Smotherman v. John Doe #1 et al

Filing 8

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint (Doc. 1 ) (including COUNTS 1, 2, and 3) is DISMISSED without prejudice. DEFENDANTS JOHN DOE #1, JOHN DOE #2, JANE DOE #1, and WEXFORD MEDICAL CENTER are DISMISSED without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED th at, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint, stating any facts which may exist to support a failure to protect, excessive force, and/or a deliberate indifference to medical need claim and naming the individual Defendants directly responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivations, within 35 days of the entry of this order. (Amended Pleadings due by 8/29/2013). Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 7/24/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SANCHEZ SMOTHERMAN #32202-044,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE #1, JANE DOE #1,
JOHN DOE #2, and
WEXFORD MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-00638-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Sanchez Smotherman, a former inmate in St. Clair County Jail, 1 brings
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that during his
incarceration at St. Clair County Jail, Defendants violated his constitutional rights by causing, or
allowing, him to sustain an injury during an assault. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
The Complaint
Plaintiff’s complaint consists of four allegations. First, Plaintiff alleges that “on
about June 23, 2012, C.O./Sheriff John Doe #1 was negligent in his job description [and]
violated [Plaintiff’s] rights, by noticing [his] injury, being informed verbally by [Plaintiff] of
[his] injury and still sending [Plaintiff] into/allowing [him] to stay in a place of danger” (Doc. 1,
p. 5). Second, the St. Clair County Jail “ignored video surveillance and did not respond to
situation in a timely manner.” Third, Wexford Medical Center and its employees denied Plaintiff
“appropriate medical attention and forced [him] to sleep on the floor with a broken jaw.”
Finally, John Doe #2 was responsible for Plaintiff’s injuries that occurred during an assault.
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Plaintiff lists his current address as the Federal Correctional Institution in Pekin, Illinois.
institution is located within the federal judicial district for the Central District of Illinois.

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This

Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold
review of the complaint. The factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The
Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, if the prisoner has raised claims that are
legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint
is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true,
see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so
sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).
Such is the case with Plaintiff’s complaint. He has not stated any claim. It is not
clear who Plaintiff is suing or why. The allegations in the complaint are so vague that the Court
must guess what claims Plaintiff is even attempting to assert. The Court and the defendants are
not obligated to do so.

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A.

Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to raise an Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendants for failing to protect him from an assault (Count 1), Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state
a claim for relief. In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the Supreme Court held that
“prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal citations omitted); see also Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889
(7th Cir. 2006). To succeed on a claim for failure to protect, Plaintiff must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and Defendants acted
with “deliberate indifference” to that danger. Id.; Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889.
Plaintiff must also prove that prison officials were aware of a specific, impending,
and substantial threat to his safety, often by showing that he complained to prison officials about
a specific threat to his safety. Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996). In other words,
Defendants had to know that there was a substantial risk that those who attacked Plaintiff would
do so, yet failed to take any action. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733-34 (7th Cir.
2001). However, conduct that amounts to negligence or inadvertence is not enough to state a
claim. Pinkston, 440 F.3d at 889 (discussing Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir.
1985)).
Plaintiff’s four allegations do not satisfy this standard. Plaintiff has provided no
details regarding the assault. It is not clear who perpetrated the assault. It is also unclear what
events gave rise to the assault or how prison officials responded to it. Plaintiff does not include
facts suggesting that prison officials had prior notice of a threat to Plaintiff’s safety. Given these
shortcomings, Plaintiff’s potential Eighth Amendment claim based on Defendants’ failure to
protect him shall be dismissed without prejudice.

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B.

Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff has also failed to articulate a colorable Eighth Amendment claim based

on the use of excessive force against him (Count 2). The intentional use of excessive force by
prison guards against an inmate without penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under § 1983. See Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). An inmate
must show that an assault occurred, and that “it was carried out ‘maliciously and sadistically’
rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.’” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at
37 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). Plaintiff’s complaint is so vague that the
Court is left to guess whether Plaintiff is even asserting that a prison official used any force
against him, failed to intervene in a prisoner assault, or otherwise. Without more, Plaintiff’s
potential Eight Amendment excessive force claim fails and shall be dismissed without prejudice.
C.

Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifferent to Medical Need Claim
Finally, Plaintiff’s potential Eight Amendment claim against Defendants for

deliberate indifference to his medical need (Count 3) fails. Prison officials violate the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct
demonstrates “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The standard set forth in Estelle includes both an objective and a
subjective component. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997).
To satisfy the objective component, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he is suffering
from an “objectively, sufficiently serious” medical condition. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal
quotations omitted); see also Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1999). As the
Seventh Circuit has made clear, “[a] ‘serious’ medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a

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physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1371.
Once Plaintiff satisfies the objective component of this test, he must still satisfy
the subjective prong of this inquiry by demonstrating that Defendants displayed deliberate
indifference to his medical condition.

Deliberate indifference is equivalent to reckless or

intentional conduct. Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2002). At a
minimum it requires that a prison official “be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and that the prison official actually drew the
inference. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837.
Plaintiff’s complaint mentions a broken jaw and the requirement that he sleep on
the floor. These allegations form no basis for an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. Accordingly, the claim shall be dismissed without
prejudice.
After fully considering the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court
concludes that the complaint fails to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be
granted, and shall be dismissed without prejudice. However, Plaintiff shall be allowed an
opportunity to submit an amended complaint, to present any factual allegations that may exist to
support Eighth Amendment claims for failure to protect, for excessive force, and/or for
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. If the amended complaint still fails to state a claim,
or if Plaintiff does not submit an amended complaint, the entire case shall be dismissed with
prejudice, and the dismissal shall count as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g).
complaint shall be subject to review pursuant to § 1915A.

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The amended

Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 2) shall be HELD IN
ABEYANCE pending receipt and review of an amended complaint.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint (Doc. 1) (including COUNTS 1,
2, and 3) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
DEFENDANTS JOHN DOE #1, JOHN DOE #2, JANE DOE #1, and
WEXFORD MEDICAL CENTER are DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case,
Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint, stating any facts which may exist to support a
failure to protect, excessive force, and/or a deliberate indifference to medical need claim and
naming the individual Defendants directly responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivations,
within 35 days of the entry of this order (on or before August 29, 2013). An amended complaint
supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See
Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court
will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint. Thus, the First Amended
Complaint must stand on its own, without reference to any other pleading. Should the First
Amended Complaint not conform to these requirements, it shall be stricken. Plaintiff must also
re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended Complaint.
Failure to file an amended complaint shall result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice.
Such dismissal shall count as one of Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

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No service shall be ordered on any Defendant until after the Court completes its
§ 1915A review of the First Amended Complaint.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or
give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into
a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the
Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to
plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 24, 2013

s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
U.S. District Judge

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