McFadden v. Pearl et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 2, Plaintiffs equal protection claim, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and is thus DISMISSED without prejudice. Should Plaintiff wish to proceed on his equal protection claim in Count 2, Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint, stating any facts which may exist to support this claim, within 35 days of the entry of this order. In order to assist Plaintiff in prepar ing his amended complaint, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form. The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant RICKEY PEARL: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). (Action due by 7/29/2013). Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 6/24/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ONAFFIA MCFADDEN, # S-03239,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICKEY PEARL,
JOHN DOE #1, and
JOHN DOE #2,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-00481-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Onaffia McFadden, an inmate in Menard Correctional Center, brings this action
for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on an incident
that occurred while he was housed at Shawnee Correctional Center. This case is now before the
Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening. – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal. – On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
Upon careful review of the complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its
authority under § 1915A to identify Plaintiff’s cognizable claims.

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The Complaint
In his complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff McFadden alleges that on October 15, 2011, his
cellmate, who was a known bully, provoked a fight with him. After conducting an investigation,
Defendant Pearl, an Internal Affairs officer, issued Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket, charging
Plaintiff with committing a violent assault. Plaintiff appeared for a disciplinary hearing before
the Adjustment Committee, which included Defendants John Doe #1 and John Does #2. Plaintiff
was offered a plea bargain of sorts: plead not guilty and, if convicted, lose one year of good time
credit and be transferred to Tamms Correctional Center, the “super max” prison; or plead guilty
and serve nine months in segregation, with no loss of good time credits. Feeling threatened and
coerced, Plaintiff pleaded guilty. Nevertheless, Plaintiff ended up losing nine months of good
time credit; additionally, Plaintiff was criminally charged in the Circuit Court of Johnson
County, Illinois with assault and battery.
According to the complaint, the criminal charges against Plaintiff were dropped after
Lieutenant Gressom, an Internal Affairs officer, testified and provided exculpatory evidence
previously unknown to Plaintiff. Nearby inmates had overheard the incident between Plaintiff
and his cellmate and corroborated Plaintiff’s version of events. After Plaintiff had served nine
months in segregation, the Administrative Review Board expunged his disciplinary conviction.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Officer Rickey Pearl, John Doe #1 and John Doe #2
denied him due process when they withheld the exculpatory evidence at the disciplinary hearing.
Plaintiff also asserts that he was denied his right to the equal protection of the laws.

Plaintiff

seeks compensatory, nominal and punitive damages from Defendants in their official and
individual capacities.

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Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se complaint into two counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.

The

designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
Count 1: Against Defendants Rickey Pearl, John Doe #1 and John Doe #2
for denying Plaintiff due process in connection with Plaintiff’s
November 15, 2011, disciplinary hearing, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and
Count 2: Against Defendants Rickey Pearl, John Doe #1 and John Doe #2
for denying Plaintiff the equal protection of the law in connection
with Plaintiff’s November 15, 2011, disciplinary hearing, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
DISCUSSION
1. Count 1 - Due Process
It has long been held that, before a disciplinary board revokes an inmate’s good time
credit, the inmate must receive due process, which includes advance written notice of the charge,
an opportunity to present testimony and other evidence at a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker, and a written explanation for the decision that is supported by “some evidence.” Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564–66 (1974). The provision of exculpatory evidence is an essential
part of that due process. In Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir.2011), the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained that the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), requiring that material exculpatory evidence be disclosed to a criminal defendant, applies
in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings. See also Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939
(7th Cir. 2007); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).
According to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. (1994), if a plaintiff's success in a civil rights
suit for damages would invalidate a conviction or sentence, the plaintiff must first have the

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conviction or sentence expunged. Id. at 486-87; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648
(1997) (holding that the Heck doctrine applies to civil rights suits challenging prison disciplinary
proceedings). Plaintiff indicates that his criminal charges and disciplinary conviction have all
been expunged; therefore, it appears that Heck does not stand as a bar to this action.
For these reasons, Count 1 shall proceed.
2. Count 2 - Equal Protection
Count 2 alleges that all three defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to the equal protection of the laws. As a general matter, a “prison administrative decision may
give rise to an equal protection claim only if the plaintiff can establish that ‘state officials had
purposefully and intentionally discriminated against him.’” Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d
408, 415 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987), citing Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d
1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982).
The gravamen of equal protection lies not in the fact of deprivation of a right but
in the invidious classification of persons aggrieved by the state’s action. A
plaintiff must demonstrate intentional or purposeful discrimination to show an
equal protection violation. Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that a
decision[-]maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and
selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse
effects on the identifiable group.
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1996), quoting Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091,
1104 (7th Cir. 1982).
There is also a second type of equal protection, a so-called “class-of-one” claim. The
Supreme Court has made clear that a class-of-one equal protection claim can succeed only if it is
pleaded and proven that (1) the plaintiff has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated, and (2) there is no rational basis for different treatment. Engquist v. Oregon

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Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564 (2000).
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is nothing more than a conclusory legal assertion. No
intentional discrimination or animus has been alleged. Therefore, at this time, Count 2 shall be
dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff may submit an amended complaint to present those

allegations, as outlined below. The amended complaint shall be subject to review pursuant to §
1915A. If the amended complaint still fails to state a claim, or if Plaintiff does not submit an
amended complaint, the dismissal of Count 2 shall become a dismissal with prejudice.
3. Relief Sought by Plaintiff
Plaintiff prays for monetary damages from Defendants in their official and individual
capacities. The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money
damages. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
prayer for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities shall be dismissed
from the action with prejudice. The prayer for damages against Defendants in their individual
capacities shall stand.
DISPOSITION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 2, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim, fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and is thus DISMISSED without prejudice.
Should Plaintiff wish to proceed on his equal protection claim in Count 2, Plaintiff shall file his
First Amended Complaint, stating any facts which may exist to support this claim, within 35
days of the entry of this order (on or before July 29, 2013). An amended complaint supersedes

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and replaces the original complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v.
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept
piecemeal amendments to the original complaint. Thus, the First Amended Complaint must
stand on its own, and in addition to Count 2, must contain the allegations in Count 1. Plaintiff
must also re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended
Complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint shall result in the dismissal of Count 2
becoming a dismissal with prejudice. In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended
complaint, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
At this time, only Count 1, Plaintiff’s due process claim, shall proceed. The Clerk of
Court shall prepare for Defendant RICKEY PEARL: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and
Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum
and Order to Defendant Pearl’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant
Pearl fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30
days from the date the form was sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal
service upon Pearl, and the Court will require Pearl to pay the full costs of formal service, to the
extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made upon Defendants JOHN DOE #1 and JOHN DOE #2 until
such time as Plaintiff has identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is his responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service
addresses for these individuals.
If Defendant Pearl can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the

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Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or
disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant(s) (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendant(s) or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant Pearl is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Donald G. Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis may have been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give

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security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 24, 2013
s/ G. Patrick Murphy
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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