Ledbetter v. Good Samaritan Ministries et al
Filing
74
ORDER granting 67 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 10/19/16. (lmp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LINZIE J. LEDBETTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOOD SAMARITAN MINISTRIES, a
Project of Interfaith Counsel, BOBBY
ANDERSON and MICHAEL HEATH,
No. 13-cv-308-DRH-SCW
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Pending before the Court are two motions in limine brought by Plaintiff
Linzie J. Ledbetter (Doc. 67). Defendants responded to plaintiff’s motions (Doc.
155). Accordingly, the motions in limine are ripe for resolution. Based on the
following, the Court GRANTS both motions.
1. Felony Conviction
Plaintiff’s first motion in limine seeks to preclude defendants from
introducing evidence of, or referring to, Ledbetter’s prior felony conviction
pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609. Plaintiff Ledbetter was convicted of a
felony on July 16, 1991. He argues that FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(b) applies
in this case to prevent the defense from introducing Ledbetter’s prior conviction
during trial.
FEDERAL RULE
OF
EVIDENCE 609(b) severely limits the use of a prior
conviction to impeach a witness if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
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since the conviction or the witness's release from any confinement imposed for
that conviction. As mentioned above, the rule generally excludes convictions more
than ten years old; however, the rule does include an exception that permits a
Court to allow use of remote convictions under limited circumstances:
“Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more than ten years has elapsed… unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of
the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”
FED.R.EVID. 609(b)(emphasis added).
Defendants argue that they meet the exception set forth in Rule 609(b).
Specifically, defendants argue that they do not plan to use Ledbetter’s prior
conviction to attack his credibility, but instead they intend to use it as part of their
defense. Defendants argue that facts surround his conviction are relevant in order
to set out a clear picture for the jury of all events that occurred during plaintiff’s
employment at Good Samaritan. For example, the defendants point out that Good
Samaritan’s contract with Illinois Department of Human Services (hereinafter
“IDHS”) prohibited the employment of convicted felons. However, when Defendant
Heath took over as Executive Director and learned of this prohibition, he filed a
request with IDHS to waive the ban for two convicted felons, one being the
plaintiff. Thus, defendants argue that the probative value of the facts of plaintiff’s
historical employment with Good Samaritan, including facts surrounding his
felony conviction, substantially outweighs the possible prejudice to the plaintiff.
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See U.S. v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S.
1025 (1976).
As the Seventh Circuit has previously held, “Rule 609(b) is not an absolute
bar to the admission of a prior conviction that is more than ten years old; it is,
instead, an asymmetrical balancing test, one that requires the probative value of a
prior conviction to substantially outweigh the prejudice caused by its admission
into evidence.” United States v. Rogers, 542 F.3d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 2008).
In this case, the plaintiff’s felony conviction falls outside of the parameters
admissibility per Rule 609(b). However, as noted above, the rule does offer
guidance to this Court regarding the balancing test at issue involving prejudice
versus probative value as discussed in Rule 403.
FEDERAL RULE
OF
EVIDENCE 403 dictates that the Court “may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. Even though the Court would likely have discretion
to allow its admission under the authority cited by the defendant, the Court finds
that the probative value of the prior conviction fails to substantially outweigh its
prejudice in this case.
Upon balancing the probative value against the prejudicial nature of the
prior felony conviction, the Court finds there to be more potential for prejudice to
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the plaintiff, than probative value to the defendant in this case. Accordingly, the
Court GRANTS plaintiff’s first motion in limine.
2. EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights Letter
Plaintiff’s second motion in limine seeks to exclude any evidence of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Dismissal and Notice of
Rights letter issued to the Plaintiff Ledbetter. Plaintiff asserts that the EEOC did
not issue a report of any kind, but simply sent its standard right-to-sue letter
(Doc. 67, ¶8). In their response, defendants do not object to plaintiff’s second
motion in limine (Doc 70). Thus, the court treats this motion in limine as agreed
and GRANTS the motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 19th day of October, 2016.
Digitally signed by
Judge David R. Herndon
Date: 2016.10.19
12:19:01 -05'00'
United States District Judge
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