Ledbetter v. Good Samaritan Ministries et al

Filing 66

ORDER denying 60 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 7/13/16. (lmp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LINZIE J. LEDBETTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOOD SAMARITAN MINISTRIESA PROJECT OF THE CARBONDALE
INTERFAITH COUNCIL, BOBBY ANDERSON,
AND MICHAEL HEATH,
Defendants.

No. 13-cv-308-DRH-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is a motion for summary judgment brought by
defendants Good Samaritan Ministries- A Project of the Carbondale Interfaith
Council

(hereinafter

“Good

Samaritan”),

Bobby

Anderson

(hereinafter

“Anderson”), and Michael Heath (hereinafter “Heath”) (collectively, defendants)
(Doc. 60). Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor as to plaintiff Linzie
J. Ledbetter’s (hereinafter “Ledbetter”) complaint alleging retaliation under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Title VII), and 42
U.S.C. § 1981.

Ledbetter opposes the motion (Doc. 63). For the following

reasons, defendants’ motion is DENIED.

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II.

BACKGROUND

In this case, Ledbetter, originally acting pro se before the Court appointed
an attorney to represent him, brings a complaint for retaliation arising from his
termination from Good Samaritan on October 20, 2010. Ledbetter alleges he was
terminated for filing charges of race discrimination and retaliation with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against defendants on October 4,
2010. He requests compensatory damages of $2,500,000.00 from each defendant,
as well as $2,500,000.00 in punitive damages from each defendant.
The Court previously granted summary judgment and dismissed the case
with prejudice (Doc. 40). However, on appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed the
summary judgment ruling and remanded the action back to this Court (Doc. 54).
The Seventh Circuit also indicated that the Court should consider requesting a
lawyer to represent Ledbetter, and attorney A. Courtney Cox was appointed as his
counsel (Doc. 52). Now, defendants once again move for summary judgment
under FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 56. Defendants argue that despite the

Seventh Circuit’s prior decision, Ledbetter is unable to present evidence of a

prima facie claim of retaliation (Doc. 60). Specifically, defendants allege that they
received notice of Ledbetter’s EEOC charge on October 19, 2010, but deny any
causal connection between the EEOC claim and Ledbetter’s termination.
Defendants argue that the decision to terminate Ledbetter had been made prior to
October 19, 2010.

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Ledbetter responded opposing the motion and asserting that the deposition
testimony provided by Heath, Anderson, and Board President Walter Kent
(hereinafter “Kent”) was contrary to the affidavits previously submitted to the
Court

on

key

issues

(Doc.

60).

Therefore,

Ledbetter

argues

that

the

inconsistencies clearly indicate that a genuine issue of material fact exists in this
case (Id.).
III.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Ledbetter began his employment with Good Samaritan, a tax-exempt
organization which provides various services to individuals in need, on November
14, 2007. In June 2010, Ledbetter worked as General Staff for Good Samaritan’s
emergency shelter. Defendant Heath is the Executive Director of Good Samaritan.
Anderson is the General Staff Supervisor at Good Samaritan and served as
Ledbetter’s supervisor for the duration of his employment.
In support of summary judgment, defendants offer the deposition testimony
of Anderson and Heath (See Docs. 61-1, 61-2 and 61-3). Anderson and Heath
allege

they

experienced

behavioral

problems

with

Ledbetter

during

his

employment with Good Samaritan. In defendant’s memorandum in support of the
motion for summary judgment, the defendants allege that “Anderson met with
Plaintiff and said he was terminating Plaintiff based upon the complaints of
incidents between Plaintiff and residents and co-workers that “don’t seem to be
getting better.”” (Doc. 61-2. at 103, 110).

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On October 5, 2010, Heath and Board President Walter Kent (Kent) met
with Ledbetter, “to discuss their concerns regarding his interactions with coworkers and residents of the Shelter.” (Doc. 61-1, pg. 90)

Ledbetter was

informed that, “continuing such behavior, engaging with co-workers and residents
in an abrasive and intimidating manner, would not be tolerated.” Ledbetter was
told to, “demonstrate a professional and courteous attitude when dealing with
others at the Shelter.” Ledbetter was also given a letter memorializing Heath’s
concerns and possible repercussions that would occur if Ledbetter continued to
engage in improper behavior with staff and residents (Doc. 61-5).
Defendants allege that following the October 5, 2010 meeting, Ledbetter,
still exhibited unprofessional conduct and demeanor toward co-workers and
residents, which ultimately led Anderson to terminate him. Anderson cites to
various complaints by co-workers and residents regarding the way Ledbetter
“spoke to residents, as well as [Plaintiff’s] threatening behavior” as the reason he
decided to terminate Ledbetter (Doc 61-2, pg. 88). Ledbetter alleges that on
October 20, 2010, Anderson called Ledbetter into a meeting and asked Ledbetter
if he had filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Then, as of 7:00
a.m. on that date, Ledbetter was no longer employed at Good Samaritan.
In response to the defendants’ motion, Ledbetter cites to the deposition
testimony of Anderson and Heath, where he sets forth contradictory facts
compared to those highlighted by the defendants. Specifically, Ledbetter

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highlights the inconsistencies in the stories recounted by Heath and Anderson,
relative to the timing and basis for his termination.
IV.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery, and
disclosures establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Winsley v. Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d
598, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
nonmovant and all factual disputes are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 401 (7th
Cir. 2008). The movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of fact issues
and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). A genuine
dispute as to a material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Pugh v. City of Attica, Indiana,
259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court will enter summary judgment
against a party who does not “come forward with evidence that would reasonably
permit the finder of fact to find in [its] favor on a material question.” McGrath v.

Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1995).
V.

LAW AND APPLICATION

Ledbetter brings his retaliation claim under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The general analysis of retaliation claims is the same under either statute. See

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Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 979 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing
Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553
U.S. 442 (2008)).
Under Title VII, there are two “methods” through which Ledbetter can
oppose defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his claim of retaliation.
First, the indirect method or the McDonnell Douglas test. Under this method, the
plaintiff must first come forward with evidence of all four elements of a prima

facie case, including (1) engagement in activity protected by law; (2) meeting of
employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) suffering of a materially adverse action;
and (4) treatment less favorable than a similarly situated employee who did not
engage in the protected activity. See Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635,
641 (7th Cir. 2013); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). If the employee has evidence on each of these four elements, the
burden will then shift to the employer to articulate a legally permissible reason for
the adverse employment action. If the employer accomplishes this, the third step
of the analysis requires the employee to demonstrate the given reason is false.

See Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 641-42.
As Ledbetter does not allege a “similarly situated” individual received more
favorable treatment than he did, it appears he invokes the direct method. Under
this method, Ledbetter must offer evidence that: (1) he engaged in in activity
protected by Title VII, (2) that he was subjected to an adverse employment action,

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and (3) that there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. See id. at 642.
The disputed element in this case is causation. Ledbetter must provide
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendants terminated
Ledbetter because he filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC. See id. at
643 (citing Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517,
2533 (2013) (Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the adverse action
would not have happened but for the protected activity)).
Should

Ledbetter

present

a

“’convincing

mosaic’

of

circumstantial

evidence,” of but for causation, the direct method may be satisfied. Id. at 643
(citing Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994))). A reasonable
inference of retaliatory intent may be drawn from such evidence as, “(1)
suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or behavior towards other
employees in the protected group; (3) evidence, statistical or otherwise, that
similarly situated employees outside of the protected group systematically receive
better treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason
for an adverse employment action.” Id. at 644 (citing Teruggi v. CIT Group/

Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dickerson v. Bd.
of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011))).
Given that “close temporal proximity provides evidence of causation and
may permit a plaintiff to survive summary judgment, provided that other evidence

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exists to support the inference of a causal link,” a plaintiff may survive summary
judgment. Scaife v. Cook County, 446 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2006), quoting

Lang v. Illinois Dep't of Children & Family Services, 361 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir.
2004)(adverse employment actions began “the same month” plaintiff filed the
racial discrimination grievance with his union). “When there is corroborating
evidence of retaliatory motive… an interval of a few weeks or even months may
provide probative evidence of the required causal nexus.” See Magyar v. Saint

Joseph Reg'l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) (“This court has found
a month short enough to reinforce an inference of retaliation.”). “Deciding when
the inference is appropriate cannot be resolved by a legal rule; the answer
depends on context.... A jury, not a judge, should decide whether the inference is
appropriate.” Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC, 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir.
2011).
In this case, Ledbetter cites the timing and of his termination and
inconsistencies relating to the basis for his termination as evidence of a causal
connection. Ledbetter argues that the defendants learned of his second EEOC
charge filed on October 4, 2010, on October 19, 2010. Thereafter, on October 20,
2010, Ledbetter was informed that he was being terminated.
The Seventh Circuit has often reiterated that, “mere temporal proximity
between [the statutorily protected activity] and the action alleged to have been
taken in retaliation for that [activity] will rarely be sufficient in and of itself to
create a triable issue.” Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 308 (7th Cir.

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2012) (quoting Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644
(7th Cir. 2003)); Coleman v. Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We
have often invoked the general rule that temporal proximity between an
employee’s protected activity and an adverse employment action is rarely
sufficient to show that the former caused the latter.”) (quotation omitted).
However, “[w]hen temporal proximity is one among several tiles in an evidentiary
mosaic depicting retaliatory motive, [] ‘[s]uspicious timing . . . can sometimes
raise an inference of a causal connection.’” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860 (quoting

Magyar, 544 F.3d at 772); see also Scaife v. Cook County, 446 F.3d 735, 742 (7th
Cir. 2006) (“Close temporal proximity provides evidence of causation and may
permit a plaintiff to survive summary judgment provided that there is other
evidence that supports the inference of a causal link.”) (quoting Lang v. Ill. Dep't

of Children & Family Servs, 361 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2004)).
In this case, the timing of the decision to terminate Ledbetter is disputed by
the parties, as illustrated in the statements made by Anderson and Heath.
According to Anderson, Ledbetter regularly received good evaluations up until the
months immediately prior to his termination (Doc, 61-3, pg. 49-50). Additionally,
Anderson never indicated that he wanted to terminate Ledbetter prior to the
October 5, 2010, meeting with Ledbetter (Doc. 61-2, pg. 135).
Anderson also does not offer a specific date for making the decision to fire
him (Doc, 61-3, pg. 84-85).
A.
Q.

I don’t know the exact date, no.
But can you give me a time frame?
Page 9 of 12

A.

It would have been after -- after -- no. It would have been after
the meeting -- if you say Mike -- us three met October 5 and
he was terminated October 20, it's somewhere in that time. I
don't -- the exact date, I don't know.

(Id. at 87).
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

I don't know when 1 made the decision.
I understand that.
Okay.
I'm just asking, is it possible it was the 19th?
I don't know when I made the decision. I know what you're
asking, but that's my answer. I don't know when I made that
decision.
So it could have been -- since you don't know, it could have
been any day prior to the 20th?
Could have been.

(Id. at 131). In addition to not offering a specific date of the termination,
Anderson also cannot explain why he waited to terminate Ledbetter if his decision
was already made (Doc. 61-3, pg. 110).
Q.
Q.
A.

If you had made the decision by the I5th you could have told
him on the 15th, right? A. On the 15th, right. If I had made
the decision by the 15th. Yeah.
Now, does the fact that you did not tell him on the 15th, when
you had the opportunity to, indicate to you that you had not
yet made the decision?
No. Not necessarily. I don't know why I didn't tell him until
the 20th. I can't tell you why.

(Doc. 61-3, pg. 113).
Contradictory to Anderson’s statements, Heath stated that the decision
terminate Ledbetter was actually made during his October 14, 2010, meeting with
Anderson. Thus, the timing of the termination is called into question, given
Anderson both does not recall the October 14, 2010 meeting, and claims that he

Page 10 of 12

actually made the decision to terminate Ledbetter prior to speaking with Heath
(Doc. 61-3, pg. 91-92).
Furthermore, there is a discrepancy as to the reason for Ledbetter’s
termination. Anderson cites to the incidents with the shelter residents prior to the
October 5, 2010, meeting as the basis for termination (Doc. 61-3, pg. 92).
However, Heath recalls that during their October 5, 2010 meeting, Anderson
stated that he would not fire Ledbetter based on those prior complaints (Doc. 611 pg. 81). Further highlighting the discrepancy, Good Samaritan lawyers, in a
letter to the EEOC, stated that Ledbetter was actually terminated “subsequent to
his display of defiant and insubordinate behavior” towards Anderson. This is
inconsistent with Anderson’s story that Ledbetter was terminated because of the
way he “spoke to residents, as well as [Ledbetter’s] threatening behavior” (Doc 612, pg. 88).
Therefore, given the discrepancies surrounding Ledbetter’s termination,
and construing the facts in Ledbetter’s favor, a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to the causal connection between the EEOC claim and Ledbetter’s
termination. Ledbetter has presented evidence sufficient enough to create a
reasonable inference that had he not filed charges of discrimination, he would not
have been terminated. Thus, the Court will deny summary judgment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 60). The parties shall contact magistrate Judge

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Williams if a settlement conference would be beneficial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 13th day of July, 2016.

Digitally signed by
Judge David R.
Herndon
Date: 2016.07.13
12:16:42 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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