Lyles v. St. Clair County

Filing 11

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lyles' motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 10 ) is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for determination. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Lyles&# 039; motion for waiver of the filing fee (Doc. 10 ) is DENIED; on or before October 16, 2013 petitioner Lyles shall pay the $5.00 filing fee, or the petition will be dismissed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall answer the petition or otherwise plead within thirty days of the date this order is entered. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 9/25/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
FREDERICKA LYLES, # R85115,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 13-cv-00493-DRH

SHERYL THOMPSON,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, Chief District Judge:
Petitioner Fredericka Lyles, currently incarcerated at Logan Correctional
Center, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to
challenge the constitutionality of her conviction and sentence in the Circuit Court
of St. Clair County, Illinois. 1 By Order dated June 18, 2013, her initial petition
was dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend (Doc. 8). She was also
denied pauper status and directed to pay the $5.00 filing fee (Doc. 6).

After a bit

of confusion, Lyles’ amended petition is now before the Court (Doc. 9).

Also

before the Court is Lyles’ motion for recruitment of counsel and waiver of the
filing fee (Doc. 10).

1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d), the Southern District of Illinois (in which the court of
conviction is located) and the Central District of Illinois (where petitioner and her custodian are
located) have concurrent jurisdiction.

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Preliminary Review of the Petition
In February 2008, Fredericka Lyles was convicted by a jury of committing a
drug-induced

homicide,

for

which

she

was

sentenced

to

25

years

of

imprisonment; she was also convicted of delivering a controlled substance, for
which she received a consecutive 6-year sentence.

It appears that her direct

appeal was unsuccessful, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied her petition for
leave to appeal. It is unclear whether she collaterally attacked her conviction.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review. Rule 4 of the
Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts provides that upon
preliminary consideration by the district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from
the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in
the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to
notify the petitioner.”
The Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) allows a
district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a). Rule 2(c)(2) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts requires that the facts supporting each ground for relief be stated
in the petition.

Therefore, something more than the usual notice pleading

standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is required. “A prime purpose
of Rule 2(c)’s demand that habeas petitioners plead with particularity is to assist

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the district court in determining whether the State should be ordered to ‘show
cause why the writ should not be granted.’ ” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655
(2005). Still, the Court is mindful that pro se habeas petitions must be construed
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Lloyd v. Van
Natta, 296 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2002).
Based on a very generous reading of the entire petition, and in
consideration of Lyles’ pro se status, the Court perceives that Lyles is asserting
three grounds for relief:
Ground 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel premised upon the errors
asserted in Grounds 2 and 3;
Ground 2: A denial of due process based on Lyles being found fit for
trial, despite an IQ below 75; and
Ground 3: A denial of due process caused by the trial judge when he
questioned a potential witness in the presence of the
jury.
Ground 1, regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, is not actually listed
in the petition as one of the grounds being pursued in the Section 2254 petition.
“Ground One” on the form petition is actually blank, yet questions regarding the
procedural posture of Ground One are addressed on the form (see Doc. 9, p. 12).
Ineffective assistance of counsel is listed multiple times as an argument that Lyles
pursued in the state courts, linked to her other two grounds (see Doc. 9, pp. 3-5).
Therefore, the Court attributes the omission of the ineffective assistance argument
to “scrivener’s err,” and will recognize ineffective assistance of counsel as a
ground for relief.

Page 3 of 5

Grounds 1, 2 and 3 satisfy the Rule 2(c)(2) pleading standard, and there is
insufficient information before the Court upon which to conclude that dismissal at
this preliminary stage pursuant to Rule 4 is appropriate. Therefore, respondent
Sheryl Thompson will be required to respond or otherwise plead.
Pending Motions
Insofar as Lyles has moved for recruitment of counsel a second time (Doc.
10), the motion will be referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for further
consideration consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).
Lyles offers no basis for her request that the $5.00 filing fee be waived. As
previously explained, based on the calculation prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b),
she has sufficient funds to pay the full fee. Therefore, that aspect of her motion is
denied. An additional 21 days shall be allotted for Lyles to submit the $5.00 filing
fee. Failure to pay the filing fee by the prescribed deadline will result in the
immediate dismissal of the petition.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lyles’ motion for recruitment of counsel
(Doc. 10) is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for determination.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Lyles’ motion for waiver of the filing fee
(Doc. 10) is DENIED; on or before October 16, 2013 petitioner Lyles shall pay the
$5.00 filing fee, or the petition will be dismissed. Payment of the $5.00 filing fee
shall be sent to: United States District Court, Clerk’s Office, 750 Missouri Avenue,
P.O. Box 249, East St. Louis, Illinois, 62201.

Page 4 of 5

At the time payment is made,

petitioner’s name and the case number assigned to this action shall be clearly
identified.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall answer the petition or
otherwise plead within thirty days of the date this order is entered. This
preliminary order to respond does not, of course, preclude the State from making
whatever waiver, exhaustion or timeliness it may wish to present. Service upon
the Illinois Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Bureau, 100 West Randolph, 12th
Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60601 shall constitute sufficient service.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this
cause is referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial
proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this entire matter be REFERRED to a
United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a
referral.
Petitioner is ADVISED of her continuing obligation to keep the Clerk (and
each opposing party) informed of any change in her whereabouts during the
pendency of this action. This notification shall be done in writing and not later
than seven days after a transfer or other change in address occurs.

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2013.09.25
15:16:31 -05'00'

IT IS SO ORDERED.
September 25, 2013

Chief Judge
United States District Court
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