Friedman v. Walton

Filing 4

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondent Walton shall answer or otherwise plead within thirty days of the date this order is entered. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 5/3/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHARLES D. FRIEDMAN,
# 74834-011,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 13-00364-DRH

J.S. WALTON, and
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Petitioner Charles D. Friedman, currently incarcerated in the United States
Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge the execution of his sentence.
Friedman’s history of convictions is unusually convoluted. Put succinctly
(and risking oversimplification), petitioner Friedman takes issue with how his 24month term of imprisonment for a supervised release violation in United States
v. Friedman, Case No. 99-cr-100-JYG (D.UT Mar. 13, 2007 Second Amended
Judgment), is being run consecutively, not concurrently, with his sentence for
bank robbery in United States v. Friedman, Case No. 05-cr-933-DB (D.UT Jul.
28, 2011 Amended Judgment), for which he was initially sentenced to 57 months
in prison, but which was increased to a 151-month term upon remand from the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Petitioner contends that, pursuant to his
original plea agreement in Case No. 99-cr-100-JYG, his original 71-month
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sentence was to run concurrently with any other sentence; consequently, the 24month term imposed for his supervised release should have been treated as a
mere extension of his original sentence and should run concurrently with his
sentence in Case No. 05-cr-933-DB.

Further complicating matters, after

petitioner’s original 57-month sentence in Case No. 05-cr-933-DB was vacated
and a 151-month term was imposed, that sentence was deemed by the Bureau of
Prisons to have commenced anew, unteathered to the sentence on Case No. 99-cr100-JYG (albeit with credit for time already served on the original sentence),
thereby resulting in an incorrect, and presumably longer, aggregate sentence.
As complex as the procedural history may be, the lynchpin of Friedman’s
legal argument is relatively simplistic.

He contends the Bureau of Prisons is

bound by the original plea agreement entered into by the United States Attorney.
Without commenting on the merits of petitioner’s claims, the Court
concludes that the petition survives preliminary review under Rule 4 and Rule
1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondent Walton shall answer or
otherwise plead within thirty days of the date this order is entered. This
preliminary order to respond does not, of course, preclude the Government from
raising any objection or defense it may wish to present. Service upon the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois, 750 Missouri Avenue, East St.
Louis, Illinois, shall constitute sufficient service.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this
cause is referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial
proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this entire matter be REFERRED to a
United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a
referral.
Petitioner is ADVISED of his continuing obligation to keep the Clerk (and
each opposing party) informed of any change in his whereabouts during the
pendency of this action. This notification shall be done in writing and not later
than seven (7) days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to
provide such notice may result in dismissal of this action. See FED. R. CIV. P.
41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2013.05.03
11:29:31 -05'00'

DATED: May 3, 2013

CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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