the law library has purportedly caused
Plaintiff to seek extensions of time in a court case (Pyles v. Gaetz, No. 11-cv-378-GPM (S.D. Ill.
Feb. 28, 2013)), and has impeded his ability to pursue internal grievances. Also, Plaintiff’s
ability to study the law in contemplation of filing unspecified actions has been impaired.
Plaintiff attributes the lockdowns to a conspiracy between Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”) officials, Menard officials and the union representing prison guards.
From Plaintiff’s perspective, these officials are exaggerating the response to even minor security
concerns by imposing and/or extending lockdowns to further their own interests, all while
imposing cruel and unusual punishment upon inmates. For example, Plaintiff cites a 2008
month-long orchestrated staff shortage during contract negotiations between the union and the
IDOC, which triggered a lockdown.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory judgment, and
injunctive relief.
The complaint contains five separate counts, which the Court deems best
characterized as follows. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.

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Count 1: Against former wardens Gaetz, Rednour, Spiller and
Atchison, current warden Harrington, former assistant
warden Stock, current assistant warden Butler, former
IDOC directors Taylor and Randle, current IDOC director
Godinez, former IDOC deputy director Bates, AFSCME
Union Local 1175, Counsel 31 members, former union
president Ferranto, current union president Hirsch,
Menard business officer Paulter and Internal Affairs chief
investigator Thomas, along with unidentified lockdown
coordinators and staff, for conspiring to institute
unjustified, prolonged lockdowns in violation of
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and
unusual punishment, and constituting intentional infliction
of emotional distress in violation of state law;
Count 2: Against former IDOC deputy director Bayer, former
AFSCME president Ferranto and current union president
Hirsch for conspiring to cause unjustified and/or prolonged
lockdowns stemming from staff shortages;
Count 3: Against former wardens Gaetz, Rednour, Spiller and
Atchison, current warden Harrington, current assistant
warden Butler, former IDOC directors Taylor and Randle,
current IDOC director Godinez, former IDOC deputy
director Bates, Internal Affairs chief investigator Thomas
and unidentified lockdown coordinators and staff, for
acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and
safety by instituting unjustified, prolonged lockdowns that
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, all in violation
of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights;
Count 4: Against mental health administrator Sauerwein, mental
health professional Creason and unidentified others, for
deliberate indifference to serious risks to Plaintiff’s mental
and physical health due to the lockdown conditions, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and constituting
intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of
state law; and
Count 5: Against assistant paralegals Bramlett and Knust, C/O Ellis,
educational administrator Bonifield, former warden
Atchison, current warden Harrington and assistant
warden Butler, for denying Plaintiff adequate access to
the law library, in violation of the First Amendment.

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Pleading Standards
The notice-pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
dictates that a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” which is sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the
claim and its basis. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). See also Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012).
Although the Court is obligated to liberally construe a pro se complaint and
accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), and
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). The allegations in the
complaint must “actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations
that raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Tamayov. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084
(7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate
abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id.
Legal assertions cannot be disguised as facts. Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir.
2013). There must be sufficient factual enhancement to move from possibility to plausibility of
entitlement to relief. Id. at 845.
Discussion
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court still finds that Counts 1, 2 and
5 of the complaint are not viable and must be dismissed.
Counts 1 and 2 are similarly flawed. Both claims are lodged against AFSCME
Union Local 1175 and current and former union officials (among others). Suits under Section
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1983 are meant to deter state actors (and private parties acting so closely in concert with them
that they too should be considered state actors) from using the “color of state law” to deprive
individuals of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th
Cir. 1998). Unions and union officials are not state actors. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police
of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2009); Messman v. Helmke, 133 F.3d 1042,
1044 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, Counts 1 and 2 fail to adequately plead conspiracy claims.
Plaintiff asserts that the defendants conspired to institute and/or prolong
lockdowns without penological justification. “To establish [Section] 1983 liability through a
conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a state official and private individual(s)
reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights; and (2) those
individual(s) were willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Williams v.
Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 785 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted);
Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2007). The complaint contains only conclusory
statements that do not suggest the sort of intentional agreement necessary to establish a Section
1983 claim. Absent a viable conspiracy claim, the associated state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in Count 1 also fails.
Count 5 alleges that Plaintiff was denied adequate access to the law library, and
by extension to the courts, in violation of the First Amendment. An access to the courts claim
only arises if the plaintiff suffered “actual injury” from the inability to pursue a non frivolous
claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2000);
Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998). An access claim is also stated when “denial
of access to legal materials caused a potentially meritorious claim to fail.” Marshall v. Knight,
445 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006). The actual injury requirement is not waived even if systemic,

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continuous denials are alleged. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009).
The law library and its various resources—documents and advisors—merely
provide the instruments for reasonable access, and are not protected in and of themselves.
Plaintiff asserts that he missed court deadlines in Pyles v. Gaetz, but the documents submitted
along with the complaint indicate that Plaintiff merely had to request an extension of time to
respond to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, which was granted. Therefore,
Plaintiff was not actually prejudiced. Similarly, despite Plaintiff’s assertion that his grievances
were denied as untimely, the documentation submitted by Plaintiff does not indicate that
timeliness was why Plaintiff’s grievances were not successful. Therefore, as pleaded, Count 5
must be dismissed.
Counts 3 and 4 shall proceed, even though a savvy judge might consider the
chance of success on these claims very remote and unlikely. See Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S.
at 556. As the Supreme Court noted in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981), that the
Eighth Amendment reaches beyond barbarous physical punishment to prohibit the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain and punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime.

The Constitution also prohibits punishment that is totally without penological

justification. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Furthermore, “[s]ome conditions of
confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would
not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the
deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise-for example,
a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 304 (1991).

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Disposition
For the reasons stated, Counts 1, 2 and 5 are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Accordingly, Defendants SHANNIS STOCK, HENRY BAYER, TONY FERRANTO,
KEVIN HIRSCH, RICHARD PAULTER, AFSCME UNION LOCAL 1175, BRAD
BRAMLETT, KNUST, C/O ELLIS and ELAINE BONIFIELD are DISMISSED from this
action without prejudice.
Only Counts 2 and 3 shall proceed.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for

Defendants DONALD GAETZ, DAVID REDNOUR, WILLIAM SPILLER, MICHAEL
ATCHISON, RICK HARRINGTON, KIM BUTLER, GLADYSE C. TAYLOR,
MICHAEL P. RANDLE, SLAVADORE GODINEZ, TY BATES, BRAD THOMAS,
MELISSA SAUERWEIN and REBECCA CREASON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum
and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant
fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days
from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service
on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal
service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on the various Unknown Defendants (including
Defendant “MAJORS”) until such time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly
filed amended complaint. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the
Court with the names and service addresses for these individuals.

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With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address
provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work
address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used
only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service.

Any

documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an
appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration
by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the
date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel.
Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk
or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Stephen C. Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §
636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

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Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or
give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into
a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the
Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to
plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 12, 2013
s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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