Camp v. Colvin

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, granting 32 MOTION for Attorney Fees PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §406(b)(1) filed by Todd Allen Camp, MEMORANDUM OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE re 32 MOTION for Attorney Fees PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §406(b)(1) filed by Todd Allen Camp. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 10/8/2015. (jdh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TODD ALLEN CAMP,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 13-cv-352-JPG-CJP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on counsel’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (Doc. 32). Defendant filed a response (Doc. 35) indicating she has no
objection.
After this Court reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
the Commissioner granted plaintiff’s application for benefits.

The fee agreement between

plaintiff and his attorney provided for a fee of 25% of plaintiff’s past-due benefits.

The

Commissioner approved and withheld 25% of the past due amount (i.e., $10,950.25) pending
court approval of the fee. See Doc. 33, Ex. A & C.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that the Court may allow a “reasonable fee,” not in
excess of 25% of the total of the past-due benefits. However, if the Court approves such a fee,
“no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such representation except as provided
in this paragraph.” Id. In practical terms, as plaintiff’s counsel recognizes, this means that, in
the event of an award under § 406(b)(1), counsel must refund any amount previously awarded
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Counsel represents that he
will refund to plaintiff the EAJA fee ($4,028.72) previously awarded. See Doc. 33 at 2-3.

The Supreme Court has held that § 406(b)(1) controls, but does not displace, contingent
fee agreement in social security cases:
Most plausibly read, we conclude, § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee
agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully
representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for
court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they
yield reasonable results in particular cases.
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002).
Having reviewed the circumstances presented here, including the time and effort
expended by counsel, the excellent result received by plaintiff, the amount of the past-due
benefits and the value of the projected benefits over plaintiff’s expected life span, the Court
concludes that 25% of the past-due amount is a reasonable fee here. The Court notes that the
Commissioner has filed a response indicating that she does not oppose counsel’s request. While
the Commissioner has no direct stake in the § 406(b)(1) fee request, she “plays a part in the fee
determination resembling that of a trustee for the claimants.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798, n. 6.
Wherefore, counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §406(b)(1) (Doc.
32) is GRANTED. The Court awards counsel a fee of $10,950.25, representing 25% of the pastdue benefits.
Counsel shall refund to plaintiff the amount previously awarded under the EAJA,
$4,028.72.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 8, 2015
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

2