Caffey v. Henry et al

Filing 82

ORDER Denying 70 Motion for Reconsideration. Defendants Scott and Maue are DISMISSED from this action. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 11/10/15. (ceg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ALLEN NEELY CAFFEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LUCAS MAUE, TODD SCOTT, CHAD
HASEMEYER, SEAN HENRY,
RICHARD MOORE, and MARY
RICHARD,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:13-CV-322-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Now pending before the Court are the “Combined Motion to Object to March 30,
2015 Memorandum and Order, Move for Reconsideration, and to Answer in Response to
Two (2) Excessive Force Claims” filed by Plaintiff on April 27, 2015 (Docs. 69 and 70) and
the Response filed by Defendants Lucas Maue and Todd Scott on May 27, 2015 (Doc. 75).
INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2015, this Court entered an Order dismissing various claims and
directing Plaintiff to submit a brief as to why summary judgment should not be granted
in favor of the two remaining Defendants, Lucas Maue and Todd Scott, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) (Doc. 6). Plaintiff was specifically directed to
provide argument and “appropriate evidence.” Plaintiff alleges that these correctional
officers used excessive force when they were escorting him to a transport bus and

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placing him in the bus, respectively. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Maue struck him on
the head with a wooden stick for no reason. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Scott
shackled him too tightly and pushed his head against a bus window. In response,
Plaintiff objects to the March 30 Order and offers an undated affidavit of Curtis Croft
who states that he was present when Plaintiff was escorted by Defendant Maue and
placed on the bus by Defendant Scott (Doc. 69-1, pp. 6-7).1 Defendants do not address
Mr. Croft’s affidavit or provide any further evidence in their response.
BACKGROUND
The evidence presented to the Court in relation to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment reveals the following:
On July 29, 2011, thirty days after the library altercation, Plaintiff was transferred
from Menard to Pontiac along with other inmates (Allen Caffey Deposition, p. 8, Doc.
52-1). On that date, Defendant Maue came to Plaintiff’s cell, placed him in handcuffs,
and escorted him out of the cell (Caffey Dep., pp. 8-9). Plaintiff believes that he slipped
while being directed down a flight of stairs, and he was struck on the head by Maue.
(Caffey Dep. pp. 37-38). After being taken to a shower area and searched, Plaintiff was
then taken out of the building to a bus (Caffey Dep. pp. 40-41). Plaintiff testifies that he
was roughly placed in the bus by Defendant Scott and that during this interaction, he
requested a doctor because his “head hurt.” (Caffey Dep. pp. 42-43).2 Plaintiff further
1

Plaintiff presents a number of facts in his response that are unsupported by citations to the
record (Doc. 69).

Plaintiff testified that he was “grabbed and put” onto a seat, that he was pressed against the
window, and that he was shackled tightly. (Caffey Dep. pp. 42-43). Plaintiff also testified that the

2

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testified that, while he was in pain, he didn’t know he had a bump on his head-–he only
felt a bump under the hair on his head afterwards. (Caffey Dep. pp. 47-50). There is no
testimony or evidence that Defendant Scott was aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition
(including the bump to the head or the abrasions to Plaintiff’s feet), that he was injured
by Defendant Maue, or that he knew that Plaintiff’s shackles were too tight. A few hours
later, when Plaintiff arrived at Pontiac, it is undisputed that he was seen by medical
personnel (Doc. 7, p. 11). There is no evidence that Plaintiff sought any medical care for
any of his injuries.
In his affidavit, Curtis Croft states that he was taken out of his cell on July 29,
2011, and he observed Plaintiff walking down stairs, backwards, with his head down
(Curtis Croft Aff. ¶¶ 2-3, Doc. 69-1). He indicates that he saw a “tactical officer” hit
Plaintiff “in the head with an oak stick . . . (unprovoked in my opinion)” (Id. ¶ 5). He
later observed that “his head had swelled on the top right side, and I could see he was in
pain . . .” (Id. ¶ 7). When they were both placed on the bus, he heard Plaintiff yell for a
doctor, he saw him being pushed down “on the right side of his head (in the spot where I
observed the injury)” (Id. ¶ 9).
DISCUSSION
As stated in this Court’s previous Order, “[t]he Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’
on prisoners.” Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hudson v.
shackles on his ankles cause him pain but that, in placing the shackles on him, Defendant Scott
just did not pay “that much attention to making sure that they wouldn’t, you know, be a
discomfort to me.” (Caffey Dep. p. 50).

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McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). But “not every ‘malevolent touch by a prison guard’
gives rise to a federal cause of action, even if the use of force in question ‘may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers.’” Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 838 (quoting
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). “The use of de minimis force, so long as it ‘is not of a sort repugnant
to the conscience of mankind,’ is not of Eighth Amendment concern.” Lewis v. Downey,
581 F.3d 467, 475 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10). If the force was more
than de minimis, the core judicial inquiry is whether it “was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Lewis,
581 F.3d 467 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As for Defendant Maue, Plaintiff claims that he used excessive force when he hit
Plaintiff over the head. While the use of force was deliberate and perhaps unnecessary, it
was not so savage that it could be considered “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
Mr. Croft states that he observed Plaintiff in pain, but the undisputed evidence reveals
that Plaintiff did not seek medical care for the minor injury. There was no showing that
the bump on his head caused any lasting effects other than a momentary headache.
While Defendant Maue’s conduct cannot be condoned, it does not amount to a
constitutional violation. See Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding
no Eighth Amendment violation when use of force caused superficial injury to
prisoner’s hand); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no excessive
force where guard shoved inmate into door frame and caused bruising on inmate’s
back); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1582 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no Eighth
Amendment violation where prison guard poured bucket of water on prisoner and
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caused the bucket to hit prisoner on the head, which caused daily headaches but did not
prevent him from working).
As for Defendant Scott, Plaintiff claims that he used excessive force when he
shackled him too tightly on the bus and pushed his face into the window. The evidence
before the Court demonstrates that the force used by Scott, while perhaps unnecessary,
was de minimis and certainly not “repugnant to the conscious of mankind.” Additionally,
Plaintiff testified that Scott’s conduct was probably not intentional (Doc. 52-1, p. 13),
much less malicious and sadistic for the purpose of causing harm. Mr. Croft’s affidavit
adds nothing to this analysis. While Mr. Croft states that he saw a tactical officer push
Plaintiff down on his injured right side, there is no evidence that the officer was aware of
the bump on his head. Finally, Plaintiff made no argument and presented no evidence
that Scott’s actions caused him any actual injury. Consequently, no reasonable jury could
find that Scott used excessive force.
Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Order entered on March 30, 2015.3 Motions
to reconsider serve narrow functions: to remedy a manifest error of law or to present
newly discovered evidence. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., 90
F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996). Such motions should be filed if the Court has
misunderstood a party, made a decision outside the adversarial process, made an error
of apprehension, if there are new facts, or significant changes in the law. Broaddus v.
Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 860 (7th Cir. 2011) (overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherini,
3

Plaintiff references Local Rule 73.1(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). The first two do not apply to this Court’s March 30 Order, and the later only
applies to “final judgment, order, or proceeding.”

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724 F.3d 965, 967 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc.,
906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990))). Plaintiff has not presented any viable reason why the
March 30, 2015 Order should be reconsidered.
Plaintiff first states that he was not given the opportunity to conduct discovery.
He indicates that he served a request for production of documents on April 2, 2014 (Doc.
55-1, p. 17; Doc. 69-1, p. 2-4) for which he did not get a response. The discovery deadline
in this case was March 21, 2014. This request, then, was untimely. Plaintiff did not seek
an extension of the discovery deadline nor did he file a motion to compel once he did not
get a response. To the extent that Plaintiff is now complaining that he was prevented
from conducting discovery, his complaints are without merit. Plaintiff had ample
opportunity to conduct whatever discovery was appropriate; the fact that he waited
until after the last minute expired is not cause for either re-opening discovery or
reconsidering the Order on summary judgment.
Plaintiff further sets forth various evidentiary objections. Plaintiff objects to the
admissibility of the “Investigational Interview Sheet.” This argument is without merit
because the Court did not rely on this Exhibit in rendering a decision. Indeed, the Court
found that the conflict between the documentary evidence and Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony was a jury question. Plaintiff objects as to the finding that he was part of a
security threat group, a finding that Plaintiff claims is unsupported by the evidence.
Plaintiff appears to argue that he has some sort of interest in not being placed in a
security threat group. Such a claim is not related to this lawsuit. In any event,
notwithstanding Plaintiff’s conjecture as to what records reveal about his classification,
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he presented no competent evidence that the offender tracking system did not identify
him as a Gangster Disciple and that Defendant Hasemeyer was not entitled to rely on it.
Plaintiff objects to the perceived failure to regard three exhibits attached to his responses
to the Motion for Summary Judgment. As indicated previously, the Court considered all
the evidence submitted by the parties (Doc. 66, p. 2).
Plaintiff’s remaining evidentiary arguments are wholly without merit and do not
require further discussion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the “Combined Motion to Object to March 30, 2015
Memorandum and Order, Move for Reconsideration, and to Answer in Response to Two
(2) Excessive Force Claims” filed by Plaintiff on April 27, 2015 (Docs. 69 and 70) is
DENIED. Summary Judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants Lucas Maue and
Todd Scott and against Plaintiff. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 10, 2015
s/ Nancy J. Rosenstengel____
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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