Shatner v. Atchison et al
Filing
132
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 120 Motion in Limine; granting in part and denying in part 126 Motion in Limine. Deferring ruling on the Defendants' request to prohibit Plaintiff from offering evidence or testimony referencing I llinois Administrative Code and Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Directives regarding facility lockdown procedures. Plaintiff should be prepared to discuss at the final pretrial conference which IDOC regulations or administrative directives he would like to introduce at trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly on 11/16/17. (kos)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DARRIN SHATNER, B42950,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIKE ATCHISON and
RICHARD HARRINGTON,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:13-cv-00704-RJD
ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 126) and
Defendants’ Motion in Limine (Doc. 120). Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. 127) to Defendants’
motion and Defendants filed a response (Doc. 130) to Plaintiff’s motion. Defendants also filed a
reply to Plaintiff’s response. (Doc. 129). The motions in limine are hereby granted in part and
denied in part.
A. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine
Plaintiff’s motion in limine includes six subparts. Each will be addressed in turn.
a. Motion to Prohibit Reference to Mr. Shatner as “Inmate Shatner” or Similar
Names
Plaintiff moves to require that defense counsel address him as “Mr. Shatner” and not
“inmate” or “prisoner.” Plaintiff argues that referring to him as “inmate” or “prisoner” would be
unduly prejudicial. Defendants do not oppose this motion, “to the extent they are able to control
the testimony of their witnesses.”
Plaintiff’s motion is granted, Defendants shall make
reasonable efforts to avoid referring to Plaintiff as “inmate” or “prisoner.”
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b. Motion to Prohibit Evidence of Crimes for Which Mr. Shatner is
Incarcerated
Plaintiff moves to exclude any evidence or testimony regarding the nature of his criminal
offenses, including the length of his sentence. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion, arguing
that Shatner’s convictions are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) to attack his
credibility. Defendants also argue that they should be permitted to present evidence of Shatner’s
convictions and length of sentence to establish “the extent of their familiarity with him.”
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)(A) provides that evidence of a criminal conviction
(punishable by death or by imprisonment of more than one year) may be admitted for the
purposes of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness. This provision is subject to Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, which states “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”
The Court agrees with Shatner that the probative value of his criminal convictions is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. According to the Illinois Department
of Corrections Offender Search website,1 Shatner is serving a life sentence for armed robbery,
arson and murder. This lawsuit concerns medical treatment (or lack thereof) Shatner received
while at Menard Correctional Center. Plaintiff’s motion in limine is therefore granted in part and
denied in part. Defendants may introduce evidence that Shatner has been convicted of a felony
and is incarcerated with the Illinois Department of Corrections for an extended period of time.
Defendants may also introduce evidence of the length of time he has already spent at Menard
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Illinois Department of Corrections Offender Search website,
https://www.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx (last accessed November 13, 2017).
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Correctional Center. Defendants shall not introduce evidence identifying the specific crimes for
which he is incarcerated.
c. Motion to Prohibit Evidence of Others’ Crimes
Shatner seeks to exclude evidence of third party witnesses’ arrests and conviction
records. Shatner argues that the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of prejudice. Defendants oppose Shatner’s motion, arguing that they should be
allowed “to present evidence of arrests and conviction records involving felonies or admissions
of dishonesty or untruthfulness to impeach witness credibility.”
Shatner’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants may introduce
evidence that the third party inmate witnesses have been convicted of a felony and are
incarcerated with the Illinois Department of Corrections for an extended period of time.
Defendants shall not introduce evidence identifying the specific crimes for which the third party
witnesses are incarcerated.
d. Motion to Prohibit Evidence of Other Civil Litigation
Shatner moves to bar Defendants from introducing evidence of other litigation he has
filed.
Shatner has filed other prisoner civil rights lawsuits against Illinois Department of
Corrections employees, including Shatner v. Atchison et al., Case No. 3:13-cv-00599-NJR-RJD
(S.D. Ill.), currently pending in this District Court. Shatner argues that his other lawsuits have
little, if any, probative value and that it would be unfairly prejudicial if Defendants were
permitted to introduce such evidence. Defendants object to Shatner’s motion. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff may have knowingly filed fabricated or falsely obtained statements in the above
mentioned case, and possibly this matter. Additionally, Defendants argue that they should be
allowed “to present evidence of Plaintiff’s other lawsuits where the defendants prevailed for lack
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of personal knowledge or involvement, to show that Plaintiff recognizes when liability will not
attach to a prison official.” However, Defendants note, “[u]ltimately, though, evidence of other
lawsuits involving either Plaintiff or Defendants is irrelevant and should be summarily barred.”
The Court agrees that Shatner’s litigation history is of little relevance to this lawsuit.
Moreover, the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice and the strong likelihood that it would waste time and mislead the jury. His
motion shall therefore be granted.
e. Motion to Prohibit Evidence of Mr. Shatner’s Religious Beliefs
Shatner states that prison employees have accused him of being a devil worshipper and a
Satanist due to his astrological beliefs and work with tarot cards. He therefore asks that the
Court prohibit evidence or argument regarding his religious beliefs.
In their response to
Shatner’s motion, Defendants state they “[m]ay present evidence or testimony regarding
Plaintiff’s religious beliefs, but only to establish the extent of their familiarity with him. Beyond
this limited purpose, Defendants do not oppose this motion and do not intend to offer such
evidence unless Plaintiff opens the door for it.”
Shatner’s motion to exclude evidence of his religious beliefs is hereby granted.
However, Defendants may mention his religious practices if such testimony or evidence is
necessary to provide context for showing Defendants’ familiarity with Shatner.
f. Motion to Wear Civilian Clothing
Shatner’s last motion in limine is a request that he be allowed to wear civilian clothing
and to be seated with counsel at trial. He also requests that he not be handcuffed during trial and
for the Court to “issue an order specifying appropriate locations for marshals or other security
personnel around him in the presence of the jury so as to avoid undue prejudice.” Defendants do
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not oppose Shatner’s request to wear civilian clothing, but they do oppose the entry of an order
specifying the placement of security personnel. Because they are dealing with a convicted felon,
Defendants ask that the correctional officers escorting Shatner be given discretion in regards to
security matters.
Shatner’s motion is hereby granted in part and denied in part. Shatner shall be permitted
to wear civilian clothing during the course of the trial. Security permitting, Shatner will also be
unhand-cuffed during the course of the trial and any leg shackles will be obstructed from the
view of the jury. However, Shatner’s request for an order setting forth the placement of security
personnel is denied. During the course of the trial, the Court will coordinate with the U.S.
Marshals, the Illinois Department of Corrections and Plaintiff’s counsel to set forth a suitable
arrangement.
B.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine
Defendants’ motion in limine also includes six subparts. Each will be addressed in turn.
a. The Court should prohibit Plaintiff from offering evidence or testimony, or
otherwise suggesting, that the State of Illinois may indemnify Defendants
Pursuant to the Illinois State Employee Indemnification Act, 5 ILCS 350/0.01 et seq., the
Defendants are indemnified for any damages, attorney’s fees and costs awarded to Plaintiff in
this matter. The Defendants seek to preclude Shatner from offering evidence or otherwise
suggesting that they are indemnified by the State of Illinois.
Shatner “agrees that such
information is generally improper,” but would like to reserve the right “to introduce this
evidence should Defendants open the door.”
The Seventh Circuit has observed that evidence of indemnification, insurance, or other
payments received from collateral sources is generally inadmissible on the subject of damages.
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Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 379 (7th Cir. 1998). Defendants’ motion shall therefore be
granted.
However, if Defendants “open the door” on the indemnification issue through
testimony as to their financial situation, or that an adverse judgment would impose a financial
hardship, Plaintiff may introduce evidence that the State of Illinois has indemnified the
Defendants.
b. The Court should prohibit Plaintiff from offering evidence or testimony of
other lawsuits involving any of the Defendants
Defendants seek to exclude evidence of other lawsuits filed against them. Defendants
state that inmates are particularly litigious and that the danger of unfair prejudice, misleading the
jury and confusing the issues far outweighs the probative value of introducing such evidence.
Shatner opposes Defendants’ motion. Shatner argues evidence of other lawsuits “tends to prove,
or supports the assertion, that [Defendants] had the requisite state of mind to consciously
disregard Plaintiff’s health.” In other words, Shatner asserts that Defendants’ other lawsuits are
not being used as Rule 404(b) character evidence, but “to show Defendants’ state of mind, intent,
and absence of mistake or accident[.]” Because the Defendants have been accused of deliberate
indifference in the past, Shatner argues that “they are or should be on notice as to what type of
serious medical needs might or might not result in litigation.”
Although evidence of prior lawsuits may be slightly probative as to whether Defendants
were on notice of deficiencies in health care services at Menard Correctional Center, the value of
such evidence is vastly outweighed by the danger that it would mislead or confuse the jury. If
evidence of the Defendants’ other litigation would be introduced, the Defendants would be
afforded an opportunity to respond. This would create a “trial within a trial” situation where the
parties would be arguing the merits of other Menard Correctional Center prisoner civil rights
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cases. Moreover, jurors may construe Defendants’ litigation history as evidence that Defendants
have a tendency to violate prisoners’ constitutional rights.
Alternatively, jurors may view
Defendants’ lengthy litigation history as evidence that prisoners are overly litigious. Either way,
jurors would likely construe Defendants’ litigation history as character evidence, thereby running
afoul of Rule 404. As such, Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence of other lawsuits
is granted. Shatner shall be prohibited from introducing evidence of other lawsuits involving the
Defendants.
c. The Court should prohibit Plaintiff from offering evidence or testimony of
any misconduct, reprimand, or grievance issued against any of the
Defendants
Defendants move the Court to prohibit reference “to any previous misconduct, or
inquiries regarding, reprimands received by Defendants or grievances filed against Defendants as
irrelevant.” In Shatner’s response to Defendants’ motion, he states that the only evidence of
Defendants’ previous misconduct that arose in the discovery process is that Defendant
Harrington once had an expired driver’s license. Shatner also states that he opposes Defendants’
motion, but it is not clear which evidence of misconduct he would like to present.
Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. Shatner may introduce any
IDOC prisoner grievances he submitted against the Defendants. However, any reports drafted by
IDOC officials detailing Defendants’ misconduct shall be excluded. If any official reports of
misconduct exist against the Defendants that specifically pertain to the issues in this lawsuit, the
Court will consider reexamining the issue.
d. The Court should prohibit Plaintiff from offering evidence or testimony
referencing any “Golden Rule” appeal
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A “golden rule” argument is “one which the jury is asked to put itself in the plaintiff's
position[.]” Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1246 (7th Cir. 1982).
Courts have consistently held that golden rule arguments are improper because they ask jurors to
“depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather
than on the evidence.” Id. (quoting Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir.
1978)). Examples of golden rule arguments include:
(1) to ask jurors how much the loss of the use of their legs would mean to them, Leathers
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 546 F.2d 1083, 1085–86 (4th Cir.1976); (2) to tell jurors “do unto
others as you would have them do unto you,” Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d
53, 54 (7th Cir.1959); or (3) to tell jurors, in a reverse golden rule argument, “I don't want
to ask you to place yourself in [the plaintiff's] position,” Loose v. Offshore Navigation,
Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir.1982).
Caudle v. D.C., 707 F.3d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Because such arguments are improper,
Defendants’ motion in limine prohibiting Plaintiff referencing any golden rule argument shall be
granted.
e. The Court should prohibit Plaintiff from offering evidence or testimony
referencing Illinois Administrative Code and Illinois Department of
Corrections
Administrative
Directives
regarding
facility
lockdown
procedures
Defendants seek to exclude IDOC regulations and IDOC Administrative Directives
regarding prison lockdown procedures. Defendants argue that state law (including state agency
regulations and procedures) does not set forth the applicable standards for determining whether a
constitutional violation occurred, therefore, introducing such evidence at trial would be unfairly
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prejudicial and only serve to confuse the jury. Shatner opposes Defendants’ motion, arguing that
the IDOC lockdown regulations and directives will instruct the jurors as to how prison
lockdowns affect inmates. Shatner notes that any confusion regarding the difference between
constitutional standards and administrative policies will be remedied by the jury instructions,
specifically Seventh Circuit Civil Pattern Instruction 7.04. Additionally, Shatner argues that the
cases Defendants cite in support of their motion are all excessive force cases. In excessive force
lawsuits, there is a stronger possibility of confusion where there may be differing standards when
comparing agency policies and constitutional law as to the reasonable use of force. Here,
Shatner states that his is an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
case, and that the IDOC regulations and administrative policies that he would like to introduce at
trial pertain to lockdown procedures. As such, any confusion among the jurors should be
minimal.
The Court will defer ruling on this motion. At the final pretrial conference, parties
should be prepared to discuss this issue. Shatner should be also prepared to discuss which IDOC
regulations and administrative directives he would like to introduce at trial.
f. The Court should prohibit Plaintiff and his witnesses from testifying at trial
regarding the diagnosis of medical or mental health conditions or necessity of
any course of treatment
Defendants argue that that Shatner is not a medical professional and that “any
uninformed opinions or lay accounts proffered by [Plaintiff] regarding the diagnosis of medical
conditions or necessity for a specific course of treatment should be barred.” Shatner argues that
Defendants’ motion is overbroad and that he should be permitted to testify as to his own
perceptions as to his physical and mental health.
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Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff and his witnesses may
testify as to their own personal experiences and observations, but Plaintiff and his witnesses shall
be prohibited from testifying as to the causation of any specific medical diagnosis. See Gil v.
Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (“no expert testimony is needed when the symptoms
exhibited by the plaintiff are not beyond a layperson's grasp”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 16, 2017.
s/ Reona J. Daly
REONA J. DALY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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