Stallings v. City of Johnston City et al

Filing 99

ORDER re 81 MOTION in Limine filed by Jayne Stallings, 84 MOTION in Limine filed by City of Johnston City, Jim Mitchell, 95 MOTION in Limine filed by Jayne Stallings. See Order for details. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 2/3/16. (lmp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAYNE STALLINGS
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF JOHNSTON CITY, a municipal
corporation, and JIM MITCHELL, in his
individual and official capacity,

Case No. 13-cv-422-DRH-SCW

Defendants.
ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Now before the Court are motions in limine filed by the plaintiff (Doc. 81 &
95) and defendants (Doc. 84). On August 12, 2015, the Court held a final pretrial
conference for this matter, at which time oral arguments were heard on the
motions. Following oral arguments, the Court announced its’ ruling in open court
as to plaintiff’s motions in limine 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 as well as
defendants’ motions in limine 1, 2, 4, and 5. Plaintiff’s motions in limine 3 and 11
were withdrawn at that time. As to the remaining motions, the Court took those
under advisement.
This Order identifies and summarily describes the Court's resolution of the
motions in limine that were taken under advisement, in addition to plaintiff’s
plaintiff’s motion in limine filed at a later date (Doc. 95). The Court shall also
address defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling on plaintiff’s
motion in limine denying introduction of Steve Shafer’s testimony concerning
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metadata. Therefore, the Court renders its decision on each disputed motion
accordingly.
I.

Defendants’ Motions in Limine

a. Defendants’ third motion i n limine to bar Plaintiff from offering
testimony that the FBI did not charge or prosecute her.
Defendants’ third motion in limine seeks to bar evidence that the FBI did
not bring any charges against her because such evidence is irrelevant and
prejudicial. (Doc. 84). Defendants argue that the standard of proof in criminal
cases differs from that necessary for an employer to suspend an employee
suspected of wrongful conduct, and the different standards of proof in criminal
and civil cases might mislead the jury. The Court agrees. Criminal and civil trials
require different burdens of proof for proving guilt and liability. While a
conviction can be considered a judicial determination of guilt, failure to prosecute
may simply reflect an inability to meet the necessary burden of proof. See, e.g.,

Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 2002). Therefore, the
Court GRANTS defendants’ motion in limine seeking to bar the plaintiff from
offering testimony that the FBI did not charge or prosecute her.
II.

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

a. Plaintiff’s first and second motions in limine excluding any and all
evidence, references to evidence, argument, comments, and/or
testimony regarding the arbitration and arbitration decision
related to Stallings’ termination by Johnston City.
Plaintiff’s first motion seeks exclusion of “any and all evidence, references
to evidence, argument, comments, and/or testimony to or in the presence of the

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jury, and directing the defendants to instruct its witnesses to do likewise,
regarding the arbitration proceeding related to Stallings’ termination by Defendant
Johnston City” (Doc. 81). Plaintiff’s second motion

goes on to request the

exclusion of “any and all evidence, references to evidence, argument, comments,
and/or testimony to or in the presence of the jury, and directing the defendants to
instruct its witnesses to do likewise, regarding the Arbitrator’s decision to uphold
Defendants’ termination of Stallings”( Id.).
Specifically, the plaintiff argues that both the arbitration proceeding and
decision are irrelevant and prejudicial to the pending causes of action. The
defendants contend that the extent to which post-deprivation process was
available is a key element for the jury to consider in relation to plaintiff’s claims
for deprivation of due process.
In order to respond to the plaintiff's cause of action for due process violations,
defendants must be allowed to go into the facts surrounding the arbitration
proceedings, its timing, and defendants’ process for determining that the plaintiff
was entitled to arbitration but did not request it.

Therefore, the arbitration

hearing and decision are relevant to plaintiff's cause of action, as both go right to
the heart of plaintiff’s due process claim. As a result, the Court DENIES the
motions. However, this ruling is without prejudice to the plaintiff. The denial of a
motion in limine does not preclude a party from objecting to any evidence at trial
or from requesting that a limiting instruction be read to the jury directing them to

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refrain from considering the result of the arbitration during their deliberation in
this case.
b. Plaintiff’s fourth motion i n limine excluding any and all evidence,
references to evidence, argument, comments, and/or testimony
regarding comments or statements allegedly made by the FBI to
Defendants and/or any of their witnesses
Plaintiff’s fourth motion seeks exclusion of “any and all evidence, references
to evidence, argument, comments, and/or testimony to or in the presence of the
jury, and directing the defendants to instruct its witnesses to do likewise,
regarding comments or statements allegedly made by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to Defendants and/or any of their witnesses” (Doc.81). Plaintiff
argues that the defendants may attempt to offer statements made by FBI agents ,
for the truth of the matter asserted that address the investigation of the missing
money, which plaintiff emphasizes would be highly prejudicial.
As defendants point out, the statements are being offered for reasons other
than the truth of the matter asserted. Specifically, the statements will be offered
as to Mitchell and Richey’s state of mind and therefore are not hearsay.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the statements are relevant and their probative
value is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Therefore, the Court
DENIES the motion.
c. Plaintiff’s motion to bar John Richey’s testimony regarding
metadata and metadata spreadsheets and reports created by Steve
Shafer (Doc. 95)
Plaintiff’s final motion seeks to bar John Richey’s testimony regarding
metadata and metadata spreadsheets (Doc.95). Plaintiff argues that Richey has no
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personal knowledge of the alleged missing money and he did not investigate as to
whether there was actually missing money. Defendant argues that “nothing about
the concept of metadata in this case requires expert testimony” (Doc. 96).
Specifically, the printouts with metadata are being offered for reasons other than
the truth of the matter asserted, thus are not hearsay. Also, under Fed.R.Evid.
401, the documents that Richey showed and explained to Riva included a printout
with the metadata. Defendants argue that this information is relevant to the jury’s
determination of Stallings’ due process claim. The Court agrees.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the statements are relevant and their
probative value is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Therefore, the
Court DENIES the motion.
III.

Reconsideration of Granting Motion i n Limine

Defendant moves for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling granting plaintiff’s
seventh motion in limine denying introduction of Steve Shafer’s testimony in the
expert witness capacity (Doc. 98). Specifically, the Court ruled that Shafer may
not testify regarding metadata, metadata spreadsheets and the reports he created
relating to the missing money in the Johnston City’s Water Department (Doc. 90).
For the reasons that follow, the motion to reconsider is granted, and the Court
modifies its previous ruling in the respect detailed below.
Defendants move for the Court to reconsider the limit placed on Steve Shafer’s
testimony. Plaintiff argues that defendants’ motion for reconsideration “provides
no basis for this Court to revise its prior, reasoned ruling made after oral

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argument” (Doc. 98). However, in support of their argument, defendants contend
that “[t]he actual mechanics of how the computer records metadata and how the
software program was developed to include this information is irrelevant and
unnecessary to the jurors’ understanding of the issues in this case. All that is
relevant is that the report shows metadata, and based on the metadata,
defendants formed the belief that Stallings was responsible for the suspicious
adjustments...” (Doc. 96). Defendants further argue that “nothing about the
concept of metadata in this case requires expert testimony” (Doc. 96). The Court
agrees.
An order granting a motion in limine is not a final order; the trial court may
reconsider the issue at any time leading up to and during trial. The Court sees no
error in fact or law with respect to allowing Steve Shafer to testify regarding the
metadata under Fed.R.Evid. 901’s threshold requirement. Rule 901 “requires
only a prima facie showing of genuineness and leaves it to the jury to decide the
true authenticity and probative value of the evidence.” U.S. v. Harvey, 117 F.3d
1044, 1049 (7th Cir.1997). Defendants contend that Rule 902(11) and Rule
803(6) would allow Steve Shafer to testify to the authentication of the metadata
based on his personal knowledge of the program as its creator and the fact that
the data was kept in the course of regularly conducted activity. Also, defendants
argue that metadata printouts showing the actual time in which adjustments were
made are not being offered for their truth, thus are not hearsay.

Instead

defendants argue that the information is relevant to the jury’s determination of

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Stallings’ due process claim. Ultimately, the Court agrees that defendants satisfy
Fed.R.Evid. 901’s threshold requirement.
In light of defendant’s motion to reconsider, the Court revises its ruling as to
the admissibility of John Richey’s testimony regarding metadata and the metadata
spreadsheets. Defendants’ motion to reconsider is GRANTED. Plaintiff is free to
raise its concerns regarding reliability of the metadata with the jury.
IV.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ third motion in limine to
bar Plaintiff from offering testimony that the FBI did not charge or prosecute her
(Doc.84). The Court DENIES plaintiff’s first and second motions in limine
excluding any and all evidence and regarding the arbitration and arbitration
decision (Doc. 81) and DENIES plaintiff’s motion to bar John Richey’s testimony
(Doc. 95). Finally, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s ruling on plaintiff’s seventh motion in limine, and Shafer’s testimony
regarding metadata and the metadata printouts will be permitted (Doc. 98).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 3rd day of February, 2016.

Digitally signed by
Judge David R.
Herndon
Date: 2016.02.03
16:30:36 -06'00'
United States District Judge

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