Young v. Eovaldi et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson, the Clerk is DIRECTED to rename Defendant Unknown Party 1 as John Doe #1 and rename Unknown Party 2 as John Doe #2, John Doe #3, John Doe #4, and John Doe #5. DEFENDANTS VEATH, SCOTT, and TINDALL are DISMISSED with prejudice from this action. COUNTS 4 and 5 are DISMISSED with prejudice and COUNT 6 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice . Should Plaintiff wish to proceed on the conditions of confinement claim in COUNT 3, he shall file his First Amended Complaint within 35 days of the entry of this order. In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk i s DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form. As to COUNTS 1, 2 and 3, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEFENDANT EOVALDI: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). (Amended Pleadings due by 9/27/2013). Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 8/23/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHRISTOPHER E. YOUNG, #N-00345,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SGT. EOVALDI, LT. VEATH,
NINHT SCOTT, DAVID TINDALL,
JOHN DOES #1–5,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 13-702-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Christopher Young, an inmate currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional
Center (“Pontiac”), brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is
serving a 12-year sentence and an 11-year sentence for two aggravated criminal sexual assault
convictions. Plaintiff claims that while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with
adequate medical care. Plaintiff also asserts claims against Defendants for inhumane conditions
of confinement, excessive force, retaliation and violation of his due process rights. Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief, monetary damages, and a prison transfer.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to
filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any
portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
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may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s complaint focuses on an assault he experienced on March 24, 2012 and the
events leading up to it (Doc. 1, pp. 10-12).
According to Plaintiff, during intake after he arrived at Menard, an unnamed officer
warned Plaintiff not to try the “whiney bullshit” he tried at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff also alleges that during intake he suffered an adverse drug reaction. Id.
As a result, he was placed on crisis watch and assigned to Cell #506 in Menard’s North 2 Cell
House. Id. Plaintiff complained to several correctional officers about the conditions of Cell
#506 (Doc. 1, p. 8). According to Plaintiff, the walls and toilet were covered in fecal matter, the
cell and mattress smelled of urine, the mattress cover was missing, and hot water seeped from the
sink onto the cell floor (Doc. 1, pp. 7–8). Plaintiff asked a gallery correctional officer to move
him to a functioning cell, but his request was denied (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff also complained to a
duty sergeant who reminded Plaintiff that he had been warned not to cause problems when he
arrived at Menard. Id. Plaintiff told the sergeant that he considered his placement in the cell to
be retaliatory and to constitute “cruel and unusual treatment.” Id. The sergeant told Plaintiff to
shut up. Id. Plaintiff was subsequently denied access to his personal property and medication
“for a period of weeks” (Doc. 1, p. 8). This included his prescribed medication, asthma inhalers,
and a fan, which Plaintiff claims he needed because of his asthma. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that on March 16, 2012, a sergeant1 and a nurse came by his cell to
give Plaintiff his medications and his food tray (Doc. 1, p. 9). Because Plaintiff moved too slowly
1

Plaintiff alleges that this sergeant worked from 11:00-7:00 on March 16, 2012 (Doc. 1, p. 9).

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to his cell door to take his medication, he was denied a food tray. Id. The next morning Plaintiff
received a disciplinary ticket for the incident. Id. According to Plaintiff, the ticket contained a
false charge that Plaintiff had spat on the sergeant. Id.
At the hearing before Menard’s Adjustment Committee, Defendants Veath and Scott found
Plaintiff guilty of the violation. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendants Veath and Scott did not
consider any facts that Plaintiff tried to present or Plaintiff’s mental health status. Id. Plaintiff
was given a year of segregation, C-grade status, no visits, and no commissary (Doc. 1, p. 10). It
was also ordered that Plaintiff was to be transferred to Pontiac. Id.
Before Plaintiff was transferred to Pontiac, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Eovaldi, a
sergeant at Menard, and unknown lieutenant (John Doe #1), and four unknown correctional
officers (John Does #2–5) attacked him on March 24, 2012. Id. According to Plaintiff, while the
unknown lieutenant stood watch, Defendants Eovaldi and the four unknown correctional officers
entered Plaintiff’s cell, knocked him to the floor with a security shield, and assaulted him (Doc. 1,
p. 10). Plaintiff claims they beat, kicked, and punched Plaintiff in the head, face, and body. Id.
They dragged Plaintiff, cuffed and naked, to a secure location, kicking and smacking him along the
way. Id.

Plaintiff also claims that they stuck pens and other objects into Plaintiff’s eyes, ears,

nose, and throat. Id. According to Plaintiff, the attack lasted for at least twenty minutes. Id.
The Defendants then called a medical staff member to examine Plaintiff (Doc. 1, p. 11).
When Defendant Eovaldi stated that Plaintiff previously assaulted another staff member, the
medical staff member laughed and said that Plaintiff was free to return to his cell. Id. Plaintiff
now suffers from back and neck numbness, migraine headaches, hearing loss, bruises, cuts,
general pain, and emotional distress (Doc. 1, p. 12).

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Following the assault, Plaintiff was issued a second disciplinary ticket (Doc. 1, p. 11). At
the ARB hearing, Defendants Veath and Scott again found Plaintiff guilty. Id. Plaintiff claims
he was not given a fair hearing and denied due process. Id.
DISCUSSION
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds it convenient to divide the
complaint into six counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by the judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim for use of excessive force.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect Plaintiff.
Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim for inhumane conditions of confinement.
Count 4: First Amendment retaliation claim.
Count 5: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical
need.
Count 6: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
Count 1 – Excessive Force
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that he has a colorable Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim (Count 1) against Defendants Eovaldi and John Does #2–5 for
the assault on March 24, 2012. However, Plaintiff shall not be allowed to proceed on Count 1
against Defendants Veath, Scott, Tindall, and John Doe #1. According to the Seventh Circuit,
“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus
liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional
deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). The complaint sets forth no

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allegations suggesting that Defendants Veath, Scott, Tindall, or John Doe #1 were personally
involved in Plaintiff’s assault.

Defendants Veath and Scott are mentioned exclusively in

connection with Plaintiff’s hearings before the ARB. Defendant Tindall is not mentioned in the
body of the complaint at all. Finally, Defendant John Doe #1 stood by passively during the
assault, giving rise to a separate claim for failure to protect Plaintiff. For these reasons, Plaintiff
shall be allowed to proceed on Count 1 against Defendants Eovaldi and John Does #2–5.
Count 2 – Failure to Protect
The Court also finds that Plaintiff has a colorable failure to protect claim (Count 2) against
Defendant John Doe #1 for failing to intervene in Plaintiff’s assault. Plaintiff has not alleged that
any other defendant was personally involved in failing to protect him. Accordingly, Plaintiff
shall be allowed to proceed on Count 2 only against Defendant John Doe #1.
Count 3 – Conditions of Confinement
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a colorable
Eighth Amendment claim regarding the conditions of his confinement. Unsanitary conditions
similar to those described by the Plaintiff here have been found to state a claim under the Eighth
Amendment. See Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007); Jackson v. Duckworth,
955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989). However,
it appears to the Court that the individuals whom Plaintiff has alleged were aware of the conditions
and did nothing to remedy the situation—the gallery corrections officer and the duty sergeant—are
not listed as Defendants. It could also well be that the indivduals are named two of the nine
alleged Defendants, but it is not fair to the Court or the Defendants to have to guess which ones
Plaintiff is accusing.

As such, Count 3 shall be dismissed, but without prejudice. Plaintiff

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shall be given leave to correct this defect.
Count 4 – Retaliation
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that he has failed to state a
retaliation claim (Count 4) against any defendants.

Plaintiff mentions retaliation only in

connection with his placement in Cell #506. Plaintiff alleges that the duty sergeant told him to
shut up after he complained about his placement in Cell #506 and its conditions. Additionally, it
is not clear whether Plaintiff intended to bring a claim for retaliation related to his assault.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable claim for retaliation for either
incident. In the prison context, where an inmate alleges retaliation, it is not enough to simply state
the cause of action. The inmate must identify the reasons that retaliation has been taken, as well
as “the act or acts claimed to have constituted retaliation,” so as to put those charged with the
retaliation on notice of the claim(s). Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). The
inmate need not plead facts to establish the claim beyond doubt, but need only provide the bare
essentials of the claim, and in a claim for retaliation the reason for the retaliation and the acts taken
in an effort to retaliate suffice. Id. Plaintiff’s complaint satisfies neither requirement. He has
not set forth those acts which constitute retaliation or the reason for the retaliation. Likewise,
Plaintiff has not alleged that the duty sergeant assigned him to Cell #506 or that he was assaulted in
retaliation for exercising any protected right. As such, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails. Count 4
shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 5 – Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that he has failed to state an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim (Count 5) against any

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defendant. The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
To maintain a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he is suffering from an “objectively, sufficiently serious” medical condition, and
that prison officials “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet either prong of this test with respect to any of the
Defendants. Plaintiff’s complaint mentions no medical issues in connection with Defendants
Veath and Scott, and he fails to mention Defendant Tindall in the body of his complaint at all.
Further, although Defendants Eovaldi, John Doe #1, and John Does #2–5 were involved in other
Eighth Amendment violations, Plaintiff alleged that they immediately secured medical attention
for him following the assault. The complaint contains no allegations that Plaintiff subsequently
alerted Defendants to a serious medical need or that Defendants responded to these needs with
deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Count 5 shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Count 6 – Due Process
Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim (Count 6) against Defendants Veath and
Scott, or any other defendant for that matter. Prison disciplinary hearings satisfy procedural due
process requirements where an inmate is provided advance written notice of the charge, an
opportunity to present testimony and other evidence at a hearing before an impartial
decision-maker, and a written explanation for the decision that is supported by “some evidence.”
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564–66 (1974).

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In the complaint, Plaintiff does not include sufficient facts to suggest that any violation of
his right to due process occurred. His allegations are simply too vague to form an arguable basis
for this claim. Although Plaintiff’s due process claim in this § 1983 action shall be dismissed, it is
worth emphasizing that a loss of good conduct credit does implicate a liberty interest because such
a loss potentially affects the length of Plaintiff’s sentence. However, Plaintiff cannot challenge
the loss of good conduct credit through a § 1983 action until the prison disciplinary decision has
otherwise been invalidated, for example by expungement, a state court order, or a writ of habeas
corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). The complaint does not suggest that
Plaintiff has had the disciplinary decision invalidated. Therefore, he must first seek return of his
good time through state remedies and/or via a federal habeas corpus action before he can state a §
1983 claim on these allegations. Accordingly, Count 6 shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Defendant Tindall
Finally, Defendant Tindall shall be dismissed from the action, because Plaintiff failed to
include any allegations against him in the body of the complaint. Plaintiffs are required to
associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that defendants are put on notice of the
claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not
included a defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately
put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. Furthermore,
merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that
individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Defendant
Tindall will be dismissed from this action with prejudice.

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Discovering the Names of the Menard Correctional Staff Defendants
It is impossible to pursue a claim against unidentified defendants. See K.F.P. v. Dane
County, 110 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim requires identification of the culprits because the claim fails “[w]ithout minds to examine”).
Thus, Plaintiff must discover the names of the unknown Menard correctional officer defendants, in
order to pursue his claims against them. Plaintiff has been allowed to proceed against Defendant
Eovaldi, who is a Menard correctional officer. Defendant Eovaldi shall be served with a copy of
this complaint. Plaintiff can seek to identify the unknown Menard correctional officer defendants
through discovery. Once Plaintiff discovers the names of Defendants John Does #1–5, he must
amend his complaint to include the actual names of the currently unknown defendants, and all
defendants will be served with the summons and amended complaint.
DISPOSITION
The Clerk is DIRECTED to rename Defendant “Unknown Party 1” as “John Doe #1” and
rename “Unknown Party 2” as “John Doe #2,” “John Doe #3,” “John Doe #4,” and “John Doe #5.”
DEFENDANTS VEATH, SCOTT, and TINDALL are DISMISSED with prejudice
from this action.
COUNTS 4 and 5 are DISMISSED with prejudice and COUNT 6 is DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
COUNT 3 is DISMISSED without prejudice. Should Plaintiff wish to proceed on the
conditions of confinement claim in COUNT 3, he shall file his First Amended Complaint, stating
any facts which may exist to support his claim and naming the individual Defendant(s) directly
responsible for the alleged actions in Count 3, within 35 days of the entry of this order (on or

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before September 27, 2013).

An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original

complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am.,
354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the
original complaint. Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference
to any other pleading. Therefore, the amended complaint must include the allegations designated
above as Counts 1, 2, 3, which shall receive further consideration. However, it shall not include
any of the claims dismissed in Counts 4, 5, and 6 above. Should the First Amended Complaint
not conform to these requirements, it shall be stricken. Plaintiff must also re-file any exhibits he
wishes the Court to consider along with the First Amended Complaint. Failure to file an amended
complaint shall result in the dismissal of Count 3 becoming a dismissal with prejudice. In order to
assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a
blank civil rights complaint form.
As to COUNTS 1, 2 and 3, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEFENDANT
EOVALDI: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and
(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to
pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall

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furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the
Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on
which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Service shall not be made on the Unknown Party Defendants until such time as Plaintiff has
identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint. Plaintiff is ADVISED that it is
Plaintiff’s responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service addresses for these
individuals.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson for further pre-trial proceedings, including expedited
discovery aimed at identifying Defendants Unknown Parties #1-#3.
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
should all the parties consent to such a referral.

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If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that his
application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give security
for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a stipulation
that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay
therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff. Local Rule
3.1(c)(1).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court
and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently
investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a
transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in
the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 23, 2013
s/ G. Patrick Murphy
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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