Coleman v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 26

ORDER granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. The final order of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 7/9/2014. (jmt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KYLE R. COLEMAN,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

Civil No. 13-cv-524-CJP 1

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Kyle R. Coleman seeks
judicial review of the final agency decision denying in part his application for
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423.
Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for benefits in September, 2009, alleging disability beginning
on December 7, 2008.

(Tr. 18).

After holding an evidentiary hearing, ALJ

Michael Scurry issued a partially favorable decision on February 24, 2012. The
ALJ found that Mr. Coleman was not disabled from December 7, 2008, through
January 3, 2012, but he became disabled as of January 4, 2012. (Tr. 18-27).
The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision of the ALJ became the final
agency decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies have been exhausted and a
1

This case was referred to the undersigned for final disposition on consent of the parties, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 10.

1

timely complaint was filed in this Court. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment at Doc. 18.
Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following points:
1.

The ALJ failed to consider and evaluate important medical evidence.

2.

The ALJ’s credibility determination was erroneous.

3.

The ALJ erred in determining RFC.

4.

The ALJ erred in in not giving appropriate weight to the opinions of his
primary care physician, Dr. Altwal.
Applicable Legal Standards

To qualify for DIB or SSI, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of
the applicable statutes. 2 For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

2

The statutes and regulations pertaining to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) are found at 42
U.S.C. § 423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. The statutes and regulations pertaining to SSI are
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1382c, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416. As is relevant to this case, the
DIB and SSI statutes are identical. Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 detailing medical
considerations relevant to an SSI claim, relies on 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, the DIB regulations.
Most citations herein are to the DIB regulations out of convenience.

2

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(3).

“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing

significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered
conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the
listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the
evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If
an applicant can engage in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The
fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education,
and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in
other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not
disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination
of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of
the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the
claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of
performing any work within the economy, given his or her age, education and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 512-513
3

(7th Cir. 2009.
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes,” the claimant will automatically be
found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment, determined at step
three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at step three, and cannot
perform his or her past work (step four), the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
step five to show that the claimant can perform some other job. Rhoderick v.
Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Zurawski v. Halter,
245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (Under the five-step evaluation, an “affirmative
answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the
claimant is disabled…. If a claimant reaches step 5, the burden shifts to the ALJ to
establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national
economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision
is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. It is
important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must
determine not whether Mr. Coleman was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but
whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has defined “substantial evidence” as “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
4

Richardson v. Perales, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971).

In reviewing for

“substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into consideration,
but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of
credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater,
103 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997).

However, while judicial review is

deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010), and
cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Scurry followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He
determined that plaintiff had not worked since the alleged onset date. He found
that, before January 4, 2012, plaintiff had severe impairments of obesity, atrial
fibrillation, non-ischemic cardiomyopathy, sleep apnea, lung hyperinflation, and
right knee osteoarthritis.

As of January 4, 2012, he had the additional

impairment of disc herniation at L2-3, L3-4 and L4-5, which rendered him
disabled. He further determined that plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal
a listed impairment.
The ALJ found that, prior to January 4, 2012, Mr. Coleman had the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform work at the sedentary exertional level, with a
number of physical limitations. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the
ALJ found that plaintiff was not able to do his past relevant work.

He was,

however, not disabled because he was able to do other jobs which exist in
significant numbers in the local and national economies.
5

The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
is directed to the points raised by plaintiff and is confined to the relevant time
period.
1.

Agency Forms

Plaintiff was born in 1985, and was 23 years old on the alleged onset date.
He was insured for DIB through December 31, 2013.

(Tr. 191). In October,

2009, he was 6’8” tall and weighed 420 pounds. (Tr. 184). He alleged disability
due to morbid obesity, heart problems and high blood pressure. (Tr. 195).
Plaintiff worked in the past as a stacker and shipper in a magazine printing
facility, a sheet metal worker, a welder and a laborer. (Tr. 196). He has a high
school education. (Tr. 201).
Plaintiff submitted a Function Report in November, 2009, in which he stated
that he did very little on a regular basis. He mostly watched TV and rested. He
prepared meals for himself consisting of sandwiches, frozen food, fruits and cereal.
He did laundry and dishes for a few minutes. He was unable to do yard work
because it put stress on his heart. He alleged difficulty walking, climbing stairs,
lifting, squatting and completing tasks. (Tr. 207-214). In February, 2010, he
reported that he was becoming short of breath while dressing and was having
trouble losing weight, even with the help of a dietician. (Tr. 230). In April, 2010,
he reported that “just walking while grocery shopping” made him short of breath.
(Tr. 242).
6

2.

Evidentiary Hearing

Mr. Coleman was represented by an attorney at the evidentiary hearing on
January 6, 2012. (Tr. 35).
Plaintiff was 26 years old.

He was 6’8” and weighed 405 pounds.

He

weighed about 365 pounds before he started having heart trouble. In January,
2008, he started feeling short of breath and exhausted. He moved back in with his
mother in 2009, and was living with her at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 39-41).
He last worked as a wire welder in December, 2008. He started missing
work because of his heart problems, and his production was suffering, so he was
fired. (Tr. 46-47).
Mr. Coleman testified that he was unable to work because he was “always
exhausted.” Two days before the hearing, he started using a walker. He had been
having back pain for about a month.

He stretched a few days prior and felt

something pop. His right leg had been numb since then. (Tr. 54). He had atrial
fibrillation. A stress test showed that his heart was “beating at 30 percent of what
it should be.” He was taking medication to keep his blood pressure and heart rate
down, but he still had an irregular heartbeat.

He had two cardioversion

procedures, but it did not work. 3 He had been told that nothing else could be done
because he did not have insurance. (Tr. 56-58).
The ALJ asked plaintiff to describe his daily activities. He said that he spent
most of his time sleeping or sitting with his feet up. He did very little around the
3

Cardioversion is a procedure to “restore a fast or irregular heartbeat to a normal rhythm.” It can
be done using electrical shocks or medication. See, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/
health-topics/topics/crv/, accessed on July 7, 2014.

7

house except pick up his clothes and occasionally do a load of laundry.

(Tr.

61-63).
A vocational expert (VE) also testified. The ALJ asked the VE a hypothetical
question which comported with the ultimate RFC assessment, that is, a person of
plaintiff’s age and work history who was able to do work at the sedentary exertional
level, limited to only occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping,
crouching, kneeling, and crawling, with no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds.
He should have no exposure moving machinery or heights, and no concentrated
exposure to extreme temperatures or environmental irritants.

The VE testified

that this person could not do any of plaintiff’s past work, but there were other jobs
in the economy which he could do. Examples of such jobs are clerical addresser
and labeler, small product sorter, and telephone order clerk.
3.

(Tr. 67-69).

Medical Treatment

Mr. Coleman was admitted to the hospital through the emergency room in
January, 2008, for a rapid heart rate in the 170s. He was diagnosed with acute
atrial fibrillation with rapid ventricular response and mitral regurgitation.
Echocardiogram

showed

“normal

ventricular

function

of

61%

and

no

abnormalities.” Electrical cardioversion was unsuccessful. (Tr. 306-307).

In

February, 2008, a second unsuccessful attempt at electrical cardioversion was
made. (Tr. 387-388).
On March 11, 2008, Dr. Andrew Rudin of the Carle Physician’s Group noted
that cardioversion had again been unsuccessful, and plaintiff had symptomatic
recurrent persistent atrial fibrillation. He was placed on Digoxin and Metoprolol.
8

(Tr. 530). In November, 2008, another doctor at the same group saw plaintiff.
Cardiovascular exam was “irregularly irregular.” This doctor recommended that
plaintiff be admitted to the hospital try another cardioversion in an “attempt to
convert the patient to sinus rhythm and maintain him in sinus rhythm.” He also
recommended a sleep study as sleep apnea might be a “strong contributing factor”
to his atrial fibrillation. (Tr. 547). These procedures were not done at that time.
Plaintiff began seeing Dr. Shadi Altwal on July 22, 2009. He had been out of
medication for six months and had not been able to afford to see a doctor. Dr.
Atwal saw him regularly through at least January, 2012. Dr. Atwal repeatedly
noted irregular heart rhythm. (Tr. 560-575, 618, 630, 652, 657).
In August, 2009, plaintiff saw a dietician. He told her that he was trying to
walk more, did some yard work and helped friends with vehicle repairs. He was
“unable to exercise” as he became short of breath and his heart pounded. He set a
goal of walking at a comfortable pace for 20 to 30 minutes each day. He weighed
420 pounds. His BMI was 45.4, which she said indicated “extreme obesity.” (Tr.
425).
In September. 2009, plaintiff told Dr. Altwal that he had no chest pain, but
had increased fatigue.

He asked about another option to treat his atrial

fibrillation. He was referred to Dr. Charles Karpen, a cardiologist.
In September, 2009, an echocardiogram showed moderately decreased left
ventricle systolic function and left ventricular ejection fraction of 39%. (Tr. 421).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Karpen in October, 2009. He noted that plaintiff had been
scheduled for a repeat cardioversion, but he lost his insurance, and the procedure
9

was not done. Dr. Karpen reviewed the results of the recent echocardiogram,
noting that it showed mild to moderate left ventricular enlargement with global
hypokinesis and an ejection fraction of 39%. He said that plaintiff got short of
breath if he ran, but he had minimal shortness of breath otherwise. An ECG from
July, 2009, demonstrated atrial fibrillation.

Dr. Karpen thought he had a

tachycardia induced cardiomyopathy, but felt he needed further evaluation. He
was taking Digoxin and Coumadin, and his heart rate was adequately controlled.
Dr. Karpen “would not recommend trying to maintain normal sinus rhythm” as Mr.
Coleman was “severely obese.” Dr. Karpen also noted that he had a decreased
ejection fraction, and he would speak with plaintiff regarding an ACE inhibitor.
The doctor urged him to continue to try to lose weight. Further evaluation would
be put off until he obtained a medical card. (Tr. 415-418).
Dr. Karpen wrote a letter to Dr. Altwal, dated December 14, 2009, in which
he said that Mr. Coleman “called complaining of worsening palpitations and chest
pressure.”

He also reported increased shortness of breath.

The letter is

ambiguous as to whether Dr. Karpen saw Mr. Coleman in person thereafter, or just
spoke to him on the phone. There is no separate office note documenting a visit.
Mr. Coleman asked if there was anything more that could be done medically. Dr.
Karpen stated that, “When I saw Mr. Coleman he was on a reasonable dose of
beta-blocker and digoxin and his heart rate was well controlled.” He also stated
that his atrial fibrillation appeared under control. The doctor said that, “at this
time an electrophysiologist likely would not attempt a rhythm control strategy.”
Dr. Karpen again recommended that Mr. Coleman have a stress test and a sleep
10

study, but he did not have the money to pay for this. Dr. Karpen concluded that
his underlying problem was his “severe obesity” and stressed “the poor overall
prognosis with his weight at his young age.”

Mr. Coleman said he would “await

funding for further evaluation.” (Tr. 474). Dr. Karpen did not see plaintiff again
after this date.
In June, 2010, plaintiff complained to Dr. Altwal of occasional chest pain, not
related to exertion. He was having trouble sleeping and sometimes was awake all
night. (Tr. 568). He complained of fatigue in September, 2010, and Dr. Altwal
prescribed Ambien.

Although he was unable to afford Ambien, he reported

sleeping better at the next visit. He was taking his other medications as directed
and reported no chest pain or shortness of breath. (Tr. 570-571). In November,
2010, Mr. Coleman was feeling sad and depressed because he had been getting
worse over the years. He had shortness of breath at night with no coughing or
wheezing, and swelling in his legs. Dr. Altwal noted that he needed a stress test
and a sleep study, but could not afford them. He prescribed Wellbutrin. (Tr.
572).

Dr. Altwal changed his medication to Cymbalta in January 27, 2011,

because Wellbutrin had not helped his moods. (Tr. 573). In February, 2011,
plaintiff was again having chest pain, and agreed to undergo a stress test. (Tr.
574).
A stress test was done on February 22, 2011.

This showed atrial

fibrillation, left ventricular dilatation with right ventricular prominence and likely
severe reduction in overall systolic function, with no evidence of ischemia or
infarction.

Quantitation was “complicated by underlying arrhythmia.” Ejection
11

fraction was 33%. (Tr. 609).
Sleep studies done in May and June, 2011, showed that plaintiff had
obstructive sleep apnea which responded to CPAP.

Both studies also

demonstrated atrial fibrillation. (Tr. 621-622, 628-629).
In October, 2011, plaintiff reported to Dr. Altwal that he could not afford a
CPAP machine. His mood was stable with no psychotic features. He was taking
his medication as directed. He had lost twenty pounds. Mr. Coleman complained
of an increase in left-sided chest pain not related to exertion. Dr. Altwal noted that
a stress test had shown an ejection fraction of 30%. (Tr. 630).
Plaintiff went to the emergency room for back pain on January 4, 2012.
Cardiac monitoring showed atrial fibrillation. (Tr. 648).
4.

Dr. Altwal’s Opinions

Dr. Altwal filled out a form entitled “Residual Functional Capacity Report” in
November, 2011. The stated purpose of the form was to “determine the ability of
Kyle Coleman to do work-related activities on a day-to-day basis in a regular work
setting with the assumption that he is to engage in exertional activity no more
demanding than the sedentary work level defined by the Social Security
Regulations.” (Tr. 634, emphasis in original). The form went on to explain the
requirements of work at the sedentary exertional level.
Dr. Altwal indicated that he last saw plaintiff on October 7, 2011, and that his
diagnoses were morbid obesity, atrial fibrillation, sleep apnea, depression, low
back pain, degenerative disc disease, hypertension and cardiomyopathy.

For

objective findings, Dr. Atwal wrote “morbid obesity” and “irregular heart rate.” He
12

indicated that Mr. Coleman’s pain and fatigue would require him to take
unscheduled breaks totaling an hour. Further, he would miss about three days of
work a month because of his impairments or the need to seek medical treatment.
These limitations had been in effect since July, 2009. (Tr. 634-636).
Analysis
The Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held that although an ALJ does not need
to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ may not analyze only the
evidence supporting her ultimate conclusion while ignoring the evidence that
undermines it.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014). This
rule is long-standing. See, Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009),
and cases cited therein.
The ALJ’s discussion of the medical evidence in this case is remarkably brief
and omits reference to evidence favorable to the plaintiff.
ALJ Scurry concluded that the medical evidence does not support plaintiff’s
claim that he is unable to do even sedentary work.

He relied heavily on Dr.

Karpen’s records for this conclusion. Dr. Karpen saw Mr. Coleman on October 20,
2009, and wrote a four page letter to Dr. Altwal thereafter. The ALJ honed in on
two parts of letter. First, Mr. Coleman told Dr. Karpen that he had shortness of
breath if he ran, but not really otherwise, and he exercised regularly. Secondly,
according to the ALJ, Dr. Karpen “noted his heart appeared adequately controlled.”
The ALJ also referenced the statement in Dr. Karpen’s second letter to Dr. Altwal
that plaintiff’s atrial fibrillation was under good control. (Tr. 24).
The ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Karpen’s records is inadequate.
13

First, he

misquoted Dr. Karpen; the doctor wrote that Mr. Coleman’s “heart rate appears
adequately controlled” in October, 2009.

The ALJ erroneously said that Dr.

Karpen wrote that Mr. Coleman’s “heart appeared adequately controlled.” The
Commissioner suggests that this error is insignificant.
Footnote 2.

The Court disagrees.

See, Doc. 24, p. 6.

The error is indicative of the ALJ’s basic

misunderstanding of the medical evidence, a misunderstanding that may well be
shared by the Commissioner.
In his October, 2009, letter, Dr. Karpen pointed out that Mr. Coleman had
undergone two unsuccessful cardioversion procedures, and a third procedure had
been cancelled because he lost his insurance.
distinction between heart rate and rhythm.

Dr. Karpen’s letter drew a

While plaintiff’s heart rate was

controlled, Dr. Karpen said he “would not recommend trying to maintain normal
sinus rhythm.” (Tr. 418).

The ALJ appears not to have appreciated this

distinction.
With respect to Dr. Karpen’s second letter, the ALJ noted only that Dr.
Karpen wrote that plaintiff’s atrial fibrillation was under good control. (Tr. 24).
This is an unrealistically optimistic summary of the letter.

The ALJ failed to

acknowledge that Dr. Karpen’s second letter was prompted by Mr. Coleman’s
phone call complaining of worsening palpitations and chest pressure, along with
increased

shortness

of

breath.

Further,

Dr.

Karpen

said

that

electrophysiologist “likely would not attempt a rhythm control strategy.”

an
Dr.

Karpen again recommended further testing, which plaintiff could not afford. The
ALJ also failed to mention that Dr. Karpen said that the underlying problem was
14

plaintiff’s severe obesity, and warned that the overall prognosis was poor. (Tr.
474).
Dr. Karpen also noted that, a month earlier, an echocardiogram showed mild
to moderate left ventricular enlargement with global hypokinesis and ejection
fraction of 39%. The ALJ failed to mention this evidence at all. With regard to the
stress testing and perfusion studies in February, 2011, the ALJ said only that it
showed “atrial fibrillation but a low probably [sic] for ischemic heart disease.” (Tr.
24). In fact, that testing, performed over a two-day period, showed left ventricular
dilatation with right ventricular prominence and likely severe reduction in overall
systolic function, with no evidence of ischemia or infarction. Quantitation was
“complicated by underlying arrhythmia.” Ejection fraction was 33%. (Tr. 609).
The ALJ’s highly selective discussion of this evidence was error, and again suggests
that he did not fully understand its significance. The ALJ never mentioned the fact
that Mr. Coleman’s ejection fraction was reduced to 33%. Rather, he seemed to
believe that, as Mr. Coleman had a low probability for ischemic heart disease, he
did not have a serious heart condition.
The discussion of Dr. Altwal’s records was also highly selective. Although
Dr. Altwal saw plaintiff regularly from July, 2009, through January, 2012, the ALJ
referred to only one visit, on October 22, 2010. The ALJ highlighted plaintiff’s
statement that his sleeping was improved and he had no chest pain or shortness of
breath. (Tr. 24). This statement was taken out of context. In June, 2010, Mr.
Coleman told Dr. Altwal that he was having trouble sleeping and sometimes was
awake all night. On the next visit, in September, 2010, he reported insomnia,
15

increased fatigue, and fast heartbeat.

Dr. Altwal prescribed Ambien.

The

October, 2010, note that was highlighted by the ALJ says simply “didn’t get Ambien
(expensive) but sleeping better.” (Tr. 568-571). The ALJ failed to recognize the
context of that statement, i.e., that he had gone from sometimes being awake all
night to “sleeping better.” Further, Dr. Altwal’s note for that date indicates that he
found edema in the bilateral lower extremities, which was ignored by the ALJ. (Tr.
571).
The ALJ also failed to note that, on other visits, plaintiff complained to Dr.
Altwal of shortness of breath, palpitations, chest pain and fatigue. See, e.g., Tr.
560, 563, 563, 565, 566, 570, 625, 630, 570, 572, 574. Furthermore, Dr. Altwal
detected an irregular heart rhythm on multiple visits.

See, Tr. 560, 562-568,

570-575, 618, and 630.
The Commissioner’s defense of this case is perfunctory. She argues that the
evidence cited by plaintiff does not show that he has limitations more severe than
those assessed by the ALJ. Doc. 24, p. 6. This argument misses the mark. The
ALJ’s highly selective review of the medical evidence undermines his findings as to
plaintiff’s credibility, the weight he afforded to Dr. Altwal’s opinion, and his ultimate
findings as to plaintiff’s RFC. See, Moore, 743 F.3d at 1122-1127.

The ALJ is

not permitted to “cherry-pick” the evidence, ignoring the parts that conflict with his
conclusion.

Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009).

While he is

not required to mention every piece of evidence, “he must at least minimally discuss
a claimant's evidence that contradicts the Commissioner's position.” Godbey v.
Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000).
16

The Commissioner recognizes that the ALJ is “required to build a logical
bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusions.” Doc. 24, p. 6, citing Simila v.
Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 516 (7th Cir. 2009).

ALJ Scurry simply failed to do so

here. As in Moore, he erred in presenting only a “skewed version of the evidence.”
Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123. As a result, his decision is lacking in evidentiary
support and must be remanded. Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th
Cir. 2012).
The Court wishes to stress that this Memorandum and Order should not be
construed as an indication that the Court believes that Mr. Coleman was disabled
before January 4, 2012, or that he should be awarded benefits for the period in
question. On the contrary, the Court has not formed any opinions in that regard,
and leaves those issues to be determined by the Commissioner after further
proceedings. 4
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 18) is GRANTED.
The Commissioner’s final decision denying Kyle R. Coleman’s application for
social security disability benefits for the period from December 7, 2008, through
January 3, 2012, is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for
rehearing and reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. §405(g).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.

4

The Commissioner may wish to consider consulting a medical expert pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§404.1527(e).

17

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE:

July 9, 2014.

s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18