Grigsby v. Gaetz et al

Filing 10

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson, COUNTS 2, 3, 4, and 5 are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. DEFENDANTS GODINEZ and ALLEN are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. As to COUNT 1, The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants HAVERHALS, Jr. and GAETZ: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 8/23/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARNELL GRIGSBY, # B34441,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD GAETZ,
R. HAVERHALS, Jr.,
GINA ALLEN,
and S. A. GODINEZ,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-579-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”), brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is
serving a 25-year sentence for three counts of aggravated kidnapping. His claims arose during
his incarceration in Pinckneyville.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by cancelling his religious holiday diet (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks
declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, as well as compensatory and punitive
damages (Doc. 1, pp. 10-12).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he is a practicing Sunni Muslim, who faithfully
participates in Islamic religious activities (Doc. 1, pp. 7, 15).

During the holy month of

Ramadan, Plaintiff, along with other Muslims worldwide, fasts between sunset and sundown for
thirty consecutive days.

In 2012, Ramadan began on July 20th and continued through

August 18th. Prior to its commencement, Plaintiff asked for delivery of a special religious diet,
referred to as a “Ramadan tray,” at 4 a.m. and 8 p.m. each day during the holy month.

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For the first twenty-two days of Ramadan, Plaintiff received two “Ramadan trays” daily.
Without warning on August 10th and 11th, Plaintiff did not receive an evening tray. Thereafter,
his Ramadan tray was cancelled. When Plaintiff asked why, he learned that his name had been
removed from the “Ramadan list” (Doc. 1, p. 7).
Plaintiff filed numerous grievances, all of which were denied (Doc. 1, p. 8). Among
those who denied Plaintiff’s grievances were Defendant Gaetz (Pinckneyville’s warden),
Defendant Allen (an Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) member), and Defendant Godinez
(Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) director). In response to his grievances, Plaintiff
was advised that Defendant Haverhals, Jr. removed his name from the list after receiving
complaints that Plaintiff was eating meals during regularly scheduled mealtimes (Doc. 1, p. 15).
Plaintiff submitted new requests for placement on the “Ramadan list” to Defendants
Haverhals, Jr. and Gaetz (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff informed both Defendants that prior to his
removal from the list, Plaintiff faithfully adhered to all rules and guidelines governing
participation in Ramadan (Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff explained that he had fasted faithfully for
twenty-two days.

Further, he wanted “the opportunity to continue his participation and

observance of the Holy practice and tradition of his sincerely held beliefs” (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Plaintiff received no response from either Defendant Haverhals, Jr. or Gaetz (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Plaintiff now raises a claim against Defendants for violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s complaint raises other potential claims, both statutory and
constitutional. Each of these claims will be addressed in this order.
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of
the complaint. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, if the prisoner has raised

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claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege: 1) that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) that the
deprivation was visited upon Plaintiff by a person acting under color of state law. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that
he has stated a First Amendment claim against Defendants Haverhals, Jr. and Gaetz for violation
of his freedom of religion (Count 1). Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed against
Defendants Haverhals, Jr. and Gaetz under Count 1.
However, Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable First Amendment claim against
Defendant Godinez or Allen. The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). There is no supervisory liability in a § 1983 action; thus to be
held individually liable, a defendant must be “‘personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right.’” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff has not alleged facts
which suggests that Defendant Godinez or Defendant Allen is “personally responsible for the
deprivation of a constitutional right.” Id. According to Plaintiff’s complaint and exhibits,
Defendant Godinez’s involvement in this matter is limited to reviewing and approving an ARB
response to Plaintiff’s grievances.

Defendant Allen’s involvement is limited to processing

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Plaintiff’s grievances.

Neither Defendant’s involvement rises to the level of personal

participation in a constitutional violation.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim under the First

Amendment against Defendants Godinez and Allen fails and is dismissed with prejudice.
In addition, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against
Defendants Allen or Godinez—or anyone else—for failing to investigate Plaintiff’s grievances
(Count 2). Prison grievance procedures are not constitutionally mandated and thus do not
implicate the Due Process Clause per se. The alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons
who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772
n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81
F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). As set forth above, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants
Allen or Godinez participated in the underlying conduct at issue.

Plaintiff’s claim fails.

Accordingly, Count 2 shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s other potential constitutional claims, including an equal protection claim
(Count 3) and conditions of confinement claim (Count 4), warrant little discussion. Plaintiff has
not explicitly raised these claims. Even if he had done so, both claims involve the same set of
facts implicated in Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. The equal protection and conditions of
confinement claims would therefore be redundant. See Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580 (7th Cir.
2005) (dismissing equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims based on the same
circumstances as free exercise claim because free exercise claim “gains nothing by attracting
additional constitutional labels”). The Court must analyze Plaintiff’s allegations under the most
“explicit source[s] of constitutional protection.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989);

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Conyers, 416 F.3d at 586. In this case, the salient claim is freedom of religion. Accordingly,
Counts 3-4 shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s potential claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) (Count 5), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., fails. Plaintiff’s complaint
does not mention a RLUIPA claim. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se, the
Court construes the complaint liberally to include this statutory claim. See Grayson v. Schuler,
666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2009)).
To state a claim under RLUIPA, Plaintiff must allege facts which tend to show that he seeks to
exercise his religious beliefs and that the challenged practice substantially burdens his exercise
of religion. Kroger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). Here,
RLUIPA is of no use to Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their
official and individual capacities. The former claim is barred by the state’s sovereign immunity.
See Grayson, 666 F.3d at 451 (citing Sossamon v. Texas, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-61
(2011); Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592 (7th Cir. 2011)). The latter claim also fails
because RLUIPA “does not create a cause of action against state employees in their personal
capacity.” Grayson, 666 F.3d at 451 (citing Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 886-89 (7th Cir.
2009)). While injunctive relief is authorized under RLUIPA, Plaintiff does not seek this relief.
Therefore, Count 5 shall be dismissed withprejudice.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further consideration.
Plaintiff has filed a motion for service of process at government expense (Doc. 4). The
motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Service shall be ordered below for

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Defendants Haverhals, Jr. and Gaetz. Service shall not be ordered for Defendants Allen or
Godinez.
Disposition
COUNTS 2, 3, 4, and 5 are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. DEFENDANTS GODINEZ and ALLEN are
DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
As to COUNT 1, The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants HAVERHALS, Jr.
and GAETZ: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms,
a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will
require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the
forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.

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Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on Plaintiff’s
Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

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independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 23, 2013
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G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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